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Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J. demanded much of himself, and 
was often heard to say "one who is not willing to put himself out 
for others just has not in himself the making of a man." In his daily 
life, Father Dempsey fulfilled his own standards without reserve. 
His was a lifelong consuming desire to draw all to the praise, 
reverence and service of God, especially through academic 
endeavors, and by this means to prepare mankind for the King­
dom of God. 
Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., an established authority on 
socio-economics, published in his lifetime 52 articles in maga­
zines and journals. He is the author of several important books 
including Interest and Usury; The Functional Economy; and The 
Frontier Wage. In addition he co-authored such books as Reor­
ganization of the Social Economy; Planned Society, and Big 
Business Methods for the Small Business. 
Father Dempsey had a distinguished teaching career in­
cluding Professor of Economics at St. Louis University and later 
Marquette University. Bernard Dempsey, S.J. held a Ph.D. 
degree from Harvard University and an honorary doctorate from 
St. Louis University. In addition he has been a University Fellow 
at Harvard, a lecturer in economics at the University of New 
Delhi, President of the Catholic Economic Association, and 
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At the time of his death ( 1960), Father Dempsey was 
Director of the Department of Economics at Marquette Univer­
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A study of B. w. Dempsey's contributions to the 
socio-economic field seems varied and great. Certainly, 
the thousands of interviews and letters, often to 
prominent men, in themselves deserve to be recognized as 
an outstanding contribution in the field of social 
endeavor. His sound advice, his counsel, and his 
academic direction were eagerly sought for and just as 
freely given, though often, unbeknown to others, at a 
terrible toll on his physical powers. He demanded much 
from himself and frequently was heard to say: "ONE WHO 
IS NOT WILLING TO 'PUT HIMSELF OUT' FOR OTHERS JUST HAS 
NOT IN HIMSELF THE MAKINGS OF A MAN. 11 
Our study necessarily confines us to a study of his 
scholarly contributions in the field of socio-economic 
ideas. Four main categories of endeavor strongly suggest 
themselves: his own framework of socio-economic thought; 
his doctrine on just price; his recognized contribution 
in the field of interest and usury; and, lastly, his 
mature thought on just wage. Undoubtedly, his main 
contribution in the field of socio-economic thought lies 
in these spheres. 
In a study of B. w. Dempsey's writings, some are 
puzzled not by what he says, but by what he does not say. 
It is important to remember that in his writings he 
assumed much Scholastic tradition and made the thought of 
Joseph __ Schumpeter and to a lesser degree that of Heinrich 
von ThUnen his own. This is true to such a degree that 
to fully understand B. w. Dempsey one would be wise to 
treat the Theory of Economic Development by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter as part of B. w. Dempsey's basic economic 
thinking. In his own writings he saw no need to repeat 
the ideas contained within this book that were already so 
well-said and that he so firmly held himself. His 
thinking owes most to these three: st. Ttomas Aquinas, 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, and Heinrich von ThUnen. 
To facilitate accurate and expeditious indication of 
footnotes, references to each of B. w. Dempsey's three 
most important works will be abbreviated by means of a 
single letter: The Functional Economy -- [F]; Interest 
and Usury -- [IJ; and The Frontier Wage -- [WJ. 

INTRODUCTION 
Task and Jlethod 
iii 
B. w. Dempsey directed nearly all of his extensive
writings on economic and social matters toward the 
solution of practical problems. Yet one would be 
mistaken to accuse him of being primarily interested 
merely in practical problems as such. Always the 
academic economic analyst and social philosopher, 
practical problems provided his keen analytical mind with 
the opportunity of seeing the principles embedded in 
them. He took a keen delight in sketching and bringing 
forth these principles, as the purpose of all his 
analysis and writings was the "necessity of and the means 
for improvement of the economic community, the great the 
challenge that lies in man's call for the restoration of 
social order, the historical development of man's moral 
attitude toward economics" [F,V], All of this analysis 
he endeavored to accomplish in the light of sound 
economic theory and traditional Scholastic philosophy. 
He set before himself the large task of "examining 
systematically the forces and facts present in every 
real, working economy" [ F, V] • His endeavor was the 
balanced approach, to "project the ideal situation, which 
intelligent adherence to the enlightened teachings of the 
Church and constant awareness of the lesson of history 
can achieve, against the background of historic and 
existing economic communities" (F, V]. To present the 
principles necessarily underlying any economic community 
because these were necessary for its long-run improvement 
was both the purpose of his life's endeavors and within 
must lie his contribution and his influence as well, 
The PUrpose of This study 
Hence, the chief purpose of this study is threefold: 
1. To investigate whether or not a common set of
unifying principles runs through B. w. Dempsey's
social and economic writings; and
2. whether or not within this framework of thought he
made certain outstanding recognized contributions
in socio-economic thought; and (if the answer is
affirmative)
iv 
3. to investigate further in what precise elements
(e. g., just price, interest and usury) these
contributions in thought and influence can be
claimed to exist.
It is hoped that in the search for a unique syn­
thesis and for the main contributions this study will 
also be able to make some evaluation of this synthesis 
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TBB LIFB AHD TIMES OF BElUtABD W. DEMPSEY, S.J. 
There are people who make a difference in this life. 
B.W. "Bud" Dempsey was one of them. 
B.W. Dempsey spent much of his active life dealing 
with those who "seek honors, reputation, and the credit 
of a great name upon earth." He strove to lead them to 
embrace the good. Whether it was Prime Minister Nehru, 
with whom he had frequent contact while in New Delhi 
(1951-1953), or then Vice-President Nixon, with whom he 
exchanged letters on social and economic matters, or a 
world authority in the field, Joseph Schumpeter, who 
thanked him publicly for his assistance, or some unknown 
college freshman, Father Dempsey gave of himself without 
reserve. His was a lifelong consuming desire to draw all 
to the praise, reverence and service of God, especially 
through economic endeavors, and by this means to prepare 
mankind for the kingdom of God. 
2. Early Life
Bernard William Dempsey, the youngest child of John
Michael and Caroline Welsh Dempsey, was born in Milwaukee 
on January 21, 1903, almost within sight of Gesu Church. 
He was baptized at Gesu, from which fifty-seven and one­
half years later he was buried. Only two years after his 
birth his father died as a result of exposure during a 
fire in the family furniture establishment. Mrs. Dempsey 
was forced to go to work. Hired by Marquette University, 
she began a lifetime connection for herself and for Bud 
and his two sisters. 
As soon as he was old enough, Bud augmented the 
family income by working after school hours. He entered 
the Old Marquette Academy in 1916, participating in many 
school activities. He was a talented student, president 
of his class, and an ambitious worker. In 1920 he 
enrolled in Marquette's School of Journalism with plans 
to enter the newspaper field. He already held the job of 
Assistant Circulation Manager for the local Milwaukee 
Sentinel. 
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3. At Marquette University (1920-1922)
In his freshman year, because of his mother• s
declining health, Bud was obliged to curtail his ex­
tracurricular activities at college to be free to help 
care for her. At the end of his sophomore year, his 
mother died. This same year (September 2, 1922) he 
entered the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). 
c. Early Jesuit Years
During his novitiate and his first year of juniorate
(third year as a Jesuit) B.W. Dempsey was plagued by ill 
health and defective eyesight gave him trouble. In later 
years, students would approvingly observe that his eyes 
gave him the look of a wise old owl. He had inherited, 
too, a tendency to chronic bronchitis, which forced him 
to spend long months in the infirmary. Throughout his 
life he had recurring chronic bouts with bronchitis. 
s. Jesuit Studies
The Jesuit juniorate is ordinarily the third and
fourth year of Jesuit studies, with emphasis on Latin, 
Greek, English, and modern languages. In the juniorate, 
in spite of poor health, B.W. was brilliant in his 
studies. After only one year, though, his juniorate 
studies were interrupted and due to poor health he spent 
the year teaching history at Regis College, Denver. 
Much improved after two years, Dempsey returned to 
St. Louis to take up his philosophical studies. With his 
keen.analytic mind, philosophy was a joy, yet it did not 
completely occupy his time. Appreciation of the need for 
scholars academically prepared in all fields, especially 
in the social sciences, brought about his request to go 
into economics. His superiors, realizing how brilliant he 
was both in languages and philosophy, were reluctant to 
grant this. With some misgivings, they allowed him to 
profit by the opportunity as a resident at a university 
and to 11 try 11 graduate studies in economics. None were 
ever sorry! 
Finished with philosophy and equipped with a 
master• s degree in economics, B. W. Dempsey spent the 
following two years teaching mainly history at the high 
school level. In later years, his excellent grasp of 
history made others think that his field was primarily 
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history, not economics. All of his life he concentrated 
on economic thought and historical development, following 
in the steps of his mentor, Joseph Schumpeter. Frequent 
discussions on historical topics with his life-long 
friend, the eminent historian Joseph Donnelly, s .J., 
sharpened his skills. After two years, steeped in the 
daily teaching of history, he moved on to theological 
studies. 
6. Theology (1932-36)
In 1932, B.W. Dempsey began his theological studies 
at st. Mary's College in Kansas. Here he revived old 
seminary friendships, while 11pushing 11 the need to study 
economics for an adequate response to social problems 
among his fellow theologians, especially Leo Brown, S.J. 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931) had come out the previous year, 
the 40th anniversary of Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (1891). 
This encyclical sparked renewed interest in economics and 
social justice among catholics throughout the world. 
Under the leadership of B.W. Dempsey a number of st. 
Mary's theologians, notably Leo Brown, became intensely 
interested in social justice and economic problems. 
While the seminarians seemed far from the firing 
line, they were quietly forming a nucleus of intellec­
tuals who were destined to make a real difference in 
American Catholic social teaching. A seminar group that 
included B.W. Dempsey, Leo Brown, and Thomas Divine began 
to research the economic teachings of the lesser-known 
but important early Jesuit scholars, such as Leonardus 
Lessius (1554-1623) and Luis de Molina (1535-1601). At 
the same time they formulated tenets to support a 
"Catholic" approach to problems of social justice. Among 
the first topics handled by this seminar nucleus were 
questions of a just price and interest and usury. 
The two encyclicals, the subsequent arrival of 
economics as a practical discipline, the rise of Keyne­
sian ideas for government intervention in economic 
planning, and the New Deal of President Franklin Roose­
velt encouraged the Catholic hierarchy to seek Catholic 
scholars for the social field. There were few Catholics 
trained in social thought, even at catholic universities. 
The superiors of the American Jesuits saw the need and 
decided it was time to train young Jesuit priests in 
social studies, aiming at the art/science of economic 
thinking. 
6 
During his four years of theology, B. W. Dempsey 
instituted a seminar among those theologians who were 
intereeted in studying the papal encyclicals and the 
Scholastic economists. Among other life-long advantages, 
B.W. Dempsey's seminar brought about an enduring friend­
ship with his colleague, Leo Brown, S.J., affectionately 
known as "Browny." out of this seminar, too, came 
Dempsey's book entitled Reorganization of Social Order, 
a badly needed commentary in English on the social 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno The encyclical was written 
in 1931; Father Dempsey published his commentary in 1936, 
the year he finished theology. 
Obviously, the st. Mary's nucleus was a likely group 
to make a start. As soon as B.W. Dempsey, Leo Brown, and 
Thomas Divine were ordained, all three began doctoral 
studies in economics. Thomas Divine (1900-1979) 1 went to 
the London School of Economics, while Leo Brown and B.W. 
Dempsey, arriving together at Harvard University, 
cemented a life-long close friendship. Whereas in the 
1930's the Church in America had been concerned primarily 
with social action, in the 1940 1 s, largely through these 
three professional priest economists, the Church sought 
and attained more solid research roots. The priest 
economists fostered understanding in the Church of the 
economic forces behind the socio-economic environment. 
The prestigious academic credentials of these Jesuit 
economists made �t more likely that the counsel of the 
Church would be heeded in seeking solutions to nationwide 
economic problems. 
To understand B.W.- Dempsey's early years (1922-1937) 
it must be remembered that the Society of Jesus as 
founded by St. Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556) made rigorous 
demands on its members' formation for the sake of later 
effective evangelization. The seminary life that B. w.
1Thomas Divine, s.J. after doctoral studies went to 
Marquette University where he remained for most of his 
life, first as Chairman of the Economics Department and 
Director of the Labor School, then as Dean of the College 
of Business Administration. He is the founder of the 
Catholic Economic Association and for many years edited 
their Review of social Economy. He welcomed B. W. 
Dempsey to Marquette in 1954, and as Dean he immediately 
appointed B. w. Dempsey to be Chairman of the Economics 
Department. 
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Dempsey led involved a strict regime of spiritual
exercises and study in an atmosphere of separation,
solitude, and silence. One major purpose of the disci­
pline was to bury self. What went on outside seminary
walls for a number of years, therefore, was not "real" to
B.W. Dempsey. On one occasion, with a chuckle, B.W.
Dempsey recalled how he mentioned to an acquaintance that
he has not kept up with events "since he left the world."
The amazed acquaintance asked him where in "heaven" he
thought he was at this moment!
His scholastic years coincided to a great extent
with the great depression years. In a real sense, though,
the great depression passed B.W. Dempsey by. For him it
was an historical event; academically, a business cycle,
not a personal experience. He had surprisingly little
sympathetic understanding of the scars resulting from
deprivations of this depressing period. His sole personal
contact with poverty was at his father's death, and this
he asserted was overcome by "a willingness to work." He
never fully appreciated that at the depth of the depres­
sion there were no jobs available.
His appreciation of events, situations, and even
principles was highly conditioned by his personal
experiences. For example, B.W. Dempsey went beyond
ordinary criticism of Keynesian theory and policy. To him
the whole Keynesian revolution was something foreign. He
was uncomfortable with it, for he had finished his
economic studies at the beginning of the Keynesian era,
and always felt that he had "escaped" its popular appeal
tentacles. In this regard, with obvious approval, e.w.
Dempsey quotes Schumpeter (History of Economic Analysis,
p. 121): "The much greater success of Keynes's General
Theory is not comparable" (to Chamberlin, Hicks and
Hayek' s theoretical books) says Schumpeter, "because
whatever its merit as a piece of analysis may be, there
cannot be any doubt that it owed its victorious career
primarily to the fact that its argument implemented some
of the strongest political preferences of a large number
of modern economists. Hayek's swam against the stream."
B. W. Dempsey points out that while their roots are
similar, the analytical works of Chamberlin, Hicks and
Hayek are superior (The Functional Economy, p. 15-16).
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7. ordination 1935
B.W. Dempsey was ordained in 1935 and celebrated his
first Solemn Mass, predictably, at Gesu Church in 
Milwaukee. By this time he was already well versed in 
several languages (Latin, Greek, French, German, and 
Spanish), possessed an excellent background in history 
and the social encyclicals, had done brilliant studies 
and had earned a master's degree in economics. 
a. At Harvard university
B.W. Dempsey was content to be assigned to special
studies in economics. He chose Harvard's Graduate School 
principally because of his high regard for Joseph 
Schumpeter, the famous Chairman of Harvard's Economics 
Department. He was also influenced by respect for his 
friend "Brawny" (Leo Brown, S.J.) who had already chosen 
Harvard. In later years, Bud admitted that a Harvard 
degree gave him added status, but always denied that his 
education in economic history or economics came from his 
Harvard years. "My previous studies at several Jesuit 
universities had already completed my real education." 
Perhaps with tongue in cheek, Father Dempsey liked to 
boast that he had not made a mistake in basic education, 
for example in English grammar, in over twenty years. No 
one dared to challenge him. 
During hi� three years at Harvard (1937-1940), he 
held a scholarship every year except the first. He soon 
became known at Harvard Graduate School as a scholar to 
be respected, a priest to be admired. On one occasion he 
challenged his history professor on certain facts and 
interpretations of Scholastic economic thought. As Joseph 
Donnelly tells it, "Needless to say, Bud won the fray and 
day. 11 His work at the school restored to respectability 
Catholic economists in the Scholastic tradition of 
Lessius, De Lugo, Molina, Christian Pesch, and others. 
t. Group Discussion and social Justice
In the 1930 1 s Harvard university's economics faculty
boasted some prominent names, Joseph Schumpeter ( economic 
development, 1883-1950), Edward Mason, Alvin Hansen, 
William Crum, Abbot Usher, and summer Slichter among 
them. All doctoral candidates participated in seminars, 
and B. w. Dempsey found himself in a circle of fellow 
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students who had already distinguished themselves in 
graduate economic research at other teaching universi­
ties. He soon became a leader in these discussions. 
Frequently the groups would meet for dinner and then 
adjourn to an empty classroom in the Harvard yard. The 
sessions would last several hours. Members of the group 
would take turns analyzing and discussing various 
propositions in economic theory. Dempsey was a leader in 
analysis; Leo Brown excelled in synthesis and practical 
affairs. 
Dempsey, with his deep interest in history (some 
claimed that he was first of all a historian, secondly an 
economist), would ground his material deep in history 
before developing some understanding of economic thought 
and development. To their mutual and enduring satisfac­
tion, B.W. Dempsey was assigned to Joseph Schumpeter as 
his doctoral advisor. It was the beginning of a lifetime 
of mutual respect and admiration. B,W. Dempsey looked to 
history as a foundation stone for economics. He insisted 
that no one could claim to be a real economist who was 
not versed in history and economic thought. Nor did he 
consider a historian complete or adequate without some 
accompanying knowledge of economics. 
The two Jesuit doctoral candidates made such an 
impression on both their teachers and their peers -- and 
it fanned out from there -- that never again did econo­
mics departments fear that Catholic priests had a basic 
bent for do-good-ism rather than scholarship. Further­
more, they soon discerned that Leo Brown had a vast 
practical knowledge much wider than that of rectory 
existence. B.W. Dempsey shocked his confreres in demon­
strating that Scholastic economists were for real and 
their thought was to be reckoned with. No longer in their 
minds did the old dichotomy between activists and 
researchers surface. The priest scholars had gained much 
respect. 
Throughout his entire life, B.W. Dempsey was quick 
to seize opportunities to practice social justice. He 
possessed both the virtue and practice of that Scholastic 
virtue of balance and fairness in economic thought. His 
own life defined social justice: a scientific habit of 
mind so that with ease and facility he could act together 
with a group (class/seminar/committee/bull-session) to 
arrive at a consensus that contributed economic ideas and 
thought to the group in question. As we shall see in the 
following paragraphs, he joined in seminars at Harvard, 
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"bull-sessions" at Harvard Square, and met regularly with 
a close-knit group at st. Louis University. Later, at 
Marquette University, B.W. Dempsey instituted a similar 
atmosphere of "bull-sessions. " Daily, he practiced 
social justice, as with ease and facility he joined with 
like-minded people to bring about a consensus of socio­
economic thought and fairness. He was convinced that 
nothing was more powerful than an idea shared. On more 
than one occasion he expressed the thought that these 
active discussions were more effective than passive 
classroom lectures. Besides possessing the philosophical 
habit of social justice, Dempsey was also a competent 
economist: in other words, he was capable of making 
scientific decisions given relative scarce resources with 
ease and facility -- he had high ability to "economize." 
There were other facets to Bud Dempsey and Leo 
"Browny's" lives besides Harvard. Both stayed at Jesuit 
Bobola House on Newbury street and benefited from daily 
contact during the whole period of studies. Another haunt 
of the two during their stay at Harvard was Wursthaus 
near Harvard Square. Here they would gather with class­
mates after seminar sessions, literally lingering over a 
single beer until after midnight. Bud would often lead 
the discussions: Browny would sum up at the discussion's 
end. The priests did not hesitate to bring other Catholic 
scholars into the discussions. Always the emphasis was on 
the scholarly, an objective approach to economic problems 
as a more effective way of finding solutions in the long 
run. In B.W. Dempsey's eyes a roman collar was not a sign 
of a do-gooder who displayed a sincere but disruptive 
influence by his ignorance of the facts of economic life 
and with his soap-box techniques, but the sign of a 
scholar. 
Discussion at st. Louis University 
Such discussions continued when he moved to st. 
Louis University. After dinner an inner circle of St. 
Louis administrators and faculty members including B.W. 
Dempsey and Leo Brown would meet at the Coronado Hotel 
near the university for a snack and discussion before 
bedtime. Just as at Harvard's Wursthaus, discussions at 
the Coronado covered various socio-economic subjects, as 
well as the future of business education. While this more 
homogenous group was in general philosophical agreement, 
means toward social goals were frequently in dispute. 
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B.W. Dempsey, a recognized expert in the field of 
monetary and fiscal policy since his publication of 
Interest and Usury, invited his many friends from the 
business community to the "Coronado discussions." B.W. 
Dempsey and Leo Brown were in demand as doctoral ad­
visors, influencing greatly the caliber of research among 
faculty and graduate students. 
B. w. Dempsey years at St. Louis University coincided 
with World War II. He had his work cut out for him, 
trying to keep the Commerce School from falling apart as 
a result of faculty manpower shortages and the reduction 
of student population of draft age. Yet, in 1951, B.W. 
Dempsey proudly announced the fact that there were seven 
Ph.D.'s to be awarded in economics for the year 1952. In 
this same year, B.W. Dempsey was also referred to as a 
"trade expert, 11 for he was the first President of the st. 
Louis Chapter of the American Marketing Association. This 
year, too, he left st. Louis University to head the 
Jesuit contingent which responded to a request by the 
Indian government to take over the faculty duties at 
Nirmola College at the University of New Delhi. Before he 
left st. Louis University, in appreciation of his years 
of work, B. W. Dempsey was awarded a Doctor of Law Honor is 
Causa. 
10. B.w. Dempsey•s Dissertation
B.W. Dempsey wrote his dissertation on the Church's 
teaching on interest and usury in order to demonstrate 
that the Church's position was not only valid, but also 
to demonstrate that modern economists did not understand 
it. The thesis, published as Interest and Usury, was 
reprinted in many foreign languages, including Japanese. 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, one of America's great analytic 
economists, went to great length in his monumental 
History of Economic Analysis to commend B.W. Dempsey for 
making it possible for economists of today to understand 
what the Scholastic economists were saying. (Cf. section 
III below on B.W. Dempsey's thought on interest and usury 
for treatment in greater depth.) 
A simple persistent error that would get a snort 
from B.W. Dempsey was the assertion by critics that the 
Church changed its mind on usury, that is, that in the 
middle ages the Church said interest and usury was wrong 
but in the modern day accepts interest as morally right. 
Such superficial critics forget that the economy in the 
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middle ages was static, without saving, lacking alterna­
tive opportunities for investment. Thus, interest was 
zero percent. Today, with saving and alternative opportu­
nities for investment, the Church, living in a modern 
dynamic economy of cost, recognizes a positive interest 
rate. The Church did not change its doctrine, but the 
economy moved from a static condition (zero interest) to 
a dynamic condition (positive interest). 
11. At st. Louis university (1940-1951)
At the end of his second year of teaching at St.
Louis University, B.W. Dempsey was appointed Regent 
(ambassador representing the administration) of the 
School of Commerce and Finance. Within a short time he 
was appointed consultor of the st. Louis University 
Jesuit Community and a Trustee of the University. From 
1943-1951, B.W. Dempsey was Chairman of the Department of 
Economics. This writer as a young Scholastic graduate 
studying economics met Father Dempsey for the first time 
in 1944. It was flattering to receive his attention and 
time and to be taken under his wing. From then on I 
regarded Father "Bud" Dempsey as my mentor. 
Tbree Professionals 
With commendable foresight the Missouri Province of 
the society of.Jesus (which included st. Louis, Marquet­
te, Creighton, Rockhurst, Regis, Loyola of Chicago, 
Detroit, and Xavier) began preparing talented Jesuits for 
solid careers in economics. These were the depression 
years of heightened interest in socio-economic problems. 
Unfortunately, a number of priests of good will but 
misplaced zeal had spoken out on the social problems in 
a do-good manner. Having no professional economic 
background, these men were given little credence. 
Suddenly, three priests -- Thomas Divine, S.J., Leo 
BroTA."ll, S. J. , and B. W. Dempsey, S. J. -- burst almost 
simultaneously on the scene with doctorates in economics. 
Needless to report, when it was realized that there 
were priests with credentials to backup an interest of a 
professional nature in socio-economic questions, they 
were eagerly sought after. B.W. Dempsey was in constant 
demand to conduct courses in many dioceses in the 
country. He began to give talks and write numerous 
articles, pouring into them his combined knowledge of 
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economics, philosophy, and theology. Soon his articles 
and his books brought him recognition as an economist of 
distinction. 
In late 1958 he gathered together these articles of 
current import into a book: The Functional Economy 
(Prentice Hall). In this book of articles a reader will 
look in vain for B.W. Dempsey's underlying grand scheme, 
synthesis, plan or model. His lifetime forte was analysis 
not synthesis. He, himself, claimed that underlying his 
book was an underlying theme: the basis (principles) for 
a functional (organic) economic organization. Often he 
would assume that his overall philosophical, theological, 
and economic foundations were clear to his listener. 
Then, again, perhaps he considered that his economic 
thought was sufficiently presented by Joseph Schumpeter 
and that his social, theological, and philosophical 
thought was well presented by St. Thomas Aquinas and the 
others (i.e.: Lessius, De Lugo, Molina, etc.). He tended 
to be frugal, sparing, even chary in repeating his 
thoughts! 
However, although Dempsey was busy giving talks, 
writing, and researching, he still sought personal 
contact with students, especially young Jesuits. He 
eagerly listened to them and would advise and counsel 
them. Always the teacher in any discussion, he insisted 
on the teacher-student relationship. The author of this 
biography recalls an occasion on which he carried on 
(too?) vigorously a discussion on Economics with Father 
Dempsey. Father turned and with a half-smile and asked a 
rhetorical question, "How old are you? You are not yet 
50! I never met a person who had the "habitus" (fully a 
scientific economist) before he was 50, so I suggest you 
be more quiet and listen carefully to your elders." It 
was good advice if I wished to retain the precarious 
relationship between teacher and student. The advice was 
given whimsically, objectively, and without rancor. I 
heeded it, and it helped me move forward as an economist 
to my fateful 50th year. He never assumed mannerisms or 
became unapproachable. If I had wished to terminate the 
teacher-student relationship (before I was 50), he would 
have accepted it. But the subsequent relationship would 
have been different. Before my 50th birthday I would have 
lost an excellent teacher! 
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Depth of Vision 
One example chosen from among many will suffice to 
demonstrate his breadth of vision. In 1950, when it was 
suggested that microfilm copies of a few medieval 
documents might be procured from the Vatican Library, 
Father Dempsey assumed the responsibility -- he never 
hesitated to seize responsibility for an endeavor -- of 
obtaining funds for the venture. With characteristic 
boldness, he obtained permission from Rome. Then he 
personally made the approach to the Knights of Columbus, 
convincing them to furnish the funds, and the project 
became a reality. 
Bxcellence of Jesuit B4ucation 
As an academic administrator, Father Dempsey 
wholeheartedly supported the Jesuit ideals and methods of 
conducting universities. What was useful in other 
academic institutions of repute he was willing to respect 
and even to adapt or modify for Jesuit use. He insisted 
that 11we11 need not slavishly copy others. "Four hundred 
years of Jesuit success should preclude this." Whenever 
the opportunity presented itself, he eagerly put forth 
the excellence of Catholic Jesuit education. When 
reminded that he, himself, had a prestigious doctorate 
from a non-J�suit university, he would reply that long 
before he went to Harvard he had a full education 
received from Jesuit Catholic "finishing" schools. He did 
appreciate the status the Harvard degree conferred upon 
him, but always showed a deep loyalty to Jesuit educa­
tion. He backed up his affirmation by being an assiduous 
student of Jesuit constitutions and history. Always the 
insightful historian, he had a more profound understand­
ing than most others of Jesuit objectives and methods. 
His closeness and many lengthy discussions with Joseph 
Donnelly, S.J., a foremost historian, added credence to 
his positions. 
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The catholic Economic Association (19,2) 2 
During this same period there was a lack of catholic 
participation in the activities of learned social science 
societies, particularly in the discipline of economics. 
This lack was attacked on another front. Thomas Divine, 
on his return to Marquette University with a Ph.D. from 
the London School of Economics, saw the immediate need 
for an association of catholic economists. He was joined 
in this endeavor by Bernard W. Dempsey, Leo Brown, and a 
number of others. Thus, in 1942, The Catholic Economic 
Association (CEA) was born, with T. A. Divine as its 
first president and the editor of its official publica­
tion, The Review of Social Economy. The organizing 
committee was in agreement that while economics is 
primarily a positive science, it is in large part also a 
normative science, and its main usefulness is as a means 
of promoting the (economic) common good and social 
justice. 
The Catholic Economic Association was founded to 
promote scientific discussion of economic problems, the 
solution of which requires a knowledge of both economic 
science and (Christian) social philosophy. Other objec­
tives were to evaluate in light of Christian moral 
principles the assumptions, methods, and objectives of 
economic science and to assist in the formation of 
practical programs for the application of Christian 
social principles. 
Many give T. A. Divine credit as being the founder 
of the Catholic Economic Association. He was somewhat 
reluctant to accept this honor but admitted that maybe he 
was the instigator or even the chief architect. He felt 
that all of those who attended the first meeting in New 
York City in 1941 could be considered co-founders, 
especially the members of the organizing committee formed 
at that first meeting. B.W. Dempsey, who attended the 
first meeting, stated in his usual decisive manner that 
"without doubt Tom Divine was the prime mover and truly 
the founder." 
T. A. Divine, together with some other members of 
the Catholic Sociological Society, was disappointed with 
2"The Origin of the Catholic Economic Association," 
Review of Social Science, vol. 2, No. 1 (1944), pp. 102-
103, by Thomas Devine, s. J. 
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the annual meetings that devoted a "paucity" of time to 
economic subjects. Therefore, he suggested to this 
disappointed group that they form a separate Catholic 
Economic Association. They agreed and suggested that 
Divine do something about. By the end of 1942, the CEA 
was formed; 136 persons accepted invitations to charter 
membership and 38 to student membership. Thomas Divine, 
S.J. was elected as the Association's first President in 
1942. 
The Catholic Economic Association decided to work in 
close cooperation with the American Economic Association 
and to hold joint meetings. In 1943, the official journal 
of CEA, The Review of Social Economy, was founded. In 
1948, the review became a semi-annual publication with T. 
A. Divine, S.J. as Editor-in-Chief, a position which he
held until 1959. on the 25th anniversary of CEA (1967)
Thomas Divine, the "founding father," was deservedly
awarded and honored.
12. Hirm.ola College (Nev Delhi)
In 1951, the General of the Jesuits directed the
Missouri Province to take over a college in New Delhi, 
India. Immediately, Father Dempsey came to mind. Con­
sidering his constant delicate health over the years, he 
was asked, not told, to "discern" whether he wished to 
go. Advised that his health was likely to suffer from the 
rigorous Indian climate, he still considered the request 
a mandate from Father General. With his usual calm 
demeanor, he therefore prepared to leave America, 
apparently forever. Promptly, he resigned from national 
committees and arranged for others to direct his graduate 
students. This detaching himself form his graduate 
students was difficult for him to do; he had become very 
close to them. Lastly, as was his wont, he was preparing 
a quiet departure, but his non-Jesuit friends would have 
it otherwise and a civic dinner was given in his honor. 
st. Louis University then bestowed on Bernard w. Dempsey, 
S.J. an honorary doctorate for over ten years of tremen­
dous scholarship, research, and superb teaching at the 
University. 
Preparing for Hirm.ola College 
With consummate foresight, Father Dempsey planned 
every possible phase of the new operation. He learned 
17 
everything he could about India, even beginning the study 
of Hindi. Once the Jesuits opened Nirmola College in New 
Delhi they found themselves almost from the start in a 
most difficult situation. There was deep unrest and 
agitation among both students and faculty. Dempsey also 
met constant resistance from Indian anti-religious and 
anti-American forces. The government remained suspicious 
and unbelieving of stated Jesuit motives. There was no 
willing acceptance of the Jesuit-approved double social 
purpose: to work for the renovation of Indian people and 
simultaneously to build a better Indian society, nor 
could the government believe or accept that the Jesuits' 
stated purpose of preparing people for the Kingdom of God 
was for real. 
Treasurer ot Hirmola College 
As treasurer of the College, B.W. Dempsey was 
obliged to find his way through the intricacies of 
India's legal system, her Department of Education, her 
customs barriers, and her governmental bureaus. In later 
years, he was reluctant to speak of the hostility and 
resistance met with in those years. Those who lived with 
him in India well knew the difficulties and were quick to 
express what a tower of strength he was during those 
problem years. 
work outside of Nirmola College 
Father Dempsey's work in India was not confined to 
Nirmola College alone. He drew up excellently-designed 
articles of incorporation for missions and dioceses which 
helped them in dealing with the Indian government. He 
made several survey trips at the request of the Indian 
government to appraise economic conditions in northern 
India. He combined a trip to Jerusalem with a visit back 
to the United States to approach American foundations on 
behalf of Nirmola. During his short stay in America, 
particularly in st. Louis, he had no word of complaint 
for the conditions in India, not did he mention his 
deteriorating health. His single purpose in America was 
to approach American foundations on behalf of the newly­
founded college, not to criticize and air the difficul­
ties encountered in Indian. 
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Health Deterioration 
The years in India severely tried Dempsey's health. 
His chronic bronchitis and ability to breathe worsened in 
the sometimes high New Delhi humidity. For some months he 
was bedridden with what was thought to have been a heart 
attack, but which was actually hepatitis complicated by 
amoebic dysentery. The fall of 1953 found B.W. back in 
st. Louis undergoing intensive medical care. In whimsical 
fashion, Bud wondered out loud whether the amoebae would 
devour his liver before the competitive "sulphur" cure 
did so. "At least I don't possess an American liver 
cirrhosis!" 
13. At Marquette university (1954-1959)
In the summer of 1954 Dempsey was assigned to
Marquette University. Given his delicate health he taught 
a light schedule that fall. With the drive, determina­
tion, and patience characteristic of the man, by the 
spring of 1955 Dempsey was much improved and literally 
ready to take on the whole world. This year he helped 
direct a seminar at Claremont College, California, and 
another at Harvard. In 1956 he was fully in the saddle 
and helped to plan projects for the Business Bureau of 
the Marquette University College of Business Administra­
tion and the City of the Milwaukee. 
Dempsey was. again Chairman of an Economics De­
partment, this time at Marquette University, a task he 
retained until his untimely death in 1960. With en­
couragement from higher University administration, 
Dempsey began to beef up, gearing the Economics Depart­
ment.for a possible doctoral program. A number of top­
notch economists gifted in research, teaching and 
recognized reputation were added to the economics 
faculty. He gathered a dozen or more students with 
doctoral potential to Marquette University. Some were 
guided and recommended to Marquette because of Dempsey's 
reputation. Several were guided to B.W. Dempsey by Joseph 
Schumpeter. Others Dempsey recruited personally. At his 
death, it was decided to retain a strong Master's Program 
in Economics, but not to begin a full doctoral program at 
that time. Obviously, the advent of the doctoral program 




During the summer of 1957, Dempsey's Jesuit province 
(now the Wisconsin Province) held its provincial congre­
gation preparatory to the general congregation to be held 
in Rome. Appointed as one of the two Roman delegates, 
Father Dempsey flew to Rome and worked hard and produc­
tively during the fall months. On his return to Marquette 
University, he expressed pride and enthusiasm for the 
real accomplishmets of the congregation. He remained in 
lifetime admiration of the government of Jesuit Society. 
15. Preparing for Death
After the first of January, 1958, Father Dempsey's 
health was never really good. His bronchitis gave him 
more and more trouble. He spent the first two months of 
the year in the hospital. Then, during March and April he 
was confined most of the time to his bed, yet he never 
really rested. His friends and acquaintances beat a path 
to his Jesuit Residence door. This arrangement pleased 
him immensely. 
During 1958 his health continued to deteriorate. At 
this time he decided to draw together and edit a number 
of his previously published articles and publish them in 
book form under the title: The Functional Economy. His 
own self-criticism was that the various chapters or 
articles were not synthesized -- there was no integral 
whole blending the chapters together. Admittedly, his own 
lack of energy made it physically impossible for him to 
correct his own self-criticism. Dissatisfied and with 
time growing short, he sent The Functional Economy to 
Prentice Hall. During the spring and summer of 1959, he 
worked assiduously on his book The Frontier Wage. He 
thought this book was most important, not only to 
complete his own economic thought, but to supply the need 
in economics for an "adequate" theory of wages (cf. 
Chapter IV, "The Frontier Wage") . B. W. Dempsey's last 
work was published posthumously, within a few days of his 
demise. 
In April 1960, he had serious difficulty breathing, 
yet he had promised to address a convention of bankers on 
April 21 and insisted on giving the address. Father 
Joseph Donnelly, S.J., long-time friend and colleague, 
insisted on accompanying him to the meeting because 
Father Dempsey looked so exhausted and Father Donnelly 
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feared he might collapse. B.W. finished his address, 
patiently sitting through a long and trying question 
period. Then Father Donnelly convinced Bud to go directly 
to the hospital. A few minutes after he reached the 
hosp! tal his heart suddenly gave out and only frantic 
medical efforts prevented him from dying then and there. 
This writer, together with Father James McGinley, S.J. 
(Fordham), a long-time fellow economist and friend, 
rushed to his hospital side. We found Bud alert. He 
announced that "going directly to the hospital was 
providential; otherwise I would be dead at this moment!" 
During the weeks of his convalescence, Friends flew 
in from around the country, ostensibly to visit, but 
really to seize the last opportunity to consult him. He 
returned to his Jesuit community in late May in a much 
weakened condition. Just before the July 4th weekend, he 
suffered another serious attack and was forced to return 
to the hospital for a 10-day rest. When he came home, the 
shadow of death was upon him, though only a few of us 
surmised it. Bud himself anticipated his death. on 
several occasions he remarked to the author that he 
thought that he "had just about done the work which God 
had assigned." 
1fii. Bis Death 
In July Bud spent his time quietly preparing for 
death. Although weak, he insisted on going daily to the 
community chapel for Mass and communion. He spent his 
time quietly clearing up the last few tasks necessary to 
complete his book on wage theory. He never actually said 
that he expected to die soon, but he asked various people 
to 11.take care" of tasks which were to be done in the 
remote future. He asked this writer to "administer" for 
the time being the Economics Department. Any policy 
changes should still be referred to him. Again, he 
repeated the thought that "my work assigned by God to me 
is about finished." 
on the morning of July 23rd, Father Dempsey was dis­
covered quietly stretched out on his bed. As in life, so 
in death he appeared placid and composed, without signs 
of struggle. The news of his death was carried in every 
important newspaper in America. 
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17. Jesuit, Priest, and Scholar
As a Jesuit, B.W. Dempsey was, in this writer's
opinion, one who always sought to be close to the ideal 
which St. Ignatius Loyola proposed. He was a friend and 
advisor to the great and famous, yet he carefully 
refrained form reaping any advantage for himself. He 
lived simply. He traveled widely, yet frugally. He obeyed 
his superiors meticulously. 
His Simple Faith 
For all of his brilliance in academic matters, he 
had a simple faith. He was deeply devoted to the "Blessed 
Virgin," as he affectionately referred to her. A rosary 
was an essential to his daily life. He had a childlike 
confidence in the providence of God. In his last days, 
his only request was that those present should say the 
Litany of the sacred Heart. All of his life he had a 
militant devotion to the Jesuits and was a crusader for 
their ideals. 
This writer knew Bud well and 1 i ved in the same 
residence with him during two separate periods in Father 
Dempsey's life. As a young Jesuit Scholastic (1944-1948) 
I knew him at st. Louis university as teacher, Father 
Dempsey. From 1954-1960 at Marquette University I knew 
"Bud" as friend and colleague. I never forgot that he was 
my teacher and mentor. In all those years never once did 
I see him lose his temper or be knowingly unkind to 
anyone. His charity embraced all men, but particularly 
students. I can personally attest to his solicitude. Even 
apparent disorder and disorganization, which he abhorred, 
evinced a favorite but mild expression: 11What a way to 
run a railroad!" 
Calmness and Objectivity 
B.W. Dempsey was always calm and objective. This is 
not to say that he did not take strong positions and feel 
deep emotions concerning issues. He did! Admittedly, he 
never claimed to be neutral on any issue. Notwithstand­
ing, at all times he maintained a calmness of demeanor, 
a controlled objectivity. He was definitely on the 
"conservative" side in his opinions and major premises. 
His minor premises in an argument were irreproachable and 
difficult to "refute," providing you granted his major. 
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As an argument heated up and become more emotional, 
producing more heat than light, Father Dempsey lowered 
his voice, spoke more calmly, and argued almost in 
syllogistic form. Always, he argued without rancor, 
although aggressively and persuasively. His demeanor did 
not make him always "right" but made him more formidable 
in any discussion. Never did he seem to be trying to get 
the upper-hand in an argument. Always, you felt he was 
seeking the truth. Added to the above was a characteris­
tic manner and style of expressing himself, so that even 
simple thoughts sounded impressive. He spoke with an air 
of authority. Few had the courage to challenge him head­
on. As one listener expressed it, "if Dempsey tells you 
that black is black and white is white, you are so 
impressed that you catch yourself jotting it down.11
several days before his death, Dempsey asked this 
writer to open and read aloud a letter of medical 
evaluation concerning his health. It was very pessimistic 
with one phrase stating that the prognosis for his future 
did not look good. He calmly asked me to repeat the 
phrase. Then he stated, "This expresses the gist of the 
report. Underline it. Please read on!" 
sunahiner 
Although Dempsey had lived all over the world, he 
never ceased being a "hometown boy. 11 His home never 
ceased being Milwaukee, so he became known among those 
"select" Jesuits as a "sunshiner." To him, Milwaukee was 
a most wonderful place. Perhaps only tnose from San 
Francisco rival "sunshiners" in loyalty to their home 
city. It is not my task to defend or attack, for I am a 
"sunshiner, 11 too. 
Research an4 Teaching 
In asking a (student) a question, Dempsey was quick 
to tap his forehead and say "think. 11 If he had asked 
why, he did not tolerate a what, a where, or a when in 
response. He expected that his students had the ability 
to distinguish between contraries and contradictories. 
For him, "to think clearly and express accurately" were 
marks of a Jesuit education. Dempsey operated from a 
solid foundation of scholarship, knowledge, science, and 
practical wisdom and above all with abundant good will 
and generous sharing of himself. Although he was labeled 
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a "conservative" in thought and action, he tried to avoid 
tags of any kind. With st. Thomas Aquinas, he held that 
virtue "stat in medio. 11 
All of his life, B.W. Dempsey stressed a needed 
balance among good teaching, research, and scholarship at 
a university. "Let us not be lopsided nor top-sided." At 
a faculty seminar he listened for an entire day to what 
he considered an over-emphasis on research, although he, 
a Harvard graduate, was well known for his own research 
and scholarship. He ended the seminar with these ringing 
words: "I have listened attentively for an entire day. 
I can only conclude that if Matthew, Mark, Luke an John 
were alive they would be promoted for their research and 
publishing. But poor Jesus Christ, a mere teacher, would 
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1. A Kan of the Classical Period (1891-1961)
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Dempsey was born in 1903 and died in 1960. His life, 
therefore, coincided almost precisely with the chronolog­
ical years of the Classical period (1891-1961). More 
importantly, Dempsey's life not only chronologically 
coincided with the Classical years, his own thought 
conformed to and mirrored this period. He was a champion 
of the era. In the opening words of his Functional 
Economy (Preface), he states categorically his task is 
"to project the ideal situation, which intelligent 
adherence to the enlightened teachings of the Church and 
constant awareness of the lessons of history can achieve, 
against the background of historic and existing communi­
ties" (F,V). 
Dempsey was a skilled scientist in the presentation 
of social principles and the relationship (insight into) 
among these principles. In his own Scholastic terminology 
he possessed that "habitus" (scientific habit or virtue 
of the mind) by which he could with ease and facility 
explain, analyze, and deal with the principles of the 
Vatican social documents. The opening words of his 
chapter, significantly entitled "The Bases of Economic 
organization," (F,65) are: 
The restoration of the social order according 
to the principles of sound philosophy is the 
goal of the Church's interest in current 
social matters. For this reason, only natural 
truths and logical reasoning will be used to 
derive and establish the Pope I s teaching on 
human society and its members. Where the 
encyclical cites passages taken from scrip­
ture, careful examination shows that this is 
not done by way of proof but rather to stress 
the conformity of his logical conclusions with 
the teaching of the Gospel [O. van Nell-Breun­
ing, S.J., Reorganization of the Social Econo­
my, tr. B.W. Dempsey, p. 16], 
The modern period (1961-1991+) differsi other fonts, 
as well as natural reason, scripture, theology, social 
argumentation, etc., are integral parts of today's 
Vatican social thought. His age called for much "natural 
law" (reason) and authority, and he met these criteria 
fully! 
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In modern Catholic Social Vision, the person is 
described as a self-project engaged in a lifetime work­
task within communities, in order to become a complete­
/full personality (Cf. LE, 9). These five communities 
are: 1) Trinity, 2) Church, 3) Present living (de 
facto) community, 4) Kingdom of God, 5) Ideal (de jure} 
community of "what should be," or unchanging principles. 
All five have an appropriate place in modern social 
thought: a person is engaged in all five communities, and 
the emphasis is no longer only on the fifth. In recent 
years an emphasis has grown in recognizing the interre­
latedness of these communities and in being concerned 
that through development the gap between the de facto 
groups (family, economic, political, voluntary, cultural) 
and the de jure communities (Trinity, Church, Kingdom, 
Ideal) can be lessened if not closed (Cf. Catholic Social 
Vision, below). 
World of B.w. Dem.psey 
The world of B.W. Dempsey was the ideal (de jure) 
world of principles. He strove mightily over a lifetime 
to polish, define, and relate these principles one to 
another, providing a foundation/basis for a viable 
Functional Order. In this/his world there was 1 i ttle room 
for change or signs of the times. He dealt mostly with 
the unchanging principles (person, law, rights, justice, 
society, peace, subsidiarity, etc.). For B.W. Dempsey, 
the task of the social documents was to deal with prin­
ciples. "The instructions of the Holy See in social and 
economic questions are general for the reason that they 
are expressly concerned with principles" (F, 72). The work 
of applying these general principles was for others. 
"Thus the limitation of dealing in principles leaves a 
great volume of indispensable work to be done in each 
community --- and by no means the least, the man with a 
living to earn" (F,73). For, Dempsey, if he had lived in 
the modern period, would have felt that much that was 
taken up (MM/GS/etc.} should not be in social documents 
but rather left for the man-earning-a-living to deal with 
by applying social principles to de facto social prob­
lems. 
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Argument froa Authority 
A typical man of this Classical period, Dempsey put 
great emphasis on authority, much emphasis on reason, 
"natural law, 11 less on theology , and very little on 
theological argumentation and scripture. Remember, his 
life had been run before the modern period with its full 
use of all fonts was in vogue. It is only recently that 
sacred scripture has become integrated into Catholic 
social thought (Cf. Economic Justice for All). 
To Dempsey, Vatican principles carried immense 
authority. His task was not to dissent or disagree, but 
to explain the "authenticity" for the lay person. To him, 
these principles with which he had such familiarity and 
facility were more than simple Vatican thought; they were 
"dogma." "We are concerned here with 'social doctrine'," 
states B. W. Dempsey, "as applied more specifically to 
economic organization in modern industrial society on a 
basis of natural reason" (F, 65). Therefore, the first 
effect of the encyclical of 1891 (Rerum Norvarum) was "to 
give the sanction of Papal authority and with this a 
degree of respectability that formerly they had not 
enjoyed" (F, 68). At times his instincts and Classical 
background forced him to rely on authority even to the 
extent of not bothering to state rational arguments for 
a position: to quote authority was sufficient reason. 
Surely, certain attitudes of the modern period would have 
distressed him. But he was not of the modern period --­
his heart and mind had stopped by 1960. 
In 1960 Dempsey was ready to depart. On several 
occasions he stated that he thought his work was fini­
shed. Certain social movements and trends were making him 
unhappy. Looking back from this (disad)vantage point of 
1991, we see why his work was finished. An attitude of 
many Jesuits (since their life work is the Lord's) is 
that when God sees their work is done, He will take them 
unto Himself. Ora pro nobis! R.I.P. 
2. Deapsey•s Social Attitudes
on Pace• In Terris
Pacem In Terris was published in 1963, three years
after Dempsey's death. Yet PT basically belongs to 
Dempsey's era, to the Classical social document period. 
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The intention of P'l' was to put forth a functional 
(organic) ideal (de jure) order of society. 
The underlying argumentation of P'l' is simple. It is 
the same development which B.W. Dempsey employed during 
his entire career. The building block of society is the 
family (the person is the family's nucleus). within the 
family a person works to complete self. All society is 
made up of these building blocks, namely, families. If 
all the families (building blocks) within each nation 
have a healthy orderliness, the resulting "family of 
nations" provides good opportunities and power to act 
justly and charitably. If each family is fair (just) and 
loving (charitable), the result will be a tranquility 
born of order, namely, peace on earth, a II Pacem in 
Terris." P'l' is the last of the encyclicals belonging 
basically to the Classical period. Mother Teresa ex­
pressed the above simply: All goes back to the family. If 
we have a world made up of good families -- a "family of 
nations" --- acting in a lovable manner, there will be 
peace on earth (paraphrased). 
Both P'l' and Dempsey treated the functional society 
(organic) principally through reason. Little emphasis was 
placed on the other fonts, particularly theology and 
scripture. The full incorporation of all the fonts had to 
wait until later in the modern period. 
As the Pope did in Pacem in Terris, Dempsey began 
with the person, one who is freely self-directed, is 
engaged in a li.fetime work, a calling, a vocation, who 
seeks opportunities and power to act for the common good, 
who practices justice a�d charity, and has certain moral 
powers and rights. When people are successful in this, 
there results a tranquility born of order: peace. Above 
all, the person was considered a social being. Only 
later, in Laborem Exercens, is the person treated as 
constitutively, essentially, a worker, too. Not only Karl 
Marx, but Dempsey, too, in his mature work, The Frontier 
Wage, assumed that all persons by their very nature are 
also workers (Cf. Chapter Seven, "The Functional Wage"). 
Arguing from reason, Dempsey begins with the social 
person, looks at the inclinations/drives that follow upon 
a person's structure (nature) -- directing the intellect 
and moving the will toward the fulfillment and completion 
of the person within society -- namely law. Law, itself, 
implies the need of moral powers (rights) in order to 
achieve a good society. The logical movement and close 
interrelationship from person, to law, to rights, moves 
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to justice as a protector of those rights. Charity 
completes what justice begins. Society, as a union of 
persons acting together for opportunities and power-to­
act (common good) through the practicing of justice and 
charity, results in an order born of tranquility called 
peace. 
on Subsidiarity 
As treated in PT (139 and 140), the principle of 
subsidiarity was also a mainstay of Dempsey's social 
treatments. In theory, B.W. saw the right and duty of the 
state under certain conditions to enter the economic 
sphere. These conditions were namely four: when there is 
(1) a real loss to the common good, when (2) the loss
continues, when it becomes (3) a last resort, the state
could then enter (4) to help the economic sphere help
itself ( Principle of Intervention) . Dempsey, at this
point, liked to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, namely, "the
state should enter only to help others help themselves."
In practice, he saw very few instances in which the 
right to enter was verified. And he could not see a 
practical case in which the state had a duty to intervene 
into economic affairs. He loaded the dice even more by 
choosing to employ the word II interfere" rather than 
"intervene." Usually, he would inform the listener that 
it was his experience that once a horse was allowed to 
put its nose into a full feedbag, it was most difficult 
to get it out. It is better that the state never get the 
opportunity to "interfere" in economic affairs. 
The principle of subsidiarity was all important to 
Dempsey in his treatment of a functional society. It set 
up definite interrelationships between the various groups 
(e.g., family, economic, political, and the many volun­
tary groups) that make up the larger society. Dempsey 
never confused state and society. "It's a Marxian trap." 
Always, he would point out that the state was only one 
member of the larger society. Going back to QA (1931), 
Dempsey expressed subsidiarity function as "the outer 
order (state) that should foster, stimulate, regulate, 
supplement, integrate, review, restrain, encourage, 
direct, watch, stimulate, etc., but not absorb the inner 
orders (family, economic, voluntary and the person 
itself) of society. The principle in practice took on the 
function of a "linebacker" in football, in reserve and 
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ready to help the others, especially the prime line of 
the family -- "family primacy." 
on Aca4emic Bzcellence 
Thirty years before PT, Dempsey and his Jesuit 
companions (the three professionals) advocated and 
practiced scientific competency, technical capability, 
and recognized skill in their profession. If Dempsey had 
lived to read Pacem in Terris, particularly paragraph 
149, he would have given his characteristic sigh of 
agreement, namely, an audible "amen." 
But in a culture and civilization like our own 
which is so remarkable for its scientific 
knowledge and its technical discoveries, 
clearly no one can insinuate himself into 
public life unless he be scientifically com­
petent, technically capable, and skilled in 
the practice of his own profession (PT, 149). 
On occasion, in a firm but a kind manner, he dropped 
students from the graduate program. He decided that they 
did not measure up to this three-fold standard. When B.W. 
was told by another faculty member that he thought a 
certain person "promising," his brief response: "To be 
promising is not enough!" 
on Alpha Sigma ·•u 
Dempsey was proud to be the moderator of Alpha Sigma 
Nu, the Jesuit honor fraternity. He considered Alpha 
Sigma, Nu the "elite" of honor fraternities. All 28 Jesuit 
universities in the United Sates have a chapter of this 
fraternity. B. W. was particularly enamored because of the 
criteria for membership in Alpha Sigma Nu: character 
shown not only through scholarship (as in Phi Beta Kappa) 
but also loyalty and service to all the groups (societ­
ies), especially intermediate groups and particularly the 
Jesuit university attended. 
In choosing candidates, Dempsey made these criteria 
operative and practical. Besides scrutinizing a prospec­
tive member's degree of scholarship, loyalty and service, 
he also emphasized the honor and privilege of any member 
to arrange a personal appointment with the university 
president. He insisted that the active university 
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membership (juniors and seniors) submit in the course of 
a year three (3) reports to the President on both the 
good/bad of the faculty, the administration, and student 
involvement. After B.W. 's death, this writer became 
Fraternity Moderator and helped achieve a dream of Father 
Dempsey's -- opening the honor fraternity to qualified 
women. 
In his last year of life, B.W. welcomed to Marquette 
University the National Alpha Sigma Nu convention and 
banquet. Enthusiastically, he chose a graduate of 
Fordham, a Jesuit University, as speaker and to be 
honored, namely, Vince Lombardi, the new and as yet 
unknown coach of the Green Bay Packers. B.W. Dempsey had 
already taken full measure of the man and declared him in 
one word to be "superb." I recall "Bud" taking me by the 
arm to be sure that I met this "great man." Certainly, 
Dempsey regarded Lombardi as a kindred spirit in outlook 
and character. 
During Coach Vince Lombardi's excellent talk on 
motivation and how to achieve one's goals, Father Demp­
sey's face glowed as Lombardi emphasized the five D's: 
dedication, determination, discipline, desire, and 
decision-making. He echoed Dempsey's life philosophy, 
too, when he declared that blocking and tackling done 
only 85 percent right were just insufficient. At least, 
the endeavor should be a full 100 percent. If alive 
today, Dempsey would be advocating the current recognized 
need for the United States to target perfection in its 
economic endeavors, not just to settle by "doing a good 
job." 
on Dempsey, The Teacher 
This protege of Father Dempsey, teacher, sealed his 
fate when he agreed to place himself under his tutelage 
for a number of weeks, totally unaware (still being under 
SO) of what a hard taskmaster, disciplinarian, and 
demanding teacher to whom he had indentured himself. The 
task was "to attack together" the history of economic 
analysis. As text, Dempsey chose his favorite learned 
book: History of Economic Analysis by Joseph Schumpeter, 
his favorite economist -- 1,260 pages of small print 
including footnotes. Our bloody sessions were two hours 
long. My exhausting assignment work requirement was to be 
prepared to demonstrate complete (not 85 percent) 
knowledge, understanding and integrative insight into a 
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sizable chunk of the book. Of course, the expression or 
recital had to be precise, accurate and eloquent. Never 
before did I have an understanding of what complete 
mastery meant. Never before did I appreciate how bloody 
an entrance knowledge makes. Not only was the preparation 
fatiguing and exhausting, the rough sessions were even 
more so. Having survived the ordeal, I was never the 
same. I shall always be grateful for being taught how to
think! 
Father Dempsey, teacher, was quick to insist that 
his students excel. On one occasion a very good student 
complained to Father Dempsey that he thought he deserved 
an A in his course. Father Dempsey seldom "gave" A I s! 
His reply was, "You may be a genius, but I had to 
overwork you -- you did not overwork yourself. An A is 
completely self-earned!" 
on John xx:n:I 
In the late 1930 1 s, Dempsey's background and love of 
history resulted in a somewhat startling prediction. 
Sometime before Roncalli became John XXIII, Dempsey 
raised in conversation that "it would make sound Church 
historical sense if the coming Pope would choose the name 
John XXIII." When Dempsey was scoffed at for his state­
ment, his brief but friendly answer was "Please don't 
contradict me, I am well aware of what I am saying." 
Roncalli and hi.story proved Dempsey right! 
on St. Thomas Aquinas 
Dempsey always had a high regard for Aquinas. But in 
his earlier years he looked elsewhere for systemized and 
organized bodies of economic knowledge. Only in his last 
years did he fully utilize st. Thomas. An extensive and 
intense reading of St. Thomas gave him a deeper apprecia­
tion of st. Thomas•s understanding of economic ideas. In 
fact, in his last years he tended to "abandon" some of 
the later Scholastics (Lessius, De Lugo, etc.) and go 
directly to St. Thomas for economic answers. 
The discussion of fundamental economic ideas 
in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, however 
penetrating and acute, was at all times a by­
product of some other activity. St. Thomas was 
not an economist, and at no time was he con-
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cerned with the analysis of economic problems 
for their own sake. Though he touches upon 
many economic topics and touches them with 
characteristic neatness and accuracy, he is 
always primarily interested in some other 
problem [F,164]. 
Although references to economic subjects occur in 
many parts of Aquinas• larger works, his principal 
economic statements are in his comments on the virtue of 
justice (cf. s.Th. Summa Theologica, 2a, 2ae, qq. 57-80) 
and in the Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle. 
Dempsey considered the discussion of the economic 
ideas of st. Thomas as being "extremely difficult to set 
forth in satisfactory sequence." 
The concepts are so closely interrelated that 
the analysis of each threatens at any moment 
to branch off into an apparent digression, but 
when the whole analysis has been presented, 
the digression will appear integral to the 
topic [F,392]. 
In St. Thomas, for example, a discussion of 
property cannot proceed without some inquiry 
into the division of labor coincident with the 
division of resources. Once this notion is 
introduced, the concept of exchange constantly 
hovers on the horizon. Exchange is the princi­
pal instrument by which goods privately owned 
still minister to the common good. With ex­
change comes the introduction of money, with 
money, the question of price, and of just 
price specifically [cf. Chapter 5). With the 
question of just price comes the question of 
the just price of money, that is, of usury 
[F,392) [cf. Chapter 6]. 
on the Font of Theology 
For several months, Dempsey's constant companion was 
the other Wisconsin delegate to the Roman congregation, 
namely, Father Cyril Vollert, S.J. (Dean of the Jesuit 
Theologate, Professor of Theology, and publisher of 
theological works). At this time, Dempsey not only 
discovered st. Thomas fully, but also the need for using 
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theology as a real font in the social documents. In his 
short span of life remaining, he did pursue this aim. 
on Bconoaic syst8Jll.s 
From his heavenly vantage point, Dempsey must be 
looking down in prayerful and thankful amazement. World 
communism is on its deathbed. Dempsey was a life-long 
implacable enemy of communism, all the more so because he 
considered it a reaction, an attempted displacement for 
the capitalistic system. In spite of his often sharp 
criticism of even a mixed capitalistic system, he was 
quick to defend the capitalistic system as the only 
viable, existent, practical economic system. 
In SRS (1987), John Paul II spoke out against 
injustices in both the political and economic spheres. To 
the chagrin of critics in the first world, he attributed 
injustice equally to both the communist and capitalist 
systems. Such a papal statement would have caused Dempsey 
in his characteristic manner to pause and hold his breath 
-- for a moment or so! 
Dempsey, the historian, fully expected thirty years 
ago that the political experiment menacing the world with 
totalitarian domination would mercifully come to an end, 
but not even this accomplished historian predicted the 
demise would be so abrupt and so complete. Dempsey did 
have a penchant for predicting social and economic events 
accurately from past historical events, but this sudden 
demise of communism was not one of them. 
John XXIII, in his opening address at Vatican II, 
referred to many of his counselors as "prophets of doom 
who know no history. 11 Dempsey would be in substantial 
agreement with this assessment: "Don •t predict the worst; 
neither history nor you can bear that out." He spoke of 
theories of a world evil conspiracy as absurd and 
preposterous and would have applauded his fellow histori­
an John. 
Today Dempsey must be showing tremendous interest, 
with eyebrows raised, as he stares owlishly upon the 
changing attitudes and solutions offered in the world 
which had begun within five years of his death. Cer­
tainly, he would be greatly impressed by the official 
Church teaching of Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes (GS). 
Dempsey, who was never known to take a neutral stand on 
anything controversial, would more likely accept its 
close reasoning, and of course the document itself, on 
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the basis of the authority of the Church, than to accept 
a seemingly reasonable argument not sanctioned by Church 
authority. Authority always had priority over reason, at 
least in the practical order, both in his mind and in his 
actions. 
on Religious Freedom 
During Dempsey's time religious freedom was much 
debated, and he willingly participated in these discus­
sions. He saw the Church as given a divine mandate for 
religious freedom. For an argument from reason, he 
referred to John Courtney Murray, s .J., as his authority, 
without going into Murray's reasons. In his authoritative 
manner, Dempsey would state, "one would do well to 1 is ten 
to John Courtney Murray, for he has much to say on this 
matter." He was quick to state that the Church had not 
yet spoken clearly on religious freedom. A man of his 
time, he was wont to quote the slogan "error has no 
rights. 11 But this was more than five years before Vatican 
II (although Murray had much to say) had published its 
Decree on Religious Freedom (1964). 
One who knows Dempsey's social attitudes can say 
that he would be thrilled at the advent of Pacem in 
Terris (PT). In 1963, John XXIII cut through the argu­
ments dealing with human rights which had befuddled some 
in the Church for over a thousand years. In this docu­
ment, John maintains that every human person, as the 
image and 1 ikeness of the Creator, is entitled to an 
essential freedom which must be respected by Church and 
state alike. He also puts forth that the right of the 
individual to religious freedom is founded in the 
straight secular ( de facto) order on purely rational, 
philosophical principles. 
Dempsey would have welcomed this philosophical 
argument based on the dignity of man. There would be full 
acceptance on his part, not because of its rationality, 
but because of the authority of Pope John XXIII, as 
expressed in PT. For him, authority always came first; 
reason had to find a way to accommodate. And yet he 
derived most of his principles from reason or "natural 
law." 
In PT, the axiom "error has no rights" still stood. 
But John insisted that only human persons had rights. 
Even in error, individual persons retain the right to the 
inviolability of their persons. Of course error should be 
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repudiated, yet the one in error retains a personal 
dignity which must be respected. In political and 
religious matters, no one is to be forced to act in a 
fashion contrary to personal beliefs. 
In Vatican II, the Decree on Religious Freedom 
reiterates that an individual has no right to err, but at 
the same time must follow a fully formed conscience, a 
process of practical reason, which is the only way one 
can arrive at practical truth. It would be a good guess 
that for Dempsey this would be another troubling matter 
for discussion, as he strove "to arrive at a satisfactory 
conclusion." 
Option for the Poor 
In 1968, Pope Paul VI dedicated the Church to a 
radical "option for the poor. 11 As a boy, Dempsey had 
overcome personal poverty in a short period and proudly 
and repeatedly spoke of this success. But this talented 
and strong-willed man would have succeeded under almost 
any circumstances. Dempsey really never understood the 
powerlessness of ordinary people forced to remain poor 
for extended periods. He grew up in an individualistic 
atmosphere in which he breathed notions that all are born 
industrious, frugal, and honest, and therefore destined 
for economic success, providing only that they put in the 
effort. Personally, he held that one should resist any 
"interference"' in individual liberty, especially by the 
state and its many institutions. In various ways he 
expressed the notion · that one need not· remain poor 
(powerless), for each one has the power to "overcome" the 
poverty. 
It would be interesting to see Dempsey wrestle with 
the emphasis given recently by both the Church and his 
own Society of Jesus to this "preferential option for the 
poor. " We can be assured that he would bow to the 
authority of the Church and his beloved Society, regard­
less of his "reasonable opposition." A man who could 
assure a group of listeners and make it sound plausible 
to them that a football team had won a "moral victory" 
when it had lost 30 points could certainly bring himself 
around to the desired conclusion. 
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TODAY11S CATHOLI:C SOCI:AL VI:SI:OB 
1. The Modern Social Period (1961-1991+)
The most startling and amazing happening of the last 
30 years has been the sharpening and clarifying of the 
all-embracing Catholic Social Vision. Such a vision is 
not built on "reason" alone, but on the fonts of theol­
ogy, scripture, philosophy, the social sciences, and 
"natural law" (reason). The most gratifying happening 
within the Catholic Social Vision is the fleshing out of 
the concept of Development. Beginning with Gaudium et 
Spes (GS) and continuing with Populorum Progressio (PP) 
and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) there is movement 
toward a new century of social documents (1991 and 
beyond). There is the wholeness of a complete vision. If 
Dempsey were alive today -- after he got over his initial 
"alien" shock -- to see the tremendous JO-year movement 
in Vatican social thought, I believe he would calmly 
embrace/accept it, if not from reason, then from authori­
ty, as a new challenge. A man who said in 1957 -- before 
Michael Harrington et al. -- that "In the united states 
the rich have not grown richer and the poor poorer" 
[F,288] would have much catching up to do! 
2. The catholic social Vision
The Christian Social Vision (CSV) is the cornerstone 
of modern Catholic social teaching. since Vatican II, 
there has been a radically different vision of the Church 
-- more historical, more dynamic, more vital. Much of the 
basic social vision is drawn from two of the social 
documents of Vatican II, namely, Gaudium et Spes and 
Lumen Gentium (LG). 
The Trinitarian society relates to the entire 
universe and especially to human societies. The Triune 
God -- Father/Son/Spirit -- founds and supports through 
the son the Church society; demonstrates power and 
presence to the Secular society (our world); is present 
and penetrates the Kingdom Society. The Trinity furnishes 
a real exemplar of the Ideal Society in Jesus Christ and 
calls the human person to co-creation (partnership). In 
turn, the Church helps the people of God prepare for the 
Kingdom and directly assists the persons and societies 
which make up the present order. 
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The Catholic Social Vision not only relates to the 
immediate vision of a realizing process of human persons 
and their societies, but to the larger context of man and 
God working together (co-creation) to achieve a universal 
mission of a complete realization of the entire CSV. For 
many, the traditional "vision" (including B.W. Dempsey's) 





















Main Catholic Social Teachings {CST) and Symbols 
Rerum Novarun (1891) Leo XIII (On the Condition of the worker) 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931) Pius XI (Restructuring the Social 
Order) 
Divini Redemptoris (1937) Pius XI (On Communism) 
La Solennita della Pentecoste (1941) Pius XII 
Christmas Address on Democracy (1944) Pius XII 
Hater et Hagistra (1961) John XXIII (Christianity & Social 
Progress) 
Pacem in Terris (1963) John XXIII (Peace on Earth) 
Gaudium et Spes (1965) Vatican II (The Church in the Modern 
World) 
Lumen Gentium (1965) Vatican II (Constitution on the Church) 
Declaration on Religious Freedom (1965) Vatican II (Dignitas
Humanae) 
Octogesimo Adveniens (1971) Paul VI (Development of Peoples) 
Justice in the·. World (1971) Synod of Bishops 
Medellin Documents (1968) (Justice, Peace, Message of the 
Peoples of Latin America) 
10th Anniversary of Pacem in Terris (1973) 
Evangelization of the Modern World (1974) Synod of Bishops 
Redemptor Hominis (1979) John Paul II (Redemption of Man) 
·Laborem Exercens (1981) John Paul II (On Homan Work) (90th
Anniversary of RN)
Economic Justice (1986) U.S. Bishops
Sollicitude Rei Socialis (1987) John Paul II (On Social
Concerns)
Ethical Choices and Political Challenges (1983) Canadian
Bishops
(Such documents (GS, JW, MD, RR, EWW', EJ) although not written under 
papal direction are included since the promulgating authority 
depended on papal approval.] 
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The first test of any philosophy or theology is 
whether it makes real sense in terms of the reader's 
experience. Does it enrich the reader's life? In 
considering Vatican documents, the question is whether 
their treatment conforms to the last hundred years of 
social encyclicals. After 40 years of reflection on these 
social documents, my conclusion is that they do. My early 
exposure was to the Classical documents, Rerum Novarum 
(RN) and Quadragesimo Anno (QA), and later to the modern 
social documents, Mater et Magistra (MM) and Gaudium et 
Spes (GS), etc. Recent openness has been to the neo­
modern or latest documents, Populorum progressio (PP), 
Redemptor Hominis (RH), Laborem Exercens (LE), and, most 
recently, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) with its 
emphasis on integral development. 
Five Macro-societies 
over the last hundred years, Catholic social 
Teaching has formed a distinctive catholic Social vision. 
Unfortunately, not only have the Vatican social documents 
been a well-kept secret, even in Catholic circles, but 
the Catholic Social Vision has, too. The center or 
nucleus of the vision is the human person. But the 
family, made up of persons, is the building block of all 
earthly societies .• A human person is essentially a social 
being, an image of the Trinity, having a basic need for 
society to complete itself, as well as to provide 
opportunities to display generosity, love and knowledge. 
The catholic Social Vision includes five macro­
soci�ties: Trinitarian Society, Church Society, Secular 
(de facto) Society, the Ideal (de jure) Society, and the 
Kingdom society (cf. accompanying diagram). The human 
person has contact in all these five macro-societies and 
also is engaged through the family building block in the 
micro-societies: political, families, economic, interme­
diate, which make up both the de facto present secular 
society and the de jure ideal society. 
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3. The Vatican Social Documents (1891-1991)
Classical Vatican Documents (Bsp. RR and QA) 1891-1961) 
These documents dealt almost exclusively with the 
Ideal Society: what should the earthly society become? 
Argumentation was mostly from the font of reason or 
"natural law" philosophy. By 1960 some social experts, 
B.W. Dempsey among them, felt that a framework of social 
principles was solidly in place. They did not expect to 
see more important encyclicals, but only the drawing out 
of known principles in greater detail. 
Kodern Vatican Documents (Bsp. HK and GS) 1961-1971 
With a shift in emphasis from the de jure, the 
should be, to the de facto, what is, major new social 
documents did appear. Certain old Classical social 
philosophers did not consider the new teaching of actual 
present events and signs of the times as appropriate 
material for Vatican 11 dogma." They held that such 
"application of principles" should be the daily work of 
the laity, not of Vatican documents. The de facto 
treatment (cf. MM and GS) detailed the shortcomings of 
the present situation, "the mess we are in, 11 in relation 
to the ideal. Briefly, what is is considered in relation 
to what should be. 
Of course, the illumination of principles continued 
with the further inclusion of the fonts of theology, 
sacred scripture, and social science (e.g., economics, 
political science, sociology). In addition to philosophi­
cal reason, these other fonts have made important 
contributions. Today, with emphasis moving to the de 
facto society, social philosophers and theologians are 
more likely to speak of Catholic Social Teaching, rather 
than using the traditional tag of Catholic Social Dogma. 
Recent (Beo-Kodern) Documents (Esp. PP, RB, LB, SRS) 
1971-1991 
The social problem broadened over these years and 
became a global problem, embracing all peoples, not just 
Christians and Catholics. In early Classical times the 
social problem was referred to as a social question: the 
maldistribution of income in the economic order. The gap 
between the de facto and the de jure of world society is 
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now treated, and the problem came to be seen as global. 
Thus, the global gap became the global problem. The 
recent encyclicals are putting forth integral development 
as the means to diminish or lessen the gap. The answer to 
the Global Problem is the achieving of rights (moral 
power and influence) in the various micro-societies. 
Integral Development means growth in rights of persons 
living in the family, political, economic, and immediate 
orders in an interrelated and integral unitary fashion. 
,. catholic social Vision an4 the Human Person 
Recent encyclicals have stated elements of a modern 
definition of the human person (cf. LE, et al; RH). The 
human person is described/defined as a self-project 
engaged in a life-work task within community in order to 
become a full npersonality n (self-realized) in prepara­
tion for living in the Kingdom of God. 
(See Diagram on Page 47) 
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This free human being, because loved by God, thereby has 
dignity bestowed on the person; constituting the person 
as esse11tially a social being and a worker. 
The person is an image and reflection of Trinitarian 
Society, yet has a need to overcome inadequacies and 
incompleteness. Being a person is only relatively self­
realized, opportunities are needed for growth in love and 
knowledge as a social being. Recent documents have 
emphasized the partnership of the human person with the 
Divine Persons. Together, they are truly co-creators and 
co-decision-makers. The human is considered a true, 
although admittedly a junior, partner with God. 
Today's description of the (human) person includes 
engagements in a work-task (calling/vocation) both as a 
reaction and a response to God's love. The human person 
is constitutively/essentially a worker with a twofold 
purpose: firstly, to develop into a better person through 
virtuous achievement; secondly, and simultaneously, to 
produce a better society by mastering domination/submis­
sion over goods. 
"Making up one's mind" (making decisions/choices). 
The whole earthly universe is summed-up in the human 
person. The person is not only a part of the rational but 
also of the inanimate, vegetative, and sensing world. All 
these levels are integral, interconnected, and interre­
lated within the person. When a person "makes up his/her 
mind, 11 all levels of his/her being contribute to this 
final decision .  More accurately, there are many levels 
that are determinants, including a co-creating partner 
God. Many determinants, rational, and non-rational, enter 
into any person's make�up and the making up of one's mind 
in coming to a decision. 
,In making up a person's mind, there is the uncon­
scious organizing activity, plus the conscious decision­
making. Such a human II switchboard II results in dynamic 
interrelationships. All the determinants (human and 
divine) work in relative "harmony" toward a conscious 
final rational decision. At each moment, the non-rational 
structures of a human person make a statement -- present 
determinants. At every moment, the person spontaneously 
organizes the data arriving to the nerve centers of the 
brain from the external senses and internal organs of the 
being. Fully conscious decisions are invariably the 
result of reflecting upon one set of components in fully 
conscious decision-making. This is a reflection on a 
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whole series of determinants rising (from a sub-conscious 
level}. 
The Dignity of the Person 
God loves his creation, the human person. This 
theological fact gives the human person worth (dignity). 
Just as the fortunate child knows that mother loves 
him/her above all others -- an unconditional love giving 
the child worth and dignity in mother 1 s eyes -- so God 
loves all persons unconditionally, thereby bestowing on 
them dignity. Thus, all persons have dignity (worth). All 
human persons, therefore, must be fundamentally equal. 
God does not love human persons because they possess 
worth, but makes them worthy because he loves them. The 
reverse would put the cart before the horse! 
Knowing that one has dignity (worth) because loved 
by God can instill tremendous hope, confidence, and trust 
within a person. Immeasurably, this helps the person 
accept the pains and crosses of life -- perhaps cheerful­
ly! For example, Father Dempsey was one of those 
fortunate people knowing -- and frequently expressing -­
that he was loved both by his earthly and heavenly mother 
and God too! 
s. Trinitarian society
Drawing upon the theological font, apart from any
relation to creation, the exchange of life and love 
between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit in the 
Trinity is unending. All three persons are needed to 
sustain Trinitarian Society's common life; hence, their 
unity with one another is strictly indissoluble. Human 
persons, being reflections and images of Trinitarian 
Society, must be naturally (essentially) social beings. 
While human society tries to achieve and keep the unity 
of the Trinity, the most achievable unity for a finite 
society is a degree of unity. The life flowing among the 
three persons is the metaphysical basis for the incor­
poration of created beings (mankind} into divine social 
life. 
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The Father -- First Person of Trinitarian Society 
God the Father creates and conserves all creatures 
(human and non-human). The Father gives an impulse of 
life and love to each, giving them their very essence and 
existence. All beings are expected to act in accordance 
with their natures. Non-humans without choice (freedom) 
must act in such a manner. Human persons should follow 
their natures, but have freedom of choice, are not 
necessitated to do so. 
In a broad sense, non-humans make built-in decisions 
in accord with God's directives. They are determined, 
that is, they must follow their natures, which are 
determinants of their actions. The human person includes 
in his/her very being all levels of non-human earthly 
being, but also has human rationality. On the lower 
levels, the vegetative, the sentient, etc., God works 
within the person giving a set mode of operation. 
These non-rational or pre-rational operations (some 
of which must be resisted!) express these lower levels. 
These determinations are for the most part not conscious­
ly made by humans. (Of course, all determinations and 
decisions are made consciously by the Trinity.) Humans, 
however, for example, exert gravity, digest food, feel 
emotion at a non-rational or pre-rational level. When 
someone makes up his or her mind, these determinants, 
plus the conscious, rational function, come into play in 
making the decision. Only persons, rational beings, make 
conscious deci'sions, though with varying degrees of 
awareness. 
Humans do make free decisions contrary to their very 
nature. No one says that they should go contrary to their 
natur.e, but they do. The nature and laws of a human being 
are givens. Freedom lies in the choosing between finite 
available goods. Of course, the degree of responsiveness 
is each one's personal decision. We remain free to 
respond -- make up our minds -- in the way we choose to 
the divine offer of life. 
The Trinity of Human Persona 
If any entity could say "no" to the Trinity's 
creation, it would, of course, cease to exist. In some 
way and to some degree, all beings must respond to their 
(created) natures. The degree of compliance may vary from 
one entity to another. 
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Human persons can relatively fail to respond to 
their natures; they are free to deviate. They can to a 
degree deviate from what the Father has in mind for them 
at any moment of world history. such deviation brings 
evil, disorder, sin. Even subhuman beings seemingly can 
deviate to some degree from their natures, but not 
really. In other words, de facto there is disorder/chaos 
in creation, but not all chaos need be destructive. 
Sometimes chaos is paradoxically the necessary prelimi­
nary to the emergence of higher forms of order. For 
example, in the seasons of the year, fall brings dying, 
winter slumber, and spring sprouts forth new life. The 
Trinity continually adjusts at each moment, ultimately 
bringing the whole universe through evolvement to a 
Divine Milieu. Even Genesis speaks of order coming out of 
chaos. From a human vantage point, we tend to see chaos, 
disorder, suffering, as ends. But the stance of faith is 
that they may be glorious means moving toward a final, 
universal end. Generations of disorder may perdure, yet 
ultimately a higher good is to come forth from the 
apparent evil; order can evolve out of chaos. 
The vision embodied in the divine aims of the 
Trinity for the universe must be the only basis for a 
true evolving lasting order within the universe. over 
time the Trinity restores peace, the tranquility born of 
order. This gives serenity and harmony to the working of 
the world of creation. As was seen above, any creature 
must respond to this divine impulse in some degree simply 
to continue to exist. 
Jesus Christ: second Person of Trinitarian society 
Jesus Christ is working on all levels for all 
humankind. He works to achieve a better world and 
simultaneously to renovate the human persons within this 
better world. He tries to assist all to become better 
persons in a better world, thereby preparing all for the 
Kingdom of God. The more anyone responds positively and 
wholeheartedly to Jesus Christ's life work, the more s/he 
is in union with the will of the Father, namely, the 
Kingdom of God. Together with Jesus Christ, human persons 
as co-creators (partners) work to make a better people 
within a better society through the practical power of 
the Spirit. Jesus•s life-task (vocation/calling), 
therefore, is to carry out the Father's plan, the 
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salvation of the world through the Holy Spirit 
preparing all humans for the Kingdom. 
The Xnoarnation of the son 
In his Spiritual Exercises, st. Ignatius has the 
members of the Trinitarian Society look down upon this 
earthly universe to peer at the chaos reigning among the 
persons and within the de facto secular society. Chaos 
rules among individual persons, families, political and 
economic groups, etc. The Trinity's decision is to send 
the second person of the Trinity to enter this chaotic 
world and lead all men/women and the societies they live 
in to ordered life and, eventually, the Kingdom. 
I try to enter into the vision of God, in his 
triune life, looking upon our world: men and 
women aimless, despairing, hateful and kill­
ing, men and women sick and dying, the old and 
the young, the rich and the poor, the happy 
and the sad, some being born and some being 
laid to rest. The leap of divine joy: God 
knows that the time has come when the mystery 
of his salific plan, hidden from the beginning 
of the world, will become manifest (Sp. Ex. 
106, 107, 108, tr. Fleming; cf. Luke 1:26-28). 
The coming ·of Jesus Christ -- The .Incarnation
brings the divine presence and active power within the 
world of creation. Jesus arrives to do the Father's will, 
to bring the whole universe to its ultimate good, the 
Kingdom. Direct confrontation exists now between good and 
evil', order and disorder (chaos). 
Every created being (human and non-human) joins with 
the Son in building the Kingdom of God. This is carried 
on at every moment of existence through response to the 
life-giving offer of the Father in the power of the 
Spirit. The perishable world strains toward God. The 
earthly world's sole enduring value is its contribution 
to the fullness of the Kingdom. 
The son Jesus submits to the promptings of his 
Father. At every moment of his earthly life, he either 
consciously or unconsciously coordinates his human 
thought and action with his ongoing response as son of 
the Father. His humanity, therefore, becomes an ever more 
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perfect instrument for the revelation of what it truly 
means to be divine. 
Holy Spirit -- Third Person of Trinitarian Society 
At every moment, on all levels, the Holy Spirit 
works within the human person -- Paul calls us "temples 
of the Holy Spirit." This work is demonstrated by our 
non-conscious determinants and our conscious decisions. 
The Spirit takes the lead, guiding the human person to 
achieve the world good on all levels. Even the sub-atomic 
inanimate components make statements in accordance with 
their nature. Even more so do human persons, having 
rational decision capacity added to lower level determi­
nants or sub-decisions. All the drives/inclinations of 
the human being are led at every moment of existence by 
the Holy Spirit to the good of the whole person. The 
Spirit guides these inclinations by directing and moving 
the person on all levels. This is often referred to as 
making up one's mind! 
st. Ignatius, in his retreat treatise, refers to a 
similar process as Spiritual Exercises: 
For just as taking a walk, journeying on foot, 
and running are bodily exercises, so we call 
Spiritual Exercises every way of preparing and 
disposing the soul to rid itself of all inor­
dinate attachments, and after their removal of 
seeking and finding the will of God in the 
disposition of our life for the salvation of 
our soul [Sp. Ex. no. 1). 
Making up one's mind, that is, being self-aware of 
determinants under the constant guidance of the Holy 
Spirit, makes human persons co-creators and co-decision­
makers. This results in a real relationship with the 
Trinity, which may be designated prayer, friendship or 
fellowship and so on. 
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7. Church society and catholic social Vision (CSV)
Today there is a new "vision" of the Church Society. 
Emphasis has changed since Vatican II. There is less of 
an individualistic and more of a social approach, greater 
enga-gement in the work-task of the "marketplace," more 
participation and emphasis on the dynamism of the person 
who is in the process of "becoming." The world picture 
(vision) is now different. 
Today there is no dichotomy between Church Society 
and (world) Secular Society. With the coming of Vatican 
II, the seeming split or drifting apart of the notion of 
being a Christian and being human is healed. No longer 
does this "schism" (split) threaten the Church. Christian 
humanization has been declared decent, desirable, 
authentic. Man is again asked to love the world, which is 
an image of God. It is up to men/women to make this world 
and society better. Man is again asked to live and love 
the world in the process of self-realization. Long before 
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Vatican II, B.W. Dempsey promoted the above and would 
feel gratified at this work of Vatican II and its 
aftermath. 
The Church Society assists the Secular Society, 
incorporating the secular members into the "community of 
disciples," the Church Society. Dempsey would applaud. 
For 100 years, Catholic Social Teaching (CST) has put 
emphasis on the two-fold goals of the members to renovate
themselves and reconstruct (build a better) society. 
Dempsey was in full accord. In his thinking there was no 
dichotomy between Church Society and the secular world. 
By this renovation and reconstruction of the present 
society, the "people of God" prepare themselves for the 
Kingdom Society; Dempsey would appreciate the emphasis on 
the final end, the "Kingdom Society." 
The Church is not synonymous with the Kingdom of 
God. In fact, the Church is the divinely chosen instru­
ment for the Kingdom's realization. The Kingdom is 
broader, including all of creation to the extent it is 
joined to the Son's ongoing relationship with the Father. 
The Church is basically a society, a community of 
disciples. The Church is described as an association of 
those human persons to whom the Father's plan for the 
salvation of the world has been fully revealed. 
Christians alone profess belief in God as Triune. 
Christians alone believe that Jesus is the Son of God. 
The Church, therefore, bears a special responsibility for 
carrying on the work of Jesus, not simply as individual 
persons, but as members of a community called the Church. 
Christians are expected to internalize the very pattern 
of Jesus•s life. Christians should think and act as Jesus 
did. Christians should respond to the inner promptings of 
the Father as Jesus did, in fellowship, friendship, or 
prayer. 
Like all persons, Christians are essentially social 
beings. For a human person and a group to call themselves 
Christians, there must be established an immutable/unmis­
takable link with the very person and message of Jesus. 
This link must be visible in the behavior of that person 
or that group. 
a. Ideal society and Catholic Social vision
Of course, the Ideal Society does not really exist. 
Nor should it be confused with the Kingdom. CST postu­
lates the Ideal Society -- what ought/should be --today 
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in the image of the Trinitarian Society. The basic thrust 
of the entire Classical period was to present an ideal 
order, a "utopia." At best, the ideal can only be 
approximated in this life. Thus, for the most part, the 
Classical period of CST (1891-1961) presented what should 
or ought to be. The modern period of CST (1961-1991+) 
deals foremost not with the de jure, but with the de 
facto Secular society. Modern CST deals with development, 
how the gap (the social problem) can be closed and how 
the Ideal Society reflecting unchanging principles can be 
approximately reached. Thus, the modern period is filled 
with change, historical sequence, signs-of-the-times, 
etc. 
9. Xntegrative Development an4 catholic social Vision
Integrative development is defined as the "basic
right of a person to participate progressively in rights: 
on all four (4) levels of (integrated) being 
(supernatural/rational/sensible/vegetative) 
in all social order (family/economic/politi­
cal/intermediate) 
and in the cultural heritage of society. 
Integrative· development refers 11to the dynamic 
interpretation of all those fundamental human rights upon 
which the aspirations of individuals and nations are 
based" (JW, 15). Integral development is the means of 
modifying and relatively closing or lessening the gap 
between the secular and the ideal order. Today this gap 
is referred to as the Global Social Problem (GS/PP/SRS). 
10. Kingdom Society an4 csv
The Kingdom has its beginning in this life; com­
pletion must wait until the next. In this life, pre­
paration is made for the full Kingdom of the next life. 
Wherever the presence and power of God exists within, the 
Kingdom lives (exists). The Kingdom is found wherever 
justice and fellowship (charity) abound. 
The Kingdom is not some heavenly territory, but the 
way God shows his presence and power. God as Father has 
the great purpose to establish the Kingdom. Jesus, 
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behaving as his Father's Son, takes up the Father's 
cause. Jesus does not have his own personal agenda or 
program. His task is to carry out his Father's program, 
the establishment of the Kingdom. 
Jesus Christ is King: King of the Universe, King of 
the Kingdom. Jesus called upon the Father to initiate the 
Kingdom. Jesus in the name of the Father gives a start to 
the Kingdom in history. The Kingdom is brought about by 
what Jesus does. From Christ's use of his presence and 
power, a fellowship arises (especially with the poor), 
which brings about reconciliation of unrealized persons 
("sinners"). "Thy Kingdom come • • on earth as in 
heaven." The Kingdom is the Triune God's final plan for 
men/women. The plan will be fully implemented, come into 
existence, in the next life. God penetrates and is 
present in this Kingdom of God forever. His Son is King 
of this heavenly society. 
11. Universe in Development
The whole universe is in process of development. The 
world is in process of becoming (socialization), for the 
universe has not yet been perfected. The world is moving 
"beyond" this present tangible order of created beings. 
The whole created universe -- the Christian Social Vision 
universe -- is groaning through and through in constant 
pangs of childbirth. The Triune God draws man and society 
toward a complete fulfillment. Through the course of 
time, creative, co-creative, and continuing creative 
action go on, moving the entire CSV onward/upward into 
eternity. All creation has a thrust that moves onward and 
upward to the final destiny. 
"Le Milieu Divin," the whole cosmic picture vision, 
the plan of God, must be won back for and with God, says 
Teilhard de Chardin. Creation still retains the hope of 
being freed and developed. "Creation retains the hope 
that in the end the whole of created life will be rescued 
from the tyranny of change and decay . • • at the present 
time all created life groans in one great act of giving 
birth" [Cf. Rom. 8: 21-22). All the elements of the entire 
universe are moving (developing/evolving) toward a total 
good (destiny). 
Positively within the universe is the divine urge, 
a basic urge of generosity and development implanted in 
the human person, as well as in the cosmic universe. The 
universe is becoming, engaged in its self-realization. 
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Within the universe exists sheer potentiality for final 
achievement of success (St. Thomas Aquinas). catholic 
Social Vision develops and evolves over time, becoming 
more and more an image of God. 
All created beings (human or non-human) are created 
to praise, reverence, and serve the three divine persons 
and by this means reach the Kingdom. All creatures, and 
all created societies, are each for the other, to help 
each attain the purpose of their creation. Essentially, 
(by their natures) they depend upon one another. This 
constitutes the God/World (cosmic universe). All the 
inclinations/drives of all beings at every moment con­
tribute to the building of the Kingdom of God, now and 
for eternity. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin speaks of this 
notion as an ongoing "hymn of the universe." 
The whole universe, through its co-creator, is
united as it moves through evolution to its final end. 
All beings further the universe goals. Even free will 
persons can only temporarily impede the universe's motion 
toward its goal of existence -- life. 
To conclude, Dempsey I s scholarly attainments are 
preserved in his writings for all to see. His four main 
economic ideas will be treated in depth in the remaining 






The Just Price 
Interest and Usury 
The Functional Wage 
In his 20 active years· he published 60 articles and 12 
books. The above chapters should prove helpful for an 
understanding in some depth of B.W. Dempsey's principal 
contr'ibutions. Notwithstanding, the chapters are no 
substitutions for reading his ground-breaking books and 
articles themselves -- Interest and Usury, The Frontier 
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Whether or not B.W. Dempsey had a set of unifying 
principles running through his socio-economic writings 
is certainly not clear to the casual reader. Possibly, 
such a unique synthesis of thought could elude even 
some who make a closer scrutiny and study of his works. 
Always the analyst, seldom a conscious synthesizer, 
B.W. Dempsey himself saw "unity" in the accomplishment 
of his purpose. He considered unity as an effect of 
order [F,55) and approvingly quoted the traditional 
definition of order: "Unity arising from the apt ar­
rangement of a plurality of objects." He considered 
that his writings were a unified whole. Reviewers of 
his works, friends, and critics were apt to criticize 
what they considered a "lack of unity." Dr. Stephen 
Worland neatly expresses this common criticism in his 
review of B.W. Dempsey's The Functional Economy: "the 
author [B.W. Dempsey) cites st. Thomas and Aristotle on 
the evils of excessive unity and he gives ample heed to 
their warning. 111 In all fairness, Dr. Worlund, in his 
most excellent review of The Functional Economy, goes 
on to point out that 11though not apparent to the casual 
observer, an underlying theme persists throughout the 
book and provides unity among diversity. 112 Since The 
Functional Economy is a collection of B.W. Dempsey's 
writings and essays over a twenty-five year period,3 
the unity must come from a unity within B.W. Dempsey's 
thought; certainly, such organization is not apparent 
in the arrangement and make-up of the book. 
1Review of Social Economy, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Sep­
tember, 1959), p. 174. 
2Ibid., p. 174. 
3As B. w. Dempsey incorporated much of his period­
ical writings and almost all of his thought into The 
Functional Economy, only on occasion will it be necessary 
to refer to his many articles written for periodicals. 
This does not hold true for books or chapters written for 
books. 
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Although B.W. Dempsey would have been "pleased" 
that this unity was seen by so able a reviewer of his 
work (and that unity or underlying theme certainly 
exists}, he himself places the "unity" that he confi­
dently assumes and asserts in his writings on an en­
tirely different basis. Always suspicious and critical 
of a "social progress" that was based on an apparent 
"solution" of social problems without a full and cons­
cious knowledge of their underlying principles, B.W. 
Dempsey would be quick to deny that a proper orienta­
tion, that sound practice, could exist without sound 
theory, that any long-run social progress could be 
achieved unless the principles were known and applied. 
He saw unity in his writings because his writings never 
deviated from his one purpose of stating and making 
clear the principles needed for a solution of a social 
problem. Quoting from the preface of The Functional 
Economy: 
There is a unity in the chapters that follow; 
the same principles are brought to bear on 
diverse problems. The principles are the 
same, and the radical basis of the conclusion 
is therefore the same. However, there is 
diversity in the problems attacked, in the 
level of abstraction, therefore, also diver­
sity in the immediacy of practical applica­
tion and in the degree of scientific appara­
tus appropriate for different problems and 
different audiences. The underlying unity, 
however, justifies the presentation of these 
pages as one book [F,V]. 
No single work by B.W. Dempsey contains a complete 
synthesis of his economic and social thought. He never 
saw the need to present such a synthesis. His purpose 
was professedly the "improvement of the economic com­
munity." His interest, purpose, unity were elsewhere. 
He, himself, would have a certain suspicion of making 
such a synthesis as diverting him from his true purpose 
and maximum good with the possible assumption of making 
the mistake of Socrates, "of thinking that the maximum 
good lay in the maximum unity" [F,V]. Nevertheless, 
B.W. Dempsey did possess such a synthesis of thought, 
even though it is not explicitly found in his writings. 
This not only becomes apparent from an examination of 
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the consistency of his writings, but their effective­
ness, the reception they received, create the presump­
tion that he followed a rather definite system in his 
economic thinking. 
In any presentation of B.W. Dempsey's writing, in 
order to present the unique synthesis of his thought, 
cognizance must be taken of his own realistic approach. 
Always realistic in his approach, he blueprints no 
ideal order, but begins his endeavors by examining 
systematically the forces and facts present in every 
real working economy. With this groundwork accomplish­
ed, he is ready to "project the ideal situation," but 
only with "intelligent adherence to the enlightened 
teachings of the Church and constant awareness of the 
lesson that history can achieve, against the background 
of historic and existing economic communities" [F,V). 
A. The Guild Systea
Certain facts are apparent to B.W. Dempsey. The 
guild system, an institutional structure sound in prin­
ciple, has been wiped out. No principle of organization 
has taken its place. The state, as a result, is 
"overwhelmed with tasks for which it is not yet equip­
ped" [F,284]. Present economic communities are bereft 
of a true principle of organization. This ensuing 
disorganization is due to certain causes. He analyzes 
the conditions and causes. To understand his thought, 
it is necessary at this juncture to sketch these ideas 
in more detail. 
With the breakdown and destruction of the "guild 
system as a method of economic control," the "means of 
improvement of the economic community" came to an end. 
To this very day the guilds have not been replaced, and 
until their principles are again in economic society, 
there can be no true economic community. B.W. Dempsey 
evaluates well their place and importance: 
Light and shadow are well-blended in the 
guild scene. But associations were economi­
cally efficient. They [the guilds) did raise 
the volume of regular production of useful 
goods and they distributed the increased 
product equitably, at least within the sys­
tem. The principle of their organization is 
sound. Living and growing as it did when it 
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extended from merchant to craftsman, it had 
unlimited possibilities. But when lower 
grades in the community were excluded from 
enjoying the same type of status as that 
possessed by those already organized, the 
guilds belied their own vital principle, 
withered, and were destroyed. The void that 
their ultimate extinction left has never been 
filled, and the complete absence of a common 
way of life among moderns makes it a fair 
question whether or not there is a sufficient 
substratum of natural virtue to enable people 
to get together on an associational basis to 
fill that void. The guilds were possible 
because there was a prevailing pattern of 
social thought that no one questioned, and 
that could be used as a foundation for social 
action. Today, far from agreeing upon the 
nature of man and his destiny, the schools 
are at loggerheads over the preambles of 
philosophy. Yet if we cannot find some reas­
onable principle for common action, it is 
still true that "all the crafts will be des­
troyed" and the "community will not be main­
tained" [F,103-104). 
"Some reasonable principle for common action" -- a 
sound socio-economic organization -- is necessary if 
the economic community is to improve and minister to 
the well-being of man. Proper principles again dis­
covered and applied to a modern scene is a basic need. 
"It will not be denied that the ideas and ideals of men 
have force in the shaping of their history and institu­
tions" [F,95). 
B. Causes of Disorder
"Disorder is the essential note of our society" 
[F,105). "Our contemporary society seems to be almost 
unique among the societies of which we have any accur­
ate historical records in that it is concerned with an 
almost universal revolution" [F,105). B.W. Dempsey then 
indicates the extent of this universal revolution: 
But in our generation, revolution and the 
dissatisfied attitude that makes possible the 
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spread of revolutionary ideas are not limited 
to the forms of political organization. Every 
social institution is under fire and the 
whole question of the nature of man, the 
number, the quality and origin of his rights, 
if any, and the social institutions best 
suited to such a man, family, civil communi­
ties, industrial organization, are all called 
into question at the same time. It is thought 
we could say that previous generations dealt 
with social questions whereas our generation 
is concerned with the social question [F,105-
106]. 
In the course of his life, B.W. Dempsey touched upon 
all the above-mentioned. We need not pause to consider 
some of these, e.g., nature of man, rights, etc, as his 
treatment does not differ from sound "traditional phil­
osophy." His genius and contribution are directed in a 
different direction. 
With characteristic boldness, B.W. Dempsey does 
not hesitate to delineate the causes of what he calls 
the "complete disorganization" of society. "This com­
plete disorganization," he asserts, "is the result of 
five revolutions which, despite origins in the past, 
have in our generation converged in their damaging 
effect" [F,106]. Immediately, B.W. Dempsey states why 
it is important to set out these five revolutionary 
causes of the disorder beyond their complete disorgani­
zational effect upon society. "To understand these 
revolutions," he says, "is not only useful in apprais­
ing the society in which we live, but such understand­
ing is also indispensable in order to know what is 
necessary for its rehabilitation and what methods will 
succeed in achieving that rehabilitation" [F,106]. 
Always, his objective is the "improvement of the econo­
mic community." Briefly, this study will now indicate 
what B.W. Dempsey considered was the chief damaging 
effect that each of the five revolutions had upon the 
economic community, resulting in society's "disorder" 
and "complete disorganization." 
1. The Protestant Reformation [F,106-107) • . •
is "the first of these revolutions." The result is 
that the great mass who today call themselves Chris­
tians are "without any genuine knowledge of Christian 
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teaching." The practical significance of this in the 
economic world is that we have been living on a Chris­
tian momentum that is gradually running out. B.W. Demp­
sey expresses it with economic succinctness by saying 
that "we have been living on our religious capital and 
we are rapidly approaching a genuine religious bank­
ruptcy" [F,107). Practically, this leaves many "who 
recognize no law external to themselves" whatever in 
"control" of our economic community. 
2. The commercial Revolution "completely reori­
ented the commerce of the world." Yet "the significant 
fact" that B.W. Dempsey points to "is that this greatly 
expanded and constantly expanding market was developed 
without any acceptance on the part of the traders of 
any common doctrine of just conduct in economies" 
[F,108). This is in contrast to the "medieval economic 
social organization," which B.W. Dempsey points out 
"did quite a creditable job in governing such local 
markets for the common good." Hence, whatever the 
economic gains, the commercial expansion meant a social 
and moral loss to the common good. The commercial 
movement "expanded our economic universe making avail­
able a greater and greater quantity and variety of 
goods," but, as B.W. Dempsey significantly says, "with­
out progress in the development of the government of 
these markets for the benefit of all human beings" 
( F, 108) • "Thus,'' a·. W. Dempsey concludes, "the remote 
foundations of the great expansion of modern times were 
laid without consistent principle commonly held to 
direct that expansion" [F,109). 
3. The Industrial Revolution, as Arnold Toynbee
summarized in his study,4 "is the substitution of com­
petition for the medieval regulation which has previ­
ously controlled the production and distribution of 
wealth" [F,110). B.W. Dempsey quotes this definition 
approvingly, but not without qualification: "To be 
perfectly accurate," maintains B.W. Dempsey, "this 
expression should say 'competition alone"' [F,273). 
Continuing, our author states the implications of this 
4F,110; Arnold J. Toynbee, Lectures on the Industri­
al Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, Popular Address­
es and Other Fragments, (London: Longmans, 1908}. 
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"rectified" definition. While not coming to the defense 
of the "degenerate guilds," he does emphasize that the 
"important thing is that these institutions were 
replaced by a principle that pretended to be an automa­
tic and complete regulator of the economy" [F,111]. An 
explanation of the extension of this principle was 
clearly expressed by B.W. Dempsey: "Competition was 
regarded as automatic in the sense that it not only 
regulated markets that had been already organized but 
that it organized them perfectly in the first place. It 
was regarded as complete in the sense that no antece­
dent, supplementary, or auxiliary principle was needed 
to effect the most economic distribution of available 
resources" [F,111]. 
"Competition, although a useful principle, is a 
secondary and incomplete one." B.W. Dempsey quotes the 
above from Quadragesimo Anno as a source of authorita­
tive criticism of free competition, a principle regard­
ed as automatic, incomplete, and primary. 
Free competition, however, though within 
certain limits just and productive of good 
results, cannot be the ruling principle of 
the economic work; this has been abundantly 
proved by the consequences that have followed 
from the free rein given to these dangerous 
individualistic ideals [F,222]. 5 
"Competition must operate within a given framework," 
B.W. Dempsey concludes, "as all persons have an obli­
gation in social justice to see that the terms of com­
petition are actually such as to promote the common 
good and are kept constantly amended in changing cir­
cumstances with the end in view" [F,111]. 
Admittedly, "the removal of outmoded regulation" 
by the so-called "Industrial Revolution" released pro­
ductive resources. But B.W. Dempsey is more interested 
in the "incalculable hardship on human beings" imposed 
by the "reliance on an incomplete and inadequate prin­
ciple of economic organization." Characteristically, 
he concludes his treatment of "Industrial Revolution" 
by pointing out how it "left economic society without a 
solid constitution within which to conduct a competi-
5Quadragesimo Anno, paragraph 88. 
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tive business firmly directed to the common good" [F,1-
12). 
,. The Revolution in •inane• came about when new 
bank borrowing practices resulted in an expansion of 
money. Today, it is common economic knowledge "that 
banks do add to the effective money supply" [F,114). No 
one claims any longer that the individual bank acting 
alone can "create" money supply; all agree that the 
same bank acting as part of the banking system can and 
does do so. This relatively modern banking phenomenon 
had far-reaching results. B.W. Dempsey emphasizes two 
of these effects of money or credit creation that can 
add to "disorder" and "disorganization" of the economic 
community. 
The first important effect is that such a revolu­
tion in finance "has enormously increased the power of 
governments" [F,114), for government has now a source 
of borrowing at negligible cost money that enables it 
"to spend sums which may cause important changes in the 
economy and to do this without consulting the taxpayer" 
[F,114). To consult a taxpayer in the creation of mod­
ern (paper) money is not necessary because the cost is 
so negligible. To produce any other good, labor, capi­
tal, and so on, all cost items must go into their sup­
ply. In the chapter called "Price of Money" in his book 
Interest and Usury, B.W. Dempsey significantly observes 
that "the supply of real capital is limited by purely 
physical conditions, while the supply of money is, in 
theory, unlimited and eyen in practice is held only 
with fairly elastic boundaries. "In other words," he 
says, "there is one element in the price system where 
'P' (price) has no relation to 'q' (quantity); when 
persons desire money with which to control present 
resources, the increasing marginal utility of money in 
hand is not reflected in any increase in the price of 
the "product" [I,107). 
Banks, the creators of money, must be firmly regu­
lated, much more so than producers of steel, flour, 
autos, and so on. The primary reason for control is 
that banks' activities affect the money supply and 
therefore the economy's health. B.W. Dempsey warns of 
the danger inherent in modern money creation. "The 
supply and demand for goods for any purpose, hoarding 
included, have objective restrictions; but when the 
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demand for money can determine the supply, then any 
movement of prices is possible" [I,30]. 
s. The Political (l'rench) Revolution "created a
society which was not only an actual break with the 
past but a break based on the principle that whatever 
was ancient, medieval, or Christian was bad and was to 
be got rid of merely because it was ancient, medieval 
or Christian" [F,116]. Long ago in a classic manner 
Edmund Burke exposed the weakness and disruption of the 
French Revolution. Referring to France, he says: 
• • •  you had all these advantages in your
ancient states; but you chose to act as if
you had never been molded into civil society;
and had everything to begin anew. You began
ill, because you began by despising
everything that belonged to you. You ?ot up
your trade without a capital [F,117]. 
B.W. Dempsey was fond of quoting this passage and other 
passages from Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French 
Revolution. The French Revolution's "example" and "new 
doctrines" disrupted numerous economic communities. As 
a practical result of the French Revolution -- with its 
insistence that groups intermediate between the state 
and the individual must, for the sake of "quality," be 
abolished -- the two extremes of liberalism and 
socialism arose. 
c. Class conflict
With the absence of sound social organization and
the substitution of either extreme liberalism or soc­
ialism came two unfortunate results: unrestrained class 
conflict on the one hand, and, as an ill-advised an­
tidote to the first, depersonalized bureaucratic stat­
ism. B.W. Dempsey spent much time and effort in writ­
ings, lectures, and speeches castigating these twin 
evils. Time and again he hit at the "erroneous•• 
Ricardo-inspired notion that class conflict is unavoid­
able [Cf. F,8; 59; 143.-144; 208; 242; 208]; the follow­
ing statement is typical: 
6Edmund Burke, op.cit., pp. 23, 33-34. 
70 
The acceptance of class conflict not merely 
as a fact but as a valid principle has been, 
if not actually universal in American indus­
trial society, at least very common indeed. 
This one erroneous idea, common to both li­
beralism and socialism, has been accepted as 
a settled and established point of departure 
in disputes by labor and business alike, and 
by the congress and the courts which viewed 
the industrial world in which these factions 
live, interpreted it, legislated for it, and 
made decisions concerning it (F,144]. 
He reserved his sharpest criticism for the socialist 
theory of class conflict: 
But it is one thing to admit the opposition 
of particular interest as a fact in various 
concrete circumstances and another thing to 
accept permanent opposition of one particular 
set of economic interests as the determining 
factor in all economic history and in all 
current economic relationships. Class strug­
gles as a fact come and go, causing more or 
less harm and distress as they go. The class 
struggle as the eternal and decisive prin­
ciple of economic life has neither historical 
nor analytical foundation. The community of 
interest of "capital" and "labor" in produc­
tion on-the-job has more reality than this 
putative class struggle [F,154]. 
His constant emphasis on the disordering effect of 
class conflict stemmed from his conviction that "before 
anything can be done to release the powerful forces of 
which that cooperation can be the source, labor and 
business must both discard their Ricardian-Marxian bi­
focal spectacles and look at the facts as they are in 
themselves, not as theory has made them" [F,146]. "Be­
neath the superficial and induced conflict," B.W. Demp­
sey always saw lying the "reality of productive cooper­
ation." His basic class lesson was always that "class 
conflict is neither necessary nor inevitable." This is 
where all reform and economic community must begin. 
Unless the truth about the fallacy of class conflict is 
realized, cooperation is impossible. Without social 
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cooperation, no real economic community is possible. 
"However real particular conflicts may have been in the 
past, however widespread and deep-seated false theories 
may have rendered them today, the class conflict is 
neither necessary nor inevitable" [F,146]. "Before 
anything positive can be accomplished the road must be 
cleared by the abolition of class conflict, and this is 
the first obligation of the state and of every good 
citizen" [F,284). 
D. Principle of Sul>sidiarity
The Guild System as "institutional structure sound
in principle had been wiped out." With the absence of 
an internal principle of order necessary for a sound 
social organization, the state is forced to"substitute" 
and as a result is "overwhelmed with tasks for which it 
is not equipped" [F,284]. "This is a violation of the 
principle of subsidiarity," asserts B.W. Dempsey, and 
adds, "recovery depends upon its observance." As 
should be expected, B.W. Dempsey made much of this 
principle. An examination of his writings seems to show 
no original research; he seemingly was content to rely 
for the analysis and importance of the principle of 
subsidiarity on the authoritative pronouncements of 
Pius XI; on the interpretation and explanation of this 
principle given by Oswald von Nell-Bruning; and on 
quotations from st. Thomas Aquinas showing the underly­
ing reasons for the necessity of observance of this 
principle. Here is one brief excerpt from a much longer 
passage quoted by B.W. Dempsey in The Functional Econ­
omy: 
According to the principle of subsidiarity 
the state is entitled to as much legislative 
power as it needs for its task as supreme 
guarantor of common good, that common good to 
which it had to supply as one of its essen­
tial contributions, the necessary uniformity 
of law and the inviolable security of inter-
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nal peace. No more legislative power, but no 
less either, is due to the state [F,119].7 
"Violation of the principle," B.W. Dempsey adds, "had 
robbed men of perfective activity and especially of 
that peculiarly perfective activity, the acceptance of 
responsibility in [their] work-a-day relations and 
decisions" [F,284]. Building upon this argument, he 
quotes from St. Thomas. "To preserve the perfections of 
things governed and not to diminish them is a proper 
function of government" . • • "This optimum in any 
government is that things governed be provided for 
according to their own capacity, for in this does the 
justice of a government consist. If men were prevented 
by the governor of a community from carrying on their 
own functions, this would be contrary to the principle 
of human government, unless perchance it be done 
occasionally for a brief time in some emergency. 118 
"Since things governed are by government to be led on 
to perfection, government is the better precisely to 
the degree that greater perfection is communicated by 
the one governing to those governed. It is a greater 
perfection that a thing should be good in itself and 
also be a cause of good in others, than it should be 
good only in itself.119 
A government, B.W. Dempsey would insist, which 
interferes with the free functioning of a human per­
sonality, stunts the development of that personality. 
As one man may not use another namely as a means to an 
end, so neither can the state. A government which takes 
over for its citizens functions which they can ade­
quately perform for themselves forces them to a less 
virtuous life. B.W. Dempsey gives several examples 
showing this loss of virtue due to violations of the 
principle of subsidiarity. "They will be less prudent 
or less provident, less resourceful. They are lesser 
men than they could have been." To govern a thing is 
70. von Nell-Bruening, s. J., "The vocational Order
and Monopoly," Review of Social Economy, vol. IX, no. 2 
(September, 1951), p. 98. 
8St. Thomas Aquinas. Contra. Gent. 3:71. 
9S • T. , I, q. 10 3 , a. 7 • 
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to direct it to its end. When a state violates the 
principle of subsidiarity, it directs its citizens to 
its own end, not to the proper end of the citizen, 
which is his fullest possible development as a person. 
This is the complete reversal of the function of gov­
ernment. "Subsidiarity," observes B.W. Dempsey, "has 
been given classic expression by Pius XI:" 
As history abundantly proves, it is true that 
on account of changed conditions many things 
which were done by small associations in 
former times cannot be done now save by large 
associations. Still, that most weighty prin­
ciple, which cannot be set aside or changed, 
remains fixed and unshaken in social philoso­
phy: just as it is gravely wrong to take from 
individuals what they can accomplish by their 
own initiative and industry and give it to 
the community, so also it is an injustice and 
at the same time a grave evil and disturbance 
of right order to assign to greater and high­
er associations what lesser and subordinate 
organizations can do. For every social ac­
tivity ought of its very nature to furnish 
help to the members of the bodfc social, and
never destroy and absorb them. 0 
B.W. Dempsey considered it obvious and beyond 
argument that "modern states have violated the prin­
ciple of subsidiarity in a wholesale manner by rushing 
into the gap left by the failure to develop economic 
justice when these relations outgrew the form of the 
household economy." Then, more precisely, he indicates 
that the "nature of the failure is that the political 
state imposed political justice upon economic communi­
ties, instead of calling upon economic agents to use 
their prudence as an intellectual and moral virtue to 
find and apply means of extending the principles of 
economic justice from the household to the firm and 
industry." Of course, this failure in order through 
subsidiarity principle violation could not help but be 
"heightened by the injection into a real problem of the 
10Encyclical: Quadragesismo Anno, paragraph 79. 
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synthetic theory of universal and inevitable class 
conflict." 
II. PRINCIPLES OP SOCIAL ORDER
B.W. Dempsey's conception of an ordered economic
community is, of course, largely an interpretation of 
Pope Pius's XI's plan for a social order. At every 
point he made a conscientious effort in his interpreta­
tion and application to keep faithful to the spirit of 
the entire body of papal teaching. Always, he drew a 
delicate but clear line of demarcation between the 
doctrinal teaching of the Church and his own economic 
analysis. 
A. Organic order
Only after a sufficient delineation of the nega­
tive elements of class struggle, unregulated competi­
tion, and the false relation of the modern state to 
society does B.W. Dempsey turn to positive elements 
that make up a "good society" or "economic community." 
B.W. Dempsey would never regret the length of his repe­
titious treatment on class conflict, for he considered 
the "abolition of class conflict" as "the essential 
condition to the restoration of social order." He knew 
in his emphasis that he was "thinking with the Church." 
His own reference for this emphasis harks back to the 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, paragraphs 81�83; 112-
114. Certain salient excerpts from these passages duti­
fully illustrate the need for this emphasis:
81. Now this is the primary duty of the
state and of all good citizens: to abolish
conflict between classes with divergent in­
terests, and thus foster and promote harmony
between the various ranks of society.
82. The aim of social legislation must
therefore be the re-establishment of voca­
tional groups. Society today still remains in
a strained and therefore unstable and uncer­
tain state, being founded on classes with
contradictory interests and hence opposed to
each other, and consequently prone to enmity
and strife.
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83 • • • •  demand and supply of labor divides 
men in the labor market into two classes, as 
into two camps, and the bargaining between 
these parties transforms this labor market 
into an arena where the two armies are 
engaged in combat. To this grave disorder, 
which is leading society to ruin, a remedy 
must evidently be applied as speedily as 
possible. 
B.W. Dempsey did treat improvement in utilization, 
distribution and administration of property with due 
concern. He considered them "important aids" in remov­
ing causes of class conflict. But if there is to be 
order instead of disorder, harmony must replace class 
struggle. The necessary condition, not the cause, of a 
just social order is the elimination of class conflict. 
Ranging over the entire social field, B.W. Dempsey 
wrote, among other topics, on the just wage and just 
distribution of wealth. These he would insist lead us 
to the "threshold" of a sound economic community. He 
reiterated papal doctrine when he stated that there 
"should be access by all to property in its twofold 
personal and social function, a fair distribution of 
income and just wages." Respect is demanded for the 
"fundamental right possessed by every man to use the 
goods of this world," respect for human labor, care for 
function of capital in the development of society and 
of persons. 
Nothing of this is accidental. Nothing can be left 
out of account. All will help the economic community to 
the "threshold" of order. But "order" of itself does 
not consist of the necessary condition, social order; 
the elimination of class conflict; or the threshold 
through necessary activities treated above. "Order" in 
society is the dynamic principle of all these tasks. 
His long treatment of the guilds in their "limited 
local activities" was not to advocate their return. 
Forthrightly, he states that "there is little for us to 
learn directly from the guilds" [F,279). He is sharply 
critical of the fact that they "never functioned effec­
tively beyond a local market" and that their fame or 
infamy comes "through their faults and limitations" 
rather than their virtues. Then he clearly pinpoints 
their importance. "The only thing that the guilds have 
to offer modern industry and commerce is a functional 
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principle of organization both within an industry and 
in the relation of industry to the state and to other 
industries. There is a great need of a revival of the 
functional principle, and if the functional principle 
were successfully applied to modern industry, it would 
take a smart medieval guildsman to recognize that the 
same principle was at work under the greatly changed 
conditions" [F,279]. 
With the disappearance of the guilds, an internal 
principle of organization or order was lost. The In­
dustrial Revolution had no principle of organization. 
It held, in effect, that "natural economic forces" not 
only regulated existing markets, but constituted mar­
kets where none existed" [F,314]. Thus "markets were 
left to establish themselves." The result was a vast 
gap in social organization. our economy became "theor­
etically rudderless" [F,329]. Thus, concern for the 
well-being of the person -- for his material welfare 
and, more importantly, for his need as a person to 
exercise responsibility and to control his own destiny 
-- requires that functiona� groups, similar in prin­
ciple to medieval guilds, be re-introduced into the 
social structure. 
"Order is what we are seeking in the economic 
field" [F,366]. This order will come through discovery 
and felicitous application of principles to the exist­
ing economic community. "Order presumes some end toward 
which things are -ordered." Social order is the "ar­
rangement" of human persons in a "variety of social 
institutions organically linked together" [F,367]. 
Social life is organic� according to B.W. Dempsey, if 
social life develops from an internal principle and 
feeds and grows on what is around it [F,307]. A social 
life attempted to be brought about by extrinsic prin­
ciples or external forces will have no vitality, no 
real life. A truly human social order must be personal 
and social at one and the same time. To have a sound 
economic community, the growth must come from within. 
Then only can institutions grounded in personal respon­
sibility which are necessary at all levels of society 
be established. Today's society needs to bring back to 
life intermediate bodies which would be free associa­
tions with regard to the state -- although they will 
have to be recognized by it -- and free also in their 
internal affairs. 
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Human society, in a certain sense, necessarily 
forms a social and organic body. In accordance with 
Papal doctrine, B.W. Dempsey gives constant emphasis to 
"a truly organic body" [F,207]. 
An organism has a true internal directive 
principle. Economic life has been organized 
in modern society on the mechanistic prin­
ciples of Liberalism supposedly leading to an 
equilibrium of mechanical forces offsetting 
each other. At the opposite extreme, national 
socialistic societies have been organized 
with economic society held together only by 
an extrinsic bond. Neither of these brings 
into existence a "truly social and organic 
body • • •  economic society must have an 
intrinsic principle" [F,207]. 
Hence, B.W. Dempsey considered social order a unity, 
one group ordered to a common end. Society is one, not 
with the unity of a physical (biological) organism or 
of a substance, but with the unity of free and rational 
agents intending one end and working together for the 
attainment of that end. The unity of society is gov­
erned by an inner (intrinsic) principle, that is, by 
the common end of mutual supplementation. To his pur­
pose, B.W. Dempsey quotes from the Reorganization of 
Social Economy: "as in the living organism, it is im­
possible to provide for the good of the whole unless 
each single part and each individual member is given 
what it needs for the exercise of its proper functions, 
so it is impossible to care for the social organism and 
the good of society as a unit unless each single part 
and each individual member -- that is to say, each 
individual man in the dignity of the human personality 
-- is supplied with all that is necessary for the exer­
cise of his social functions."11
11Cf. F, 220 quoting from o. von Nell-Bruening, s. 
J., Reorganization of Social Economy, B. w. Dempsey, 




B.W. Dempsey never looked upon the "vocational
order" as a plan or blueprint which could be applied in 
the same manner to all countries and conditions, but 
rather as a presentation of certain principles that 
should serve as a foundation for "the re-organization 
of the social order. Associations of human beings, 
however basic and natural their principles, cannot and 
should not be blueprinted like machines" [F,305]. 
Again, "to project the detailed form of economic in­
stitutions is idle fancy" [F,322]. 
His presentation of a sound economic community 
begins with the present institutional arrangements. "No 
matter where we are we must start from where we are." 
With Edmund Burke, he thought that the French Revolu­
tion's total rejection of the past had done untold 
damage to society. "You [France] might have repaired 
those walls; you miiht have built on those old founda­
tions" [Cf. F,116). 2 "Institutions should be studied 
as they are, and the relevant moral concepts must be 
studied as they can be applied to these institutions as 
they are." At no time did he consider it desirable to 
tear down a sound building just because the roof was in 
bad repair. 
c. Natural community
The present social order is never completely bad.
Always, there are good elements present. In existence 
behind and beyond the opposition of classes was the 
idea of a natural community. In his search not for a 
blueprint but for principles that could be applied to 
any existing institution for the ordering and "improv­
ing of an economic community," he was quick to point 
out that the "naturalness of economic community is not 
only a principle, but it is a social principle" 
[F,305). He was fond of saying that "man does not be­
come something entirely different when he goes to work" 
[F,305). "There exist in the United States genuine 
functional communities, large groups of people who have 
12Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolu­
tion, ed. E. Rays (New York: Everyman•s Library, E. P. 
Dutton and Company, 1910), pp. 23, 33-34. 
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a common interest, a common task, a common purpose. 
These persons, regardless of location, form a function­
al community quite as real and almost as important as 
the civil municipality" [F,320-331]. "Functional as­
sociation is the first principle of human organization 
in economic life, as in all other life" [F,319]. 
Everyone recognizes that close and enduring as­
sociation is the first principle of organization in 
civil and domestic order. Moving into the economic 
order, B.W. Dempsey points out that, analogously, the 
11man who goes to work is the same citizen and husband." 
This analogy seems to require that the "first principle 
of economic life be association rather than competi­
tion" [F,293]. Men in society should be "united accord­
ing to what they do and contribute, namely, their func­
tion" [F,304]. "Economic community begins with the 
physically co-operating members of the producing unit. 
These people live and work together, constantly com­
municate, and share knowledge, experience, and the 
results of their joint effort. They genuinely have 
something in common (the basis of community), and with­
in this working unit, self-government of the economic 
community must begin" [F,320). 
His contribution in this part of social thought, 
therefore, came from the development of the proposition 
or thesis in Quadragesimo Anno, paragraph 83, namely, 
that "nature induces those who practice the same trade 
or profession [to] combine into orders." These autono­
mous groups are necessary for a stable and healthy 
economy. In support of this thesis, B.W. Dempsey pre­
sented historical considerations -- historical and 
statistical data in support of the co-natural character 
of the economic municipality: analytical considerations 
drawn from man's social nature -- towns are natural to 
society, integral to social well-being; an argument by 
analogy with domestic and civil society; and many argu­
ments from many divergent authorities who, having ex­
perience of modern societies, drew the conclusion of 
the usefulness of functional organizations.13 His own 
conclusion: "the order, the autonomous economic com­
munity as municipality, is natural." Society must be 
13Cf. Chapter 15, "The Basis of Functional Com­
munities," and Chapter 16, "Growth in Functional or­
ganization," in The Functional Economy. 
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"united according to what they [men] do and contribute, 
namely their function" [F,304]. 
D. Justice
The "first principle of organization of markets 
and self-regulation of industry" is the virtue of jus­
tice.14 Justice is traditionally defined as the vir-
14Justice -- a stable and constant inclination, that 
is, a virtue which prompts each to render to another that 
which is his due. 
A. Particular Justice
1. Commutative Justice -- Man to Man Relation
Called commutative after its major part, which
concerns contracts of exchange. It also
concerns anything which may be due to another,
for example, property lost through theft or
damage, or anything else which can be ap­
praised at a price. It exists between two
mutually independent equal determinate indi­
viduals (usually human persons but may be
corporations or states). The virtue which
prompts a man ( in exchange transactions) to
render to another that which is his due in
strict �quality.
B. Common Justice
1. Distributive Justice -- Relation of Organized
Community to Individual Member
The virtue of distributive justice resides in
the executive. The virtue which prompts the
administrator of any community to render to
each member of that community that which is
his according to a proportionate equality.
2. Contributive or General Justice -- Relation of
Man to Unorganized, Imperfectly organized, or
Disorganized Community
a. Legal Justice -- Relation of Man to Orga­
nized Community (usually of citizen to
state)
The virtue which prompts a member of any
community to render to the community that
which is theirs as defined by positive
ordinances.
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tue, or constant and stable habit, to render to each 
person that which is his due, and being a virtue, it 
resides properly and primarily in morally free persons 
[F,218]. "And it is as habits, that is, a bent by which 
acts are performed readily and easily, that virtues 
affect social order" [F,218]. 
1. Bxchanga Justice. Briefly, s.w. Dempsey dis­
cusses justice as it touches upon the economic communi­
ty. The "forms of justice" he calls "the pillars in the 
structure of Scholastic social thought" [1,133]. "The 
central action," he says, "that is to be governed by 
the virtue of justice is the transaction of exchange 
between two persons. In this case, we speak of commuta­
tive or exchange justice and that virtue governs all 
contracts of exchange, explicit or implicit, such as 
purchase and sale, hiring or renting, leasing, loaning, 
and the like, and the restoration or respecting of the 
economic goods of another, independently of contract" 
[ F, 218] • 15
"The attainment of equality in exchange is the 
work of commutative justice" [1,135). Much of the trea­
tises on justice and right is concerned with determin­
ing what things are equal, and this obviously involves 
a theory of value, price, and money" [1,135]. Molina is 
approvingly quoted by B.W. Dempsey when he says that 
"commutative justice consists in equality as to value 
between price and object" [Cf. I,135 quoting Molina, 
365:10]. 
[F,222] 
b. Contributive Justice -- Relation of Man
to Unorganized, Imperfectly organized, or
Disorganized Community
The virtue which prompts a member of any
community to render to the community that
which is theirs as defined by the demands
of the common good.
15Justice in relation to exchange will be taken up 
in a separate heading. B. W. Dempsey, realizing the 
importance of understanding just price and its corollary, 
interest and usury, devoted much of his writings to this 
general topic. 
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Exchange is fundamental to human society: it 
is natural in the sense that it so obviously 
meets human needs that intelligence will seek 
it out and use it. Exchange is a natural 
necessity to human nature in order that soci­
ety move on that level which is consonant 
with man's obvious aptitude and exigency. As 
man freely but inevitably builds a society 
around him ("inasmuch as no man is sufficient 
unto himself") so within that society man 
will inevitably exchange, not from any inter­
nal or external compulsion but from a direct 
rational grasp of his own human nature in 
relation to a concrete practical situation. 
In such transactions in which men communicate 
in social life, it is "in accord with right 
reason," and therefore "natural" and "just," 
that the exchange be at an equality. Both 
parties need the social framework within 
which they operate. Each needs the goods of 
the other. Each wishes and intends to get the 
full value of what goods he has to offer. 
Neither has the right to subordinate the 
other to his purposes. Commutative justice 
will see that this value is received, all of 
it, but not more [I,136]. 
As B.W. Dempsey.recalls, "the principle of Thomas 
Aquinas is accepted by all" [I,136]. Exchange thus 
arises from man's personal needs, but from a personal 
need that is not distinct from his need for society. 
2. Distributive Justice "Distributive justice
is of wide economic application, and may not be lost 
sight of in regulation of the public economy" [I,134]. 
Distributive justice applies to the executive, and 
obliges him to secure for each member of his community 
his due and proportionate share of both the advantages 
(e.g. subsidies) and the burdens (e.g. obligation to 
pay taxes) which are involved in the conduct of the 
community. Thus, the agent or "distributor" of the 
goods of the community apportions those things which 
belong to the community to individual members who are 
parts of that community. "A very simple case of dis­
tributive justice," B.W. Dempsey opines, "is the pro­
gressive income tax" (F,219]. 
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Nothing belongs to an individual as exclusively 
his; all that belongs to him is a share in something 
common to everyone. Good practical judgment, "an exer­
cise of prudence," is needed to decide what personal 
considerations are morally relevant to a given case. 
11 The equality of distributive justice is of a special 
kind: unequal things are given to unequal people. Com­
pensations by means of punishments and reward would not 
be just, if all rewards and all punishments were 
equal. 1116 
Determining what is the due (the right) of any one 
person can only be effected from the position and view­
point of the "executive" -- the one responsible for the 
common weal -- for the very reason that a due and fit­
ting share in the common good is involved. In exchange 
(commutative) justice, the obligation is paid; in dis­
tributive justice the obligation is allotted. In ex­
change justice, a purely numerical, quantitative equal­
ity is to be effected, the object alone being consider­
ed; in distributive justice, a proportional equality, 
which deems that the executive who administers the 
common good consider both the object (goods) and sub­
ject (persons) of the obligation [Cf.F,219]. "Distri­
butive justice does not allow the burden to fall un­
evenly" [I,134]. Thus, B.W. Dempsey concludes, "distri­
butive justice must be a primary consideration in de­
termining economic policy insofar as that falls to 
public authority in the promotion of the common good 
. • • the studious pursuit of it will be no small aid 
in furthering the common prosperity" [I,135). 
While commutative (exchange) justice and distribu­
tive justice are "both essential and requisite," they 
are by themselves "insufficient" [F,240). At this junc­
ture, B.W. Dempsey soberly reminds us of the "needless 
poverty of our (American] economic philosophy." "We 
are told," says B.W. Dempsey, "that we are confronted 
with a basic, fundamental, and inevitable choice that 
must be made -- either free markets or government regu­
lation. Admittedly, so-called liberalism "placed its 
reliance on exchange justice alone; socialism "features 
16St. Thomas Aquinas, contra Gent. 3: 42; B. W. 
Dempsey also refers to s.T. I-II, q. 96, art. 3, ad. 3 
um. In The Functional Economy, cf. 217-223; 239-240; 
315-317. In Interest and Usury, cf. 133-138; 213-220.
84 
distributive justice exclusively." Clearly, B.W. Demp­
sey shows that he recognizes that "competition and 
state regulation are both useful principles of economic 
government. But he denies that the choice between free 
market or government regulation is a "basic, fundamen­
tal and inevitable choice." Both competition and state 
regulation are "useful" and "indispensable," but both 
together are inadequate. They are "secondary princi­
ples" only [F,239]. 
3. contri�utive Justice
Besides exchange and distributive justice, there 
is contributive justice, which is "absolutely neces­
sary." B.W. Dempsey develops this at length: 
Besides commutative, exchange justice 
and distributive justice, both essential and 
requisite but insufficient, contributive 
justice is absolutely necessary. Distributive 
justice administered by the state attempts to 
regulate economic society from without. Ex­
change justice operates from within, but it 
concerns only the actions of individuals. 
Economic society, however, is a fact; it ex­
ists and is real, independently of civil 
society, though operating within civil socie­
ty. Man i,s normally a member of many communi­
ties -- the family, the town, the province, 
the club, the church. To each of these com­
munities he owes a debt of justice, called by 
Fr. Pesch, very aptly, contributive justice. 
·These things no one denies. But in economic
life we follow a very false and costly doc­
trine of opposition of interests. The worker
recognizes the economic community in his
union; the employer recognizes the same in
his trades association. But both are blind to
the community that exists in their industry
as a whole -- a real community to which both
parties taken singly owe a debt in social,
contributive justice, and both parties taken
together owe a debt to all other industries
that receive their product and whose product
they receive.
This is the fact of economic community 
which is not recognized • • •  All the persons 
who work at any level in a given industry 
have something in common that is no less 
real, and perhaps more important, than the 
geographical proximity of political communi­
ties. Steel-town and motor-town and textile­
town are communities as actual as Pittsburgh, 
Detroit, or Lowell. These communities are in 
need of order, just as truly as their politi­
cal municipal counterparts. The principle of 
contributive social justice furnishes the 
basis for a genuine direction of economic 
life, for a town-meeting organization of the 
communities within the economy. Economic life 
is in need of direction just as political 
life is in need of government, not to hamper, 
repress, or regiment, but to create and main­
tain conditions within which constructive 
forces can operate {F,240]. 
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All three justices (exchange, distributive, con­
tributive) do work together to bring about a sound 
economic community. All human actions (including acts 
of exchange, contributive and distributive justice) 
[Cf. F,369] promote the common good. "Each individual 
is to contribute to the community those circumstances, 
conditions and opportunities that are necessary for his 
personal development (distributive justice), and 
through the process of exchange (exchange justice) 
those goods that are necessary to the same end" 
[F,220]. 
Quick to realize that the virtue of social justice 
has "the primary positive role in the restoration of 
social order," B.W. Dempsey, as usual, built his anal­
ysis on Church doctrine. Closely paralleling the en­
cyclical, as always, he considered his function was to 
highlight, to elucidate, and when possible to develop, 
but never to depart from the Church's "official social 
writings." "The climax of the central action of the 
encyclical is reached in paragraph 88," said B.W. Demp­
sey, in referring to Quadragesimo Anno; and this sec­
tion, which is on social justice, "may therefore be 
taken as the very core of the doctrine of the encycli­
cal" {F,382]. B.W. Dempsey never tired of quoting and 
commenting on this salient passage. He was very quick 
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to appreciate the importance of this significant para­
graph, always giving it just emphasis. In another 
place, he reiterated the "reason for the importance and 
his emphasis" when he said that "the whole point of the 
encyclical on the 'Restoration of the Social Order• 
[his translation of the encyclical's title] was to make 
the Christian world very acutely conscious of the vir­
tue of contributive (social) justice" [F,212]. Not only 
did he accept the importance of social justice from 
authoritative sources, but he himself had a deeper 
realization than most of how "social justice rules the 
whole of economic reality and fixes the responsibility 
on all to see that our social institutions reflect 
social reality" [F,237]. 
Not stopping at mere assertion and quotation, B.W. 
Dempsey constantly hammered away at the need for social 
justice. "Social justice," he says, "is the dynamic 
virtue of economic society" [F,383]. Then he sets out 
in three steps why this "dynamic virtue" is necessary 
to bring about the "sanity and right order" to be found 
"restored in industrial communities" [F,383). In the 
first instance, social justice can be considered "the 
guardian of efficiency; it supposes that I have some­
thing to contribute." Secondly, social justice is the 
"guardian of economic institutions within which ex­
change takes place and contributions are made." Third­
ly, elimination of conscious conflict is a "necessary 
condition of a social order," but it will only be elim­
inated through.social justice, the "antidote for class 
conflict," because it is "the unifying principle of the 
functional municipalities" [F,383). Clearly, B.W. Demp­
sey recognized the virtue of social justice as the 
"primary" principle, though he readily recognized that 
"it was not the exclusive regulative principle of econ­
omic life" [F,217). 
Scattered throughout his many writings are iso­
lated passages concerning social justice and its "rela­
tionship to the social order." While in no one place 
does he give his complete thought on this virtue, his 
thinking seems abundantly clear (Cf. F,222]. Distin­
guishing between two "kinds" of contributive justice, 
he refers only briefly to legal justice: "the relation 
of the member of an organized community which has es­
tablished reasonable ordinances for the common good." 
In a single sentence and example, he dispatches legal 
justice. "Legal justice," he says, "is the sort of 
87 
virtue that the citizen or member of any other communi­
ty practices when he observes those ordinances which 
have been established for the common good, such as 
driving on the right side of the street, stopping for 
traffic lights, or disposing of garbage or other wastes 
in such a way as not to endanger the health of the 
community" [F,219]. Then he passes on to the all-im­
portant second "kind" of contributive justice -- social 
justice. Ordinarily, when he uses the term "contribu­
tive justice" in his writings, he means "social jus­
tice." When he does not, he explicitly nominates it 
each time as legal justice [Cf. F,165; 22; 319]. 
While legal justice may rule in a fully organized 
society, society is necessary for man "before it is so 
organized, when it is badly organized or administered, 
and when it is disorganized" [F,219]. B.W. Dempsey 
continues in the same vein, saying that "man has need 
of the community; the community, badly as man needs it, 
has nothing to contribute to the individual member 
except what had been contributed by himself and others 
like him" [F,219]. He sees a "kind of proportion be­
tween the contribution that the individual makes to the 
community and that the community makes to the individu­
al, even though the community may seem to contribute to 
the individual more than the individual contributes to 
the community. B.W. Dempsey places his dependence on 
the following statement of Pius XI: "it is of the very 
essence of social justice to demand from each individu­
al all that is necessary for the common good." Obvi­
ously struck by the vigor of this sentence, B.W. Demp­
sey calls attention to Pius XI's use of "essence," 
"demand," "each," and "all" in the space of this one 
brief sentence. Commenting further on the Pope's 
statement, he says that "each individual is to contri­
bute to the community of which he is a member all that 
is necessary for the common good," and adds that each 
is to receive from the community "those circumstances, 
conditions, and opportunities that are necessary for 
his personal development" [F,22O]. "Nevertheless," B.W. 
Dempsey concludes, " in a practical way, the support of 
the community is absolutely indispensable to the in­
dividual and the individuals as a group are obviously 
necessary to the community" [F,220]. 
Ever alert to official Church doctrine, B.W. Demp­
sey calls attention to the fact that social justice is 
referred to explicitly, or fairly explicitly, about 
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fifteen times in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno [F,3-
71). But the fullest and most carefully worded state­
ment, B.W. Dempsey matter-of-factly mentions, occurs 
"in the encyclical on 'Atheistic Communism'" [F,372). 
As B.W. Dempsey quotes passage 51 from the encyclical 
Atheistic Communism fully, so shall we: 
51. In reality, besides commutative justice,
there is also social justice with its own set
of obligations, from which neither employers
nor workingmen can escape. Now it is of the
very essence of social justice to demand from
each individual all that is necessary for the
common good. But just as in the living or­
ganism it is impossible to care for the so­
cial organism, and the good of society as a
unit, unless each single part and each in­
dividual member -- that is to say each in­
dividual man in the dignity of his human
personality -- is supplied with all that is
necessary for the exercise of his social
functions. If social justice be satisfied,
the result will be an intense activity in
economic life as a whole, pursued in tran­
quility and order. This activity will be
proof of the health of the social body, just
as the health of the human body is recognized
in the undisturbed regularity and perfect
efficiency of the whole organism.
The duty in social justice, therefore, falls upon 
me as a person; the right is possessed by every person 
who is a member of the same community that I belong to. 
This is true "precisely, because he is a member" [F,3-
72). "Whenever social institutions function badly," 
explains B.W. Dempsey, "so that the contribution of the 
individual to the community in his ordinary activities 
is not easy and practically certain, then the ever 
present obligation of contributive justice (that is, 
social justice) emerges and rests positively on an 
individual member of the community" [F,372). 
B.W. Dempsey calls attention to the analytical 
incompleteness of contributive justice with its rights 
and duties. In several places in his writings, he puts 
himself to the task of remedying this "incompleteness." 
In the end, in reference to the right of social jus-
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tice, he still must say, "we cannot as yet assign in 
perfect and full detail all four factors involved in 
any right -- the subject, title, matter and term. He 
develops this point as follows: "just who each claimant 
is and who each debtor is, and what is the extent of 
the right or duty; these matters are not yet accurately 
determined. The incomplete right is a reality that is 
not to be set aside by reason of its incompleteness, 
but which obliges man to complete it" [F,377]. 
B.W. Dempsey admits a difficulty that troubles 
him, while attempting to "fill out and complete rights 
and duties by specifying exactly what each one has a 
right to and which each one owes" [F,377]. The diffi­
culty is that the obligation of social justice does not 
seem to fall upon the individual but upon the group. 
"The obligation," B.W. Dempsey puzzles, "seems to fall 
on a group, or at least will issue in futility unless 
the group acts so that each and any individual can 
disclaim the responsibility of 'doing anything about 
it' unless the group acts" [F,377]. In one of his last 
published articles, "The Range of Social Justice," he 
briefly touches on this problem. Yet we are forced to 
conclude with him that there is "need for sound work on 
the virtue of social justice." B.W. Dempsey then turn­
ed his own attention to other problems; he seemed to 
think it sufficient, as with so many problems, not to 
take upon himself the burden of solution, but to call 
the attention of others to the problem. 
B. Economic Prudence
"The formulation of a sound theory of economic 
prudence," B.W. Dempsey states categorically, "is one 
of the acute problems of our generation" [F,318]. Pru­
dence, of course, as the virtue of the practical man, 
has not changed. But the problems to which the virtue 
of prudence has to be applied have changed. The practi­
cal man, as always, must select the "best means to 
attain his end among the limited and circumscribed 
resources available here and now" [F,318]. Also, the 
practical man of prudence must still keep "a clear eye 
ahead to foresee the results of his action" [F,319]. 
But the problems of economic prudence no longer revolve 
merely around household problems. "To report today the 
same facts that Aquinas included in his original dis­
cussion," insists B.W. Dempsey in reference to today's 
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broadened scope of economic prudence, "we must add the 
firm and the industry to the household as an institu­
tion or association lying midway between the individual 
and the political state and subject to economic pru­
dence. "17 
To assay the definition and work of economic pru­
dence as depicted in the mind of B.W. Dempsey, it is 
necessary to step back a pace and look at the work of 
economics. B.W. Dempsey defines economics as "the al­
location of scarce resources to selected ends" [F,9-11; 
18]. It is fundamentally "a theory of choice among 
available practiced alternatives." The very act of 
prudence, according to st. Thomas, is "to choose 
through an act of the will or of free decision" (In 
Sent. I. q. I, a. 2, ad. 2 um.]. Thus the work of the 
man of prudence would be the "selection of the best 
means to execute a correct schedule of optima, practi­
cal, rational conduct in the concrete. 1118 
B.W. Dempsey depends upon St. Thomas Aquinas to 
delineate economic prudence for him -- a concept so 
important to his own task in socio-economic life. we go 
to st. Thomas, as did B.W. Dempsey, for an understand­
ing of the virtue of prudence. Upon st. Thomas's clear 
conception, B.W. Dempsey carried on his own socio-econ­
omic activities. His was a work of prudence, the ap­
plication of "universal principles to particular con­
clusions about things to do. 1119 For him economic 
prudence meant striving for the "right plan of things 
to do 1120 in order to restore the economic community to 
soundness. He "considered those things which are remote 
insofar as they are directed toward helping or hinder­
ing those things which are to be done presently. 1121 
In his own life, this virtue of economic prudence can 
be epitomized in his economic resourcefulness, for he 
1711 Prudence, Providence and Economic Decision," 
Thought XXXV (Spring, 1960), p. 33. 
18Ibid., p. 22. 
19S. T. , I I-I I, q. 4 7 , a. 6 • 
20s.T., I-II, q. 57, a. 4.
21S.T., II-II, q. 47, a. 4.
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was always "prompt and ready in thinking up ways of 
finding means" to implement socio-economic order. His 
was the habit which "manifested itself in the unlooked 
for situation, finding what was fitting"22 on every 
economic occasion. He stated this in one long sentence: 
Prudence is the virtue of the provident 
Christian who is not only clear in his own 
mind about his ultimate end but who is also 
well-balanced in the selection of means to 
ends in the complex concrete affairs of daily 
practical life so that he makes sound practi­
cal judgments that lead to correct actions in 
his practical affairs and these successes 
minister to success of life as a whole.23 
B.W. Dempsey possessed this virtue of economic 
prudence in an eminent degree; he preached it as neces­
sary for all men in economic life. Only if men possess­
ed this habit of the "correct appraisal of things to be 
done" in the economic order, would functional commit­
tees again flourish as the order of the day. He con­
sidered his own function as being that of the prudent 
counselor. He considered himself as an intellectual 
midwife at the birth of social economic institutions. 
"Prudent Counselors," says B.W. Dempsey in stating his 
own role, "may change the parties• states of mind; this 
may help them to make a new start and to achieve what 
they sought. But they (the parties involved) must 
achieve it. So it is also in the economic community" 
[F,318). Always his emphasis was on self-determination 
and the necessity of organic growth of economic com­
munities -- habits of economic prudence, justice, and 
charity of men themselves with the economic community. 
The Schoolmen and their modern heir, B.W. Dempsey, 
would never have economics "become a geometry exer­
cise." To them "it would always remain a series of 
case studies in which general, accepted convictions are 
applied to situations never far removed from particular 
markets." "In this sense," opines B.W. Dempsey, "the 
schoolmen were institutional economists." This he held 
22s.T., II-II, q. 49, a. 4.
23Thought, ibid., p. 28. 
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as true because "they applied their analysis to the 
accepted ways of doing things and scrutinized human 
exchange agreements in the light of their historical 
origin and their meaning and content for the men who 
used them" [1,146]. Undoubtedly, the Schoolmen (and 
B.W. Dempsey also) were historians, traditionalists; 
past and present institutions were analyzed sympatheti­
cally, if critically. And as e.w. Dempsey significantly 
adds in his own words, "they did not make their sub­
jects fit their presuppositions" [I,146]. 
Functional groups, therefore, are necessary for 
the restoration of a sound economic community. Certain­
ly, economic prudence -- a virtue possessed by the men 
within the economic community -- is required to be 
present in the formation of these functional groups. 
B.W. Dempsey, in full possession of this good habit of 
economic prudence and acting as a prudent counselor, 
thereupon made his own most significant contributions 
of thought and influence in the analysis of particular 
problems of just price, interest and usury. These are, 
after all, the work of economic prudence. 
CORCLUSXON 
B.W. Dempsey approached problems realistically. He 
blueprinted no ideal order, but examined instead the 
forces and facts present in every working economy. Only 
with this comp�eted was he ready to undertake the task 
of the restoration of the economic community, and then 
always with "intelligent adherence to the enlightened 
teachings of the Church and constant awareness of the 
lesson that history can achieve, against the background 
of historic and existing economic communities." 
The Guild system, an institutional structure sound 
in principle, has been wiped out, and no adequate meth­
od of economic control has replaced it. The result has 
been the complete disorganization of the economic or­
der. This disorganization arose from five causes, revo­
lutions in religion, commerce, industry, finance and 
politics. The dire result of these revolutions was not 
only to hasten the demise of the guilds, but to bring 
about the fact of class conflict, together with the 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity. 
The elimination of class conflict is a necessary 
condition for sound social order. Without its removal, 
no improvement can be expected in the life of the econ-
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omic community. The violation of the principle of sub­
sidiarity has contributed greatly to socio-economic 
disorganization; recovery depends upon its observance. 
As a result, the state is overwhelmed with tasks for 
which it is not equipped. Violation of the principle 
has robbed men of that peculiar perfective activity, 
the acceptance of responsibility in his work-a-day 
relations and decisions. 
The organic order of society consists of neither 
simply the elimination of class conflict, nor the many 
socio-economic "threshold" measures of this order. An 
organic internal priciple of organization is needed to 
restore the economic community. A sound economic com­
munity cannot be blueprinted, but certain social prin­
ciples to which it must conform can be stated, such as 
the naturalness of community or functional association. 
Society can be united according to what men do and 
contribute, namely their function. 
The virtue of justice is the first principle of 
organization and self-regulation of economic communi­
ties. These "forms" of justice -- exchange, distribu­
tive, contributive -- are the very principles of the 
social order. Although exchange and distributive jus­
tice are essential and requisite, they are insuffi­
cient. Most important is the principle of contributive 
social justice which furnishes the very basis for a 
genuine direction of economic life. Social justice is 
the primary, though not the conclusive, regulative 
principle of economic life. All three justices must 
work together to bring about a sound economic communi­
ty. 
Unless the men daily participating in the economic 
community possess the virtue of economic prudence, a 
sound socio-economic order will not be achieved. This 
virtue manifests itself in society in the clearness of 
vision of men in the selection of means to ends in the 
complex concrete affairs of daily practical economic 
life, so that they make sound practical judgments that 
lead to correct actions in practical economic affairs. 
Only if men possess this habit of the correct appraisal 
of things to be done in the economic community will 
functional communities again flourish. Restoration of 
sound economic communities will require among the prin­
ciples of organization the virtues of economic justice 
and economic prudence. To conclude in the words of s.w.
Dempsey: 
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The need for sound work in the virtue of 
social justice, and its almost unheard of 
correlatives, social prudence, social temper­
ance, and social fortitude, is so great that 
nothing in social research seems more urgent 
or more likely to speed the day when social 
justice, known and understood, will be an 
operative force in workaday decisions and 
transactions of American life [F,391). 
Chapter Pive 
THE JUST PRICE 
Whether or not within his framework of socio-economic 
thought B. w. Dempsey made an outstanding recognized 
contribution in the field of JUST PRICE. 
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I. TBB SCHOLASTIC UALYSIS 0� BXCHUGB
A. Importance
B.W. Dempsey, S.J. spent his entire academic life 
explaining, elucidating, and developing "scholastic 
economics."1 Any real contribution of B.W. Dempsey must 
be found in these endeavors. Scholastic analysis of 
exchange is the cornerstone of scholastic economics. The 
theory of exchange value has always been the vital common 
notion that clarified the very fundamental process of 
economics. "The problem of value must always hold the 
pivotal position, as the chief tool of analysis in any 
pure theory that works with rational schema. 1122 
Competent economists both ancient and modern have 
consistently made exchange value (pure theory) central to 
their economic analysis. The Scholastic economists and 
B.W. Dempsey were no exception. Value and exchange theory 
clearly was their primary concern. B.W. Dempsey consid­
ered that "the nucleus of the economic study of the medi­
eval moralist was the contract of exchange" (I, 13 O] • 
Scholastic wage, profit, and interest doctrines are based 
and founded on their value treatments.3 
B.W. Dempsey explicitly touches upon the central 
position of exchange value or just price as follows: 
From the doctrine on private property • • 
and from the doctrine on the organic nature of 
society and its functional organization, the 
doctrine of just price follows as a ready 
corollary. If the face of the earth remains in 
a radical sense the patrimony of all men, and 
if, in their efforts to reduce the face of the 
earth to their service, men work co-operative-
1Cf. list of B. w. Dempsey's writings -- Appendix. 
2Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 588. 
3Arthur Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923), p. 
20.
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ly like the highly interdependent organs of a 
body, then obviously the exchange of what is 
produced under these circumstances must be 
made [F,99]. 
Exchange is looked upon as the foundation of the related 
problems of money, just price and usury: 
Exchange is the principal instrument by which 
goods privately owned still minister to the 
common good, as they must do if they are to 
fulfill their basic ordination. With exchange 
comes the introduction of money, with money, 
the question of price, and just price specif­
ically. With the question of just price comes 
the question of the just price of money, that 
is, of usury [F,392]. 
As can be clearly seen, B.W. Dempsey not only considered 
price analysis the basis of any economic contribution but 
considered just price as the basis of his treatment of 
interest and usury, which has long been considered 
authoritative. Nor is there any doubt from the foregoing 
that B.W. Dempsey looked upon his own endeavors as an 
attempt to develop and explain the economic ideas of the 
Scholastics. Just price must be regarded as an integral 
part of the discourse. 
B. Debt Owed
Gradually, it is being recognized that modern 
economics owes the Scholastic period a great debt. 
B.W. Dempsey early recognized, acknowledged, and wrote to 
bring others to the realization of this debt. certainly, 
his efforts in this regard have not been in vain. Joseph 
Schumpeter in his monumental work, History of Economic 
Analysis, positively affirms that "modern economics stems 
from the Scholastic writers."4 It seems fairly obvious 
that B.W. Dempsey influenced this above forthright and 
influential statement, as Schumpeter refers to him by 
name several times within this same chapter. 
4Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 113. 
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• • . Professor Dempsey's book (B.W. Dempsey,
Interest and Usury, 1943 chs. VI-VIII) con­
tains a full exposition of their economics:
this book combines to a degree that is quite
exceptional, thorough familiarity with schol­
astic thought and with economic theory, so
that the interested reader may be referred to
it with confidence.5 
The academic respect of Joseph Schumpeter for his former 
student and protege shows itself in such characteristic 
statements as that "considerations of space, however, 
make it impossible to present a more satisfactory one [on 
usury than that] which the interested reader will find in 
Professor Dempsey I s book. 6 Just as Schumpeter states, 
concerning B.W. Dempsey's Interest and Usury, that "this 
book is an important contribution to the history of 
economic thought, 11 7 so we must conclude that B.W. Demp­
sey made a unique contribution to a realization of the 
place of Scholastic thought in modern economic analysis. 
Whatever the reason for an earlier lack of this 
acknowledgment, the fact is that full acknowledgment was 
lacking and long overdue. Among the authors who have 
themselves done much to bring about a realization of 
modern economics I relation and debt to Scholastic writers 
has been Dr. Raymond de Roover. He indicates the system­
atic ignoring by professional economics of the Scholastic 
economic contribution: 
The real foundation of price theory in gener­
al, and of monopoly in particular, should, 
however, not be sought among the Greeks and 
the Romans, but in the learned treatises, 
which the Doctors of the Scholastic school 
devoted to the important subject of social 
ethics. Unfortunately, these writings have 
been systematically ignored by professional 
economists. It is true that current textbooks 
5Ibid., p. 96.
6Ibid., p. 104.
7Bernard w. Dempsey, S.J., Interest and Usury, p. 
VII1 Introduction by Joseph Schumpeter. 
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on the history of economic thought mention the 
price theories of Thomas Aquinas and the 
monetary theories of Oresme, but from there 
they jump to the mercantilists, entirely 
overlooking Aquinas was the founder of a 
school and that his doctrines were further 
elaborated and refined by his followers.8 
Since the above was written (1951) there has been much 
advance in Scholastic appreciation. B. W. Dempsey was 
foremost in remedying this lack of appreciation. The in­
fluence of his writings in bringing about a deeper 
realization cannot but be deemed a great contribution. 
To fully understand B.W. Dempsey's task and con­
tribution to the integration of Scholastic and modern 
economics, it must be remembered that the Scholastic 
doctors did not approach economic problems in the same 
way as we do today. Their terminology, method, philoso­
phical and social background, their very problems, were 
specifically different. A modern scholar, without being 
steeped in this terminology method, historical, philos­
ophical and social background, may be easily lead astray. 
Plain economic thoughts are frequently couched in 
language unfamiliar to the modern reader. The omission of 
a topic does not necessarily infer ignorance. To comment 
on another's treatise -- as St. Thomas did, for example, 
on Aristotle's Ethics -- does not necessarily mean that 
one completely agrees -- or disagrees either -- with what 
he says. 
Therefore, to fully understand and have real insight 
into Scholastic economic writings, it is not enough to 
know someone's economic writings. One must also know 
some:thing about his purpose in writing, his philosophical 
and institutional framework, and, of course, the social 
environment of the period. In the course of Scholastic 
economic writings, only the philosophical framework 
remained substantially the same; the institutional 
framework and social environment radically changed over 
this long Scholastic period. In all this B.W. Dempsey was 
most skilled. His own Scholastic background furnished the 
basis for his own contributions. 
8Raymond de Roover, "Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam 
Smith," Quarterly Journal oL Economics, LXV, November, 
1951, p.493. 
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Scholastic economics enjoyed the unquestioned 
superiority of being an integral part of a coherent 
philosophical synthesis. Economics was not regarded as an 
independent but as a dependent discipline ruled by 
justice and grounded on exchange. The purpose of the 
Scholastics was to determine the rules of justice in 
order to govern social relations for the general welfare 
(common good) [I,113). While economics was only inciden­
tal in the universal scheme of beings, it can be referred 
to as a discipline because it did embody a consistent 
doctrine of economic relations, but dependent on the laws 
of justice. 
The Scholastics appreciated the economic place of 
that touchstone principle of scarcity. Without the 
economic problem of scarcity, they were fully aware that 
there would be no necessity for exchange -- goods could 
be had freely and in unlimited quantities.9 still, they 
subordinated economics to their treatment of justice. 
Justice ought to preside over the exchange of scarce 
goods. Justice is their first consideration. But it 
cannot be forgotten -- and the disciplined minds of the 
Scholastics would be the first to realize -- that while 
economic order depends primarily on justice, this implies 
a thorough understanding and a proper use of economic 
analysis. For example, an analysis of just price requires 
both an analysis of justice and price • 
. • • [A)Schoolman•s economics always remained 
a by-product, however important, of his first 
concern, exchange justice. A joint product 
would perhaps be the better expression. They 
would have been little interested in economics 
that achieves autonomy at the expense of 
vitality; but they were willing to devote much 
thought and investigation to an economics that 
was practically co-extensive with the field of 
right and justice [I,145). 
Admittedly, the Scholastics were primarily inter­
ested in setting up ethical norms or standards rather 
than in influencing public policy. To reiterate, the 
Scholastics were interested in determining the rules of 
9St. Thomas Aquinas, s. T., II-II, q. 77, a. 3, C; 
commentary in Ethics, Bk. V, Leet. 9. 
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justice that ought to preside over the exchange and 
distribution of scarce goods. This, too, then became the 
preoccupation of B.W. Dempsey. If the purpose is to set 
up standards, they hardly can be considered "Idealists" 
in the sense of being impractical men. On the contrary, 
some were important men in practical affairs in their 
daily lives. They left the practical realization to 
others because practical realization was not their 
purpose in mind [I,124]. None of us can forget that all 
policy must be built on sound theory or principle. 
c. Scholastic Period.
The Scholastic period not only includes the Middle 
Ages [I,114] but the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as 
well, and the period definitely continues well into the 
seventeenth century. schoolmen had more in common than 
method and terminology: they had a common philosophical 
heritage -- a common way of looking at and explaining the 
universe. 10 In moral and social life their preoccupation
was with justice and the general welfare. Economics was 
always subordinate and incidental to this treatment. 
Thus, to consider Scholastic economics as medieval 
doctrine is simply an error [I,115). 11 This study at no 
time will use the word Medievalists in the sense of 
Schoolmen. The term would then be too limiting and, 
therefore, inaccurate. The Scholastic approach to 
economic problems was distinctive whether it be that of 
the middle ages or the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies. B. w. Dempsey in his writings fully recognized 
this fact: 
,Reputable economic historians will see no 
incongruity in citing thirteen and seventeen 
10see Joseph A. Schumpeter, op.cit., pp. 107-115.
He presents Scholastic framework that looks upon "society 
as a cosmos that is possessed of inherent logical 
consistency" to show the basis of Scholastic economics 
and the continuity of economic thought "that modern 
economics stems from the Scholastic writers" (p. 113). 
11See Raymond de Roover, Scholastic Economics: 
Survival and Lasting Influence from the Sixteenth Century 
to Adam Smith, pp. 187-188. 
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century writers together for a proposition, 
although the analytical context in which the 
later writer speaks may have substantially 
altered the significance of any language he 
shares with the earlier authority [I,149]. 
The basic principle in all Scholastic economic treatment 
is that, in any exchange transaction, justice demands an 
equivalence between the goods exchanged, and that certain 
determinable values must be determinable. In other words, 
Scholastics regard "price" and the factors behind it as 
the crux of the problem of obtaining justice in economic 
society. The "primary concern is to determine, under a 
given set of conditions, which exchanges were equitable 
and therefore permissible, and which were not" [I,130]. 
The Scholastics proceeded from reason rather than 
authority in the development of their thought. True, 
frequently they quoted st. Thomas, but the quotations 
presented his arguments, not merely his conclusions. In 
Scholastic economics, presenting a position because st. 
Thomas or Aristotle held it without giving the argument 
for the position was inadmissible. "Evidence on authority 
is, in principle, the weakest of arguments." What these 
Scholastics heartily endorsed -- an approach of reason 
rather than authority -- B.W. Dempsey faithfully followed 
[I,116).12 
While st. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274] founded his 
school in the middle ages, his followers continued far 
beyond this medieval period until well into the seven­
teenth century. What St. Thomas and his numerous fol­
lowers were primarily interested in, in those sections 
that touched upon economics, were the rules of justice 
governing social relations. Economics, as was said above, 
was given only an incidental place in his universal 
scheme of being. One would look in vain in st. Thomas, 
therefore, for a full treatment of economics. But he did 
lay down certain economic principles which remained for 
his successors to comment upon, interpret, develop and 
elaborate upon. Thus, to interpret st. Thomas without 
taking into account the common opinion of his own 
commentators would be faulty methodology. Yet this same 
12"Yet they (Molina, Lessius, Lugo] steadily adhered 
to Thomas' opinion that evidence on authority is, in 
principle, the weakest of valid argument . • • [I,116]. 
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host of commentators (i.e. saures, Molina, Soto, Lessius, 
de Lugo, B. W. Dempsey, etc. ) use St. Thomas Aquinas 
always as their central core, thus making both comparison 
and synthesis much easier. 
st. Thomas• economic analysis enjoyed the distinc­
tion of being an integral part of a coherent philosoph­
ical synthesis. His economics formed a consistent body of 
doctrine ruled by justice. st. Thomas' treatment of 
economic questions, however, is not brought together in 
one place, "but (is] scattered throughout the Summa 
Theologiae and his other works. 1113 Much of st. Thomas' 
treatment of economic questions is found in a commentary 
on Aristotle's Ethics. st. Thomas, here, not only was 
most painstaking in recording Aristotle's economic views
accurately -- even procuring new translations for his 
purpose -- he also refined, developed or expanded these 
views whenever he deemed it necessary. B. W. Dempsey 
writes: 
The discussion of fundamental economic ideas 
in the writings of st. Thomas Aquinas, however 
penetrating and acute, was at all times a by­
product of some other activity. st. Thomas was 
not an economist, and at no time was he con­
cerned with the analysis of economic problems 
for their own sake. Though he touches upon 
many economic topics and touches them with 
characteristic neatness and accuracy, he is 
always primarily interested in some other 
problem [F,164]. 
Analysis of economic topics can be found in many 
parts of st. Thomas Aquinas' works, also. Sometimes st. 
Thomas stops for a full treatment in connection with 
justice or some other virtue or vice, sometimes only in 
passing to round out his treatment. The general setting 
for the treatment of exchange value falls explicitly 
under justice in two places: in the Summa Theologiae, II­
II, qq. 57-80, and in the Commentary on the Ethics of 
Aristotle [Cf. F,166]. 
13Arthur Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923), p. 
18.
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B.W. Dempsey's analysis of exchange value is based 
chiefly on the Summa Theologiae, the foundation not only 
of his own treatment but of most, if not all, of the 
subsequent Scholastics. To found his analysis on was not 
to limit himself to it. The Summa Theologiae, as its 
title infers, is a summary, a compendium, and although 
complete, it still remains an epitome. Fuller treatment 
on some points will be found in the Commentary on the 
Ethics. Later Scholastics in their commentaries, that is, 
commentaries on the Summa Theologiae, will find occasion 
to elaborate and develop St. Thomas Aquinas' basic 
doctrine on exchange value [Cf. F,167]. In this stream of 
thought B.W. Dempsey immersed himself completely. 
This section, therefore, is designedly concerned 
with the problem of value. Nothing in the economic 
writings of Aristotle and the Scholastic doctors was more 
fundamental than the dependence on the principle that, in 
an exchange transaction, justice demands an equivalence 
between the goods exchanged. The Scholastics regarded 
"price" as the crux of the problem of obtaining justice 
in the economic order. The study of usury, wages, 
profits, etc. is then but a corollary of the main problem 
of exchange.14 Scholastics overemphasized the usury
problem -- an application of exchange -- and today's 
writers have given usury more than enough attention, not 
absolutely but relative to the problem of exchange. 
A grave shortcoming of the medieval as well as 
the later Schoolman is their overemphasis of 
the usury question. The space devoted to it in 
scholastic treatises has given the mistaken 
impression that it was regarded as all impor­
tant.15
14"Toward one point the analytical enquiries in this 
book converge. Behind the circular disputes about wages, 
profit, interest, and credit, the fundamental problem of 
economic justice must be attacked exactly where the 
historical studies indicate it to be, in the Just Price." 
See V. A. Demont, editor, The Just Price (London: 
Student Christian Movement Press, 1930), p. 149. 
15See Raymond de Roover, Monopoly Theory Prior to
Adam Smith, Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXV (Novem­
ber, 1951), pp. 496. 
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The Schoolman considered equity in distribu­
tion and exchange as the central problem in 
economics. The usury question was a side 
issue, but concern with it was allowed to 
crowd out nearly everything else. 16 
Usury is a very important corollary of exchanges, 
but only one. B.W. Dempsey recognized both the importance 
of usury analysis and its subordination to exchange 
analysis. 
II. THB PROBLEM OJ' BQUIVALENCB IR BXCBARGB
"The nucleus of the economic study of the medieval
moralist was the contract of exchange. Exchange was taken 
in a somewhat wider sense than good usage would approve 
today, signifying in general any burdensome contract" 
[I,130]. The task that the Schoolmen and 
B.W. Dempsey, their modern counterpart, set themselves 
(and hence our task in this section) was "to determine 
under a given set of conditions, which exchanges were
equitable and therefore permissible and which were not" 
[I,130]. The basic procedure involved not only a theory 
of law, of equity and justice, but also a theory of 
economic value. Contracts of exchange were not conceived 
as taking place in a vacuum but in a market, community or 
province [I,130]. Thus, our purpose and procedure has 
been clearly ·set out for us by B.W. Dempsey and the 
Scholastics. With an understanding of the contract of 
exchange and its rela'bionship to law, equity and justice, 
we can proceed to the solution of the problem of the 
necessity and determination of equivalence in exchange. 
The'endeavor of B.W. Dempsey was to add to Scholastic 
thought. Being perfectly sure that Scholastic doctrine in 
most instances accumulates rather than changes, any con­
tribution of B.W. Dempsey was in the nature of an 
addition rather than a departure. we would look in vain 
for a complete treatment of some of these topics -- he 
will be perfectly content to rest on St. Thomas and 
Scholastic traditional doctrine [F,V]; at the same time, 
we would search in vain for any departure from this 
doctrine. He was perfectly in accord. His was a constant 
search and development of principles that could be 
16Ibid., p. 167. 
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applied to a wide diversity of economic problems. 
In this section, we shall deal with B.W. Dempsey, 
the social philosopher, as he tackles the problem of the 
necessity of equivalence in exchange: why is equivalence 
necessary in all just exchange? In the next section, we 
shall deal with B.W. Dempsey, the academic economist, as 
he tackles the problem of the determination of equiva­
lence in exchange: How is the just price determined? 
A. contract of Bxchange
It is important in understanding B. W. Dempsey I s
development of the problem of equivalence to begin where 
he begins, with the contract of exchange. His own 
treatment of contract of exchange as a right [I,130] is 
brief; he almost entirely falls back upon traditional 
philosophy. Referring back to st. Thomas and the Schol­
astic tradition with B.W. Dempsey, we are aware that as 
soon as a person is brought into contact with other 
persons (as happens in every natural human life), his 
external actions are coincided to relate him in a special 
moral manner to these other persons. All the problems of 
moral good and evil arising from a person's associations 
with other persons are problems within the field of 
justice or charity. This places us in the sphere of 
social mobility. The notion of social mobility immediate­
ly calls to mind that of social justice, and justice in 
turn evokes the notion of right [F,415]. Right (jus) 
demands what is just (justum), and to understand this 
contract of exchange and the ramifications, we must 
exercise the various forms of right. 
B. Analysis of a Right
Justice (justitia = rightness) literally means
rightness. Obviously, justice is derived from the Latin 
word jus (jus = right), which means right (Cf. F,164; 
415). But right is the name of a relation. A relation 
occurs when one being is connected (associated/related) 
with another being in some specific way. Relation is 
treated (by st. Thomas) as one of nine accidental cate­
gories of being. One primary relation is that of 
equality • 17 
11st. Thomas Aquinas, s. T., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, c. 
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is among the 9 accidental cate­
gories of being 
is one primary relation 
is the name of a relation 
is another name for justice 
1) Two persons may establish a relation (carry on
an external operation/a deal/be associated/connected) 
with one another. 
2) Now, in this deal (external operation/associ­
ation/relation/connection) a certain equality between the 
goods or service to be transferred (exchanged= commuta­
tio or permutatio) between two persons must be estab­
lished (e.g. exchange the commodity of wine for an equal 
amount of the commodity of money). 
3) When equality is observed in the transfer or
exchange, the (buying-selling) contract is right (jus or 
justum). so the contract is objectively right when one 
good has been exchanged for another good of a certain 
equal value (equi-valence). "Justice in exchange is 
presumed when each party receives as much as he gives and 
gives as much as he receives" [1,138). If the goods 
exchanged were not done so to bring about a certain 
equality, the. situation (contract) needs to be righted 
[F,403). 
4) Briefly, for the moment, justice is a habitual
willing to do what is right in regard to contracts (ex­
changes) with another person or persons. Justice (moral 
rightness) is the habit enabling one person to give each 
and every other person his own right (jus) [Cf. F,164-
165]. 
A right is a relation. Every relation such as right 




Title -:- the reason or foundation for the 
2) Subject -- the person (e.g. individual-person,
society, corporation, government) who has the claim. 
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3) Matter -- what one has a claim to (e.g. income
in the form of exchange value or price of services: in 
the form of wages, interest, rent, profits, etc.). 
4) Term -- person bound to respect the claim. For
instance, an employer is bound to respect an employee's 
right to wages. Money is exchanged for services "involv­






Blem.ants of a Right 
work done entitles an equival­
ence 
a person (employee) 
to wages 
from another person (employer) 
1) Subject (A) a person (seller) who has a 
subjective right to equality of payment; has a debt 
(debtum) or duty to render full value in the exchange. 
2) Term (B) -- another person (buyer) who has a
subjective right that A fulfill his duty as a seller by 
an exchange of equivalence; has a duty (debitum) to pay 
for his purchase on the basis of objective equality -­
give full (equal) value for the good of A in the exchange 
transactions. When A sells to B -- the exchange is 
objectively right when there is an objective equality 
namely, that goods exchanged are of equal value. 
Thus, A and B have a debt (duty): 
A to fulfill as a seller by giving full value. 
B to fulfill as a buyer by paying for his pur­
chase on the basis of objective equality. 
In this way, objective equality or right is maintain­
ed.is 
In any transaction between two persons (the buyer­
seller relationship) the question of the equality of the 
value of the goods exchanged arises. For example, if a 
seller values and lists a watch at $70.00, and the buyer 
18S.T., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. c.
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values the watch so that he is willing to pay this price, 
the transfer or exchange can be made in equality -- a 
bargain is concluded at this price (exchange value). "The 
result of the process," states B.W. Dempsey, "is an 
increase in total utility all round" [F,54). 
Where such equality is observed, the buying-selling 
contract is right. This objective denotation is the 
primary meaning of right. So the exchange or transaction 
is objectively right when one thing is equal to another 
thing. The moral claim to this objective rightness or 
equality on the part of one of the parties is called a 
subjective right. 
3) Matter -- economic goods or services which have
the capacity to satisfy a human want (e.g. money for a 
bus ride). 
4) Subject-term -- the two "persons" must actually
exchange goods (ad personam exteriorem) of equivalence, 
not just will it. (A exchanges his good for good of 
B) .1e
Justice has to do with objective moral rightness -- an 
external quality must be established, involving at least 
two persons (e.g. A & B). 
5) Subject-Matter -- (relation of a subject and
matter; or term and matter): Right comes before justice; 
justice follows right. "If the act of justice is to give 
each man his due, then the act of justice is preceded by 
the act whereby some good became his due. 1120 
, If a good is due to a man as his own, right to 
manage goods precedes justice. One does not have a 
responsibility to give another man his due unless he has 
a right to this due (good). Thus, justice does not give 
him the right to private management, but assumes and 
protects the right. 
What, then, is the precise relationship between 
subject and matter? The subject must own in some sense 
the good; otherwise, he has not the right to exchange it 
18S.T., II-II, q. 58, a. 10.
20st. Thomas Aquinas, contra. sent. 2:28. 
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for some other good -- he cannot pay his debts unless he 
owns goods with which to pay them. 
I own the good; I am its owner; I have the right of 
ownership. Ownership is the exclusive right to manage 
(possess, enjoy, dispose) a good as one's own. More 
precisely, ownership is the relation that exists between 
the person and a good. A good is anything that satisfies 
a human want -- whether it be tangible as land or 
intangible as an idea -- between which and myself there 
is a unique relation. I can say it is proper to me, my 
property; I own it. Thus, I can claim (have a right) to 
others' obligation to respect it. Another person must 
give to me its equivalent if he wishes to possess (own) 
it. Since I own it, I have the right to exchange it for 
some other good, or to refrain from doing so. Not only do 
rights in general precede justice, but the right to 
ownership makes the act of justice possible. Consequent­
ly, st. Thomas, in his systematic treatment, takes up 
rights, a particular right of ownership, before the 
exchange contract and its justice.21 
Man has the right to manage (possess/own) income for 
the purpose of satisfying the basic needs and reasonable 
wants of his nature because of his need and natural 
endowment of intellect and will to make use of these 
goods. All men, therefore, have the right to possess or 
manage goods. Note that this right to manage is for the 
sake of use [F,179]. The right to use (consume) goods 
takes precedence over the right of their management 
(possession) [F,176]. Possession is for the sake of use, 
but use cannot be for the sake of possession. In other 
words, management is for consumption: to satisfy the 
needs and reasonable wants of all men. When other men are 
in need or want, no man may use or keep more than he 
needs.22 "Any positive treatment of ownership, 11 says 
B. W. Dempsey, "proceeds from the radical fact of the 
objective relationship between man's needs and capaci­
ties, and the capacities of the natural resources of the 
earth to satisfy those needs" [F,170]. 
6) Title: Foundation of the Right to Exchange.
What is the foundation (title) for making this exchange? 
21S.T., II-II, q. 66.
�S.T., II-II, q. 66, a. 1. c. 
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The title will be the very reason or foundation for the 
exchange. In any exchange, the foundation is a certain 
equality (equal-value or equivalence) of the matter 
(goods) to be exchanged in the minds of the subject and 
term (persons) involved. This equality is adequate for 
establishing a relationship of right and therefore of 
justice. 
D. Bzchange contract
A contract is an agreement, made between two or more
persons, which creates an obligation [I,130]. This 
agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent by two or 
more persons to one another. This agreement affects their 
relations by means of a bargain concluded between them 
consisting of an exchange of mutual promises or an 
exchange of a promise of a performance (external 
operation). 
In the ordinary contract of exchange, the act of 
consent (promissory agreement) is the initiating cause of 
the exchange. As a result of this consent, the con­
trasting parties do not stand to each other in the way 
they did before their agreement. They are related to each 
other in a new way. They are now united in their common 
purpose of exchange for mutual benefit.23 
What makes an exchange what it is is not what is 
exchanged or the reason why the exchange is made; it is 
the agreement itself -- the consent between the two 
persons (subject and term) exchanging. The substance of 
the exchange is the agreement (promise) itself. Thus it 
must be in this promissory agreement that the ultimate 
reason why a contract obliges must be found. The promise 
between subject and term is an express agreement to carry 
out the exchange into effect; a declaration (bargain) 
which binds the persons who make it. It is the declara­
tion of the bargain which gives to the person to whom it 
is made a right to expect or claim a particular (proper) 
good or service in exchange for his good so bargained 
23A contract is often defined as "a mutual agreement 
generating an obligation in at least one of those 
agreeing." The Scholastic Lessius defines a contract as 
a "practical, external manifestation of one to another 
generating an obligation from the consent of the parties 
agreeing" [Cf. I,141]. 
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(declared). 
That which is due, or the justice involved in the 
exchange contract, pertains directly to the private 
(proper/particular) good of the individual contractors 
(bargainers) but it also concerns indirectly the common 
good (public good/common welfare) of all the members of 
the community. Hence, if the contract (exchange) is one 
of equivalence, both exchange and contributive justice 
enter.24 
B. Becessity of Bquivalence in Bxchange
Central to B.W. Dempsey's thought on just price is
that equivalence in exchange is necessary for the common 
good. In numerous places in his writings he presents this 
relationship of equivalence to the common good as a fact: 
or: 
Exchange -- arises from man's personal needs, 
but a personal need that is not distinct from 
his need for society [F,136]. 
Commutative justice, though concerned with 
transactions between individuals, is not to be 
regarded or interpreted individualisti-cally 
[F,401]. 
again: 
As property and business are matters of public 
and social concern, so too, are contracts • 
Contracts are freely entered into, without 
compulsion, but they take place within the 
framework of society [F,98). 
24"Si autem fraus deficit, tune de emptione et 
veditione dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno mode, secondum 
se, et secundum hoc emptio et venditio videtur esse 
introducta pro communi utilitate utriusque: dum scilicet 
unus indiget re alterius et e converso • • •  Quod autem 
pro communi utilitate est inductum, non debet esse magis 
in gravamen unius quam al terius. Et ideo debet secundum 
aequalitatem rei inter eos contractus institui." S.T., 
II-II, q. 15, 1, corpus.
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yet again; 
The chief purpose of both civil and private 
contracts is the common good [F,98). 
finally; 
Exchange is the principal instrument by which 
goods privately owned still minister to the 
common good, as they must do if they are to 
fulfill their basic ordination [F,392). 
Exchange relationships to the common good considered as 
a fact by B.W. Dempsey was no mere assertion on his part, 
but is central to his thought and ably buttressed with 
reasons. To fully appreciate its importance, place and 
significance, and the reasons for it, there must be a 
development of this thought. 
B.W. Dempsey begins his own thought development by 
indicating that a man, "even before he is confronted with 
an actual decision, must recognize his relation to God 
and to his fellows." But recognition is not enough; 
voluntary cooperation must follow. A man should be 
"willing to cooperate in these self-subordinations that 
are the means of achieving coordination to the supreme 
unconditional end of all" [F,368). "Any other conduct or 
frame of mind," he would consider irrational and not 
truly human. 
Then follows a key principle and social motivation 
of his personal life. "Conversely, one who .is not willing 
to 'put himself out' for others just has not in himself 
the makings of a man" [F,368). "Men must in their 
seemingly most personal actions as private individuals 
act to promote the common good" [F,368). Falling back 
upon Scholastic tradition, he recalls for us how the 
"genuine practice of any virtue promotes the common 
good." The reason for this is clear in his mind, since 
"the common good of any society is promoted when the 
society is composed of virtuous members" [F,369). The 
"relation of the acts of individual persons to the common 
good is more obvious, more direct, and more important," 
B.W. Dempsey then argues, "in what concerns the virtue of 
justice" [F, 369]. Now he is ready to turn to the exchange 
contract. "In these acts of justice that find expression 
in contracts, there is first the good which is common to 
the buyer and seller," and if this is not so, concludes 
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B. W. Dempsey, "the contract could not be entered into" 
[F,369). 
"Buying and selling were instituted for the common 
good of both parties since each needs the product of the 
other and vice versa • • •  but what was introduced for 
the common utility ought not to bear harder on one party 
than on the other and, therefore, the contract between 
them should rest upon an equality of thing to thing.1125 
Central to B.w. Dempsey's thought is the reliance he 
places on this quotation and, of course, his inter­
pretation of this "key" passage. The important words are 
common good (common utility) which in two separate works, 
in almost identical words, he analyzes as having a 
"twofold meaning" [F,234; I,138]. 
1) For the mutual advantage of both parties.
2) For the advantage of the whole community.
The first is abundantly clear. Briefly, the mutual and 
reciprocal advantage of both parties would be preserved 
by "maintaining equality of values in the exchange." 
Secondly, exchange would be to the advantage of the whole 
community, "if goods of various useful values are 
exchanged in the community until their use values and 
exchange values balance all around." The "how" or 
determination of this balancing of use and exchange 
values will be treated more fully in the next section. 
What is important to note at this juncture is that 
B.W. Dempsey considered that this "balancing" is a means 
to achieve the common good. 
His reasoning continues as he argues that exchange 
would not be to the fullest advantage of the community 
unless the "division of property and the division of 
labor" contribute to the common welfare or community 
[F,234; I,138]. They must do so because both have the 
"purpose of reducing the face of the earth to man's 
greater service. How "the division of labor and the 
division of resources serve the common good is by en­
suring the "increased output made possible by increased 
25St. Thomas, S.T., II-II, q. 77; quoted in F,369 
above. 
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efficiency. 1126 B. w. Dempsey does not consider this even 
a "paradox" -- that an II institution" which serves any 
private individual advantage should have been introduced 
for the common good. "The double aspect of exchange," he 
says forcefully, "is the inevitable sequel of the double 
aspect of the division of goods and the division of 
labor" [I,137). He further explains that from the 
"division of labor arise at once two radical consequenc­
es: first, the complete interdependence of those special­
izing; secondly, which is the more important for our 
purposes, "the necessity of some process [that) will 
assure that the resources so divided continue to minister 
to the common good. 11 "To safeguard the latter, 11 he 
thoughtfully adds, "is the function of just price" 
[F,402). 
Immediately preceding his death, in a paper deliv­
ered at Harvard University and subsequently published in 
Thought magazine, he demonstrates a refinement and 
deepening of thought on this matter. In his later years 
he steeped himself in St. Thomas, drawing upon him 
extensively, so the following passage should come as no 
surprise: 
In discussing the division of labor and the 
division of resources we pointed out that both 
served the common good by the increased output 
made possible by increased efficiency. This 
generated an increased interdependence which 
required · that men cooperate in stable ex­
change. This is the most important instance of 
a basic principle. Material goods are not 
increased by being shared: the more there is 
for A, the less there is for B. Knowledge and 
love, the objects of the intellect and will, 
are increased and in no way diminished by 
being shared. The increased output in the two 
divisions is due fundamentally to the improved 
knowledge gained by specialization. The im­
proved exchanges are due to social coopera­
tion, an expression of that natural love man 
has for another and of that civil amity, or 
agreeable conduct said by st. Thomas to be 
26"Prudence, Providence and Economic Decision, 11 B. 
W. Dempsey, S.J., Thought, XXV (Spring, 1960), p. 32.
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natural to man and due to others by a kind of 
debt of natural honesty." Increase in know­
ledge and love is the basis of all improvement 
in the common good, i.e., of all social and 
economic progress.27 
Earlier, in a brief note literally inserted in 
Social Order (March, 1955) under the heading of a "Small 
Note on the Common Good, 11 he had first expounded this 
vein of thought as indicated by the above quotation. The 
kernel of this "small note" and considerable contribution 
lies in the following two paragraphs quoted from B.W. 
Dempsey in their entirety: 
The increase in productivity is a good which 
is common to all parties of the two divisions 
[of labor and resources). The increased prod­
uction is a good which is common to all. But 
the degree to which the goods are common 
depends also upon the degree to which love has 
been increased with knowledge. In the economic 
order, therefore, the common good is promoted 
when the institutions of the division of labor 
and the division of resources are so designed 
and administered as to increase knowledge and 
love. 
Social justice obliges all to contribute 
to the efficient design and function of these 
institutions that knowledge and love may be 
increased. 28 
They are proper goods, eminently my own. But through ex­
change or sharing, they are pre-eminently capable of 
being common [F,390]. We can only conclude with B.W. 
Dempsey that, though exchange transactions be "between 
individuals, they are individuals who are members of a 
community, who are using goods that, though privately 
owned, are destined nevertheless to serve the whole 
community. These goods are reduced to the common service 
in part through the institution of exchange" [F,401-402). 
27Ibid, p. 32. 
28Social Order, Vol. 5 (March, 1955), p. 120. 
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B.W. Dempsey gives credit to the Scholastics for 
seeing that "when goods are exchanged, the value which 
they have in exchange is, like the right of property, 
private and personal, but not only or exclusively private 
and personal." Furthermore, he tells us that "justice 
and equity, virtues of social human beings, ru;i.e the 
acquisition and possession of goods of any subsequent 
trading of goods so acquired and possessed. This must 
always be borne in mind," concludes B.W. Dempsey, "if we 
are to grasp exchange as the Scholastics saw it, with any 
genuine insight into their meaning" [I,133). 
B.W. Dempsey, of course, can hardly be said to have 
discovered the relationship between exchange and contri­
butive (social) justice. In fact, he gives this credit to 
St. Thomas; namely, that injustice in exchange harms the 
common good, since injustice inhibits social cooperation 
in specialization and exchange; "without justice • • •
there will be no exchange of goods" [F, 400 ff.]. In these 
pages, we find B.W. Dempsey at his best as he clarifies 
and further substantiates St. Thomas' argument by 
arguing, "that an accurate price system • • • is a common 
good," and that exchange justice is necessary to such a 
price system [F, 388]. His conclusion, therefore, is that 
in at least this sense, exchange justice is "one with" 
contributive justice. St. Thomas also argues, and is 
quoted by B.W. Dempsey [F,406], that the community 
suffers from unjust exchange since injustice in exchange 
would "destroy the crafts." B. W. Dempsey interprets this 
to mean that unjust exchange, by putting some members of 
the community out of business, deprives the community of 
their services and also deprives other segments of the 
economy of a market for their product. Perhaps the first 
reference to just exchange and its effect upon the common 
good appears in Aristotle's Ethics; B.W. Dempsey quotes 
st. Thomas' commentary on this pertinent passage in 
relation to the price of wages: 
The crafts would be destroyed if he who pro­
duces some manufactured article would suffer, 
i.e. would not receive for that manufactured
product just as much as he has produced. So
the products of one worker must be measured
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together with that of another to the end that 
exchange be just [F, 403]. 29 
In commenting on this passage, B.W. Dempsey asserts 
that the crafts would be destroyed because "the worker 
who does not receive a fair return for his efforts would 
perforce cease to produce (he would be producing at a 
loss), and the community would be deprived of his service 
and product." Then, too, he who had apparently benefited 
by the exchange would, however, have lost buyers, "for 
the underpaid craft would be unable to buy his product, 
and his craft in turn would suffer" [F,403). B.W. Dempsey 
implies that this above "simple statement" calls for "a 
whole theory of functional general equilibrium prices." 
Johannes Messner uses a similar argument to show a 
connection between injustices in private exchanges and 
the general welfare. 0 A common argument, implied by 
B.W. Dempsey in his treatment on private property [F,164 
ff.], is that exchange justice is necessary on the 
assumption that injustice in exchange, like slander, 
breaks down the very foundation of society: mutual trust 
in exchange, that is, "peace and good order." 
In conclusion, the words of B.W. Dempsey given as 
part of a summary to a chapter in The Functional Economy
can profitably be quoted: 
8. 
Justice requires exchanges at just 
prices, because men are part of a comm.unity 
which is designed to serve the common good of 
all and in which the parts, insofar as they 
are human persons, are not subordinated one to 
another, but are functionally coordinated. If 
goods are not exchanged at just prices, howev­
er, he who does not receive the just value of 
his work or product is to that extent the 
slave of the other. Justice is not maintained 
nor the common good promoted. 
29Aristotle, Commentary on the Ethics, Bk. V, Lesson 
30Johannes Messner, Social Ethics (St. Louis: B. 
Herder Book co., 1949), p. 751. 
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If just prices are frequently not paid, the 
economic order is completely disrupted and 
"the crafts would be destroyed." An economic 
imbalance is produced, which prevents one 
group of buyers of their product [F,405-406]. 
III. DBTBRIIIDTIOB OF BQUIVALBBCB IB BXCBUGB
B.W. Dempsey, the economist, had a certain approach
to economic problems that conditioned his treatment of 
economic value. He himself spoke of these principles and 
foundations that conditioned his thought on concrete 
economic problems as the "terms of economic discourse" 
[F,18]. 
A. The Terms of Economic Discourse [F,18 ff.]
"The object of economic analysis has well been
defined as the study of the allocation of available 
resources among alternative uses. " In this bold manner, 
B.W. Dempsey approaches economics and the tasks directly 
before him: equivalence in exchange. To study exchange it 
is necessary to do what B.W. Dempsey did in his own 
treatment, to place exchange in its proper setting of 
economic principles. To him economics is "a means of 
dealing economically with economic data that we may know 
which of desired optima are attainable. "31 Economic 
activity, like all human activity, is a means to the 
perfection of man. All members of society have wants and 
the corresponding right to fulfill these wants. Since all 
have the same nature and end, and since the resources of 
the earth are intended to serve the needs or wants of all 
men,,the end of economic activity is the welfare of each 
and all members of the whole society. In various places 
and under different headings, B.W. Dempsey expresses this 
thought (F,18; 51; 95-97; 99, etc.]. A somewhat similar 
thought occurs expressed in these words, admittedly drawn 
from st. Thomas [C.G. 3:76], but applied to the economic 
sphere by B.W. Dempsey: 
Under the design of Divine Providence non­
rational beings on the face of the earth find 
their perfection in serving rational crea-
31Prudence, Providence and Economic Decision, p. 21. 
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tures. Because they are rational, men par­
ticipate in divine providence, not merely 
passively and necessarily, as by obeying the 
law of gravity, but actively and freely by an 
intelligent application of non-rational things 
to man's own use in achieving the personal 
perfection which is the design of Providence 
for man. The use of non-rational things in 
their subordination to human use is the first 
step in the exercise of human providence [Cf. 
F, 56-57] • 32 
Here he relates the human economy to the Divine Economy. 
Economics has been defined by B.W. Dempsey "as the 
allocation of scarce resources to selected ends." 
FUndamentally it follows that if there were sufficient 
resources to comfortably meet all human wants, there 
would be no economic problem, no economic activity, no 
need for exchange, no economics. Ample resources for all 
means no want for any. Without wants or "needs" exchange 
need never arise. B.W. Dempsey states this well: 
Evidently there could be no economic 
problem if man had no material needs or, 
having needs, if the means of supplying them 
lay always at hand in inexhaustible supply, to 
be acquired without effort. 
An economic problem arises only because 
man has many wants, limited resources to meet 
them, and because effort is required in order 
to make even these limited resources serve his 
needs. It is necessary, therefore, for men to 
economize, that is, to use their available 
resources, both personal and material, in the 
best possible way. This limitation requires 
decisions between the cost and return involved 
in all the possible things man can do in 
bringing the economic process to its term, 
namely, provision for wants, the satisfying of 
man's needs in the most efficient fashion 
[F,20]. 
32Ibid., p. 22. 
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No society has ever had an economic system with 
sufficient resources to produce all the goods that would 
be needed to satisfy everyone. Wants have been and remain 
greater than the resources available for the satisfaction 
of these wants. "In its broadest aspect the prime 
economic problem of the individual and of society is that 
of utilizing comparatively scarce resources in such a way
as to yield maximum satisfaction" [F, p. 26]. This 
principle of scarcity is the most basic and universal 
principle in economics. It is the motivating principle 
from which all economic activity arises. There would be 
no need for economics, and hence no need for the economic 
activity of exchange, if economic resources were not 
scarce. 
Economics starts with the common observation that 
there is a basic inequality between men•s wants and the 
material and cultural goods available for the satisfac­
tion of these wants. Men are so constituted that they 
want a great many goods and services. Man has many needs, 
but his wants, outstripping his elemental needs, are 
capable of almost indefinite expansion. B. W. Dempsey, 
following the Scholastics, correctly diagnosed the 
economic problem as one of scarcity: 
In their (Scholastics') opinion, economics was 
a branch of ethics which determined the rules 
of justice that ought to preside over the 
distribution and the exchange of scarce goods. 
It is obvious that there would be no need for 
distribution or . exchange if goods could be 
obtained without effort in unlimited quanti­
ties. 33 
The economic problem, therefore, is essentially a 
problem arising from the necessity of choice -- choice of 
the manner in which limited resources with alternative 
uses are disposed of in the market at a price. For this 
reason, economics is really a theory of choice because it 
explores the possible choices [F,26], the possible 
results of such choices (decisions) [F,29] and their 
relative desirability on economic grounds [F, 34]: Cf. 
F,344]. It is, in Aristotelian terminology, the problem 
of the husbandry of resources [F,2: 393]. Those are the 
33Ibid., p. 24. 
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acts which, more or less regularly, give rise to offers 
and demands for goods and services and to exchange 
transactions. st. Thomas' s pure economics ( oeconomia, 
household management) is based on and follows Aristotle I s 
order of treatment. As Schumpeter states, 34 St. Thomas 
found in Aristotle all he wished to say in his pure 
economics, refers to him and accepts his formulations. 
What is relevant for our purposes, namely, just price, 
the price that assures the equivalence of exchange 
justice, is based on Aristotle. B.W. Dempsey's develop­
ment, therefore, follows Aristotle as much as st. Thomas 
Aquinas: 
Aristotle based his economic analysis squarely 
upon wants and their satisfactions. Starting 
from the economy of self-sufficient 
households, he then introduced division of 
labor, barter ( direct exchange] , and as a 
means of overcoming the difficulties of direct 
barter, money ( indirect exchange] .•• 35 
Goods, the counterpart of wants, are the means of 
want-satisfaction [F,18]. A good is anything an indivi­
dual regards as capable of satisfying his want. An 
economic good is everything which possesses significance 
for individual choice. What is there about a good that 
gives it the power to satisfy wants? A good possesses 
the power of utility, the capacity of want satisfaction. 
"Goods and services that have capacity to satisfy human 
needs are said to possess utility" [F,20]. An individual 
with an unsatisfied need or want sees a good that he 
thinks is capable of satisfying the want which he has. 
Thus, utility expresses a (rational) relationship between 
a subject and object from the point of view of the 
problem of want-satisfaction. Utility is the rational 
relation between the goods (objects) and individual 
(subject). Utility represents in some way an individual's 
estimate -- a subjective and relative evaluation -- of 
the satisfaction which he derives or expects (antici­
pates) to derive from a good (for desire and satisfaction 
need not correspond). 
34Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 93. 
35Ibid. I p. 60.
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Utility ignores the inherent qualities of goods 
(though, admittedly, it is on them, on "goods as a 
foundation, 11 that ability to satisfy wants depends). The 
utility or usefulness of a good, therefore, is not 
something intrinsic to it. Scholastics are abundantly 
clear on the point that individual estimates are personal 
and intensive, that "the capacity of goods to satisfy 
human wants does not depend upon their natures, but upon 
their usefulness for human needs" [F,397]. 
As St. Augustine says (De Civitate Dei, Bk. 
XI, ch. 16), the price of things does not 
depend on the dignity of their nature, since 
at times, a horse fetches a higher price than 
a slave, but it depends on their usefulness to 
man" [F,397). 
Goods are not appraised according to the 
dignity of their natures, otherwise a mouse, 
which is an animal and sentient, would be of 
greater price than a pearl, which is inani­
mate. Prices are placed on things according to 
the degree that men need them for their use 
[F,397]. 
Yet, utility, being a relation, has a certain relation to 
its subject, the individual: his needs; and a certain 
relation to the object, the goods: capacity to satisfy 
wants. "Gold and silver are dear not only on account of 
utility of vessels which are made from these metals • •  
• but also on account of the dignity and purity of their
substance. 1136 
·Following st. Thomas, B.W. Dempsey explicitly points
out a number of ways in which a good may have enhanced 
utility. Utility may increase due to a change in place, 
by transporting and handling; due to a change of time, by 
storing; due to improvement, by working on a (raw) good; 
or by risk. For instance, a shoemaker who takes raw 
material and works on it, improves it, enhances the 
utility of the material, and is therefore entitled to put 
a higher value on his finished product. 
For this (buy and sell later at a higher 
36st. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., II-II, q. 77, a. 2. 
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price) can be done lawfully, either because he 
had improved the good in some manner, or 
because the price had changed with a change of 
place or time, or because of the risk he takes 
in transporting the good from one place to 
another or even in having it transported for 
him. 37 
These listings of st. Thomas nearly correspond to 
modern categories of utility forms, such as form, place, 
time, service utility. The very purpose of production is 
to enhance the utility of goods. Goods as produced or 
enhanced can be exchanged. Utility of a good is a factor 
in exchange value because of labor, risk, change of time 
and place, etc.; the price can change (ceteris paribus) 
and, as we shall see logically follows, remain just. 
Thus, a price that varies may still be a just price. 
A certain measure of grain may command a higher 
price than a pair of shoes because the grain satisfies a 
greater need. Obviously, the grain possessed a greater 
utility than the shoes. But the grain might not have 
commanded a higher price than the pair of shoes if the 
grain was plentiful and the shoes relatively scarce. A 
good commands a price not only because of its utility or 
usefulness but also because of its relative scarcity. 
Utility is the relation between the good and the need 
(want) of the individual and the quantity of good 
available, or, briefly, between wants and resources. Both 
factors -- utility and scarcity -- are necessary to 
determine a price. St. Thomas and the other Scholastics 
were well aware of this fact. B.W. Dempsey expresses this 
very neatly in one short paragraph: 
Production may be said to generate from util­
ities; distributive, time and place utilities 
and exchange, proprietary utilities, that is, 
the benefit that accrues to an owner from the 
possession and control of that bundle of 
utilities, which represents the maximum 
available for his present and future needs 
with his present income (F,52]. 
The last paragraph quoted from B.W. Dempsey is more than 
37Ibid., S.T., ll-ll, 77, a. 4, ad. 2. 
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a clear succinct statement of utility generation, but is 
also a statement of current treatment of the subject. In 
none of the leading present day authors is proprietary 
(ownership) utility so masterfully and clearly handled. 
Certainly, B. W. Dempsey at this juncture adds to the body 
of economic knowledge. Elsewhere he again alludes to 
proprietary utility: 
Exchange is of a wholly different [from pro­
duction and distribution) order. When improved 
real property is sold, an oil well or a dairy 
farm, there may be no change in form or loca­
tion and yet an important economic fact has 
taken place. The function of exchange is most 
obvious in markets that are physically visi­
ble, such as the fruit and vegetable markets 
that still flourish in some centers in the 
early morning hours: similarly at fairs and 
auctions. Here commodities, literally, as the 
expression goes, "change hands." There is no 
change in form: there need be no change in 
location -- specialists are exchanging their 
surpluses, which are to them directly quite 
useless, for money with which to buy, from 
others' surpluses, the things they need. An 
increase of total utility all around is the 
result of th_e process [ F, 54) • 
Individuals have unlimited wants in relation to the 
limited goods available. The relation of scarcity is an 
objective fact. There are not sufficient goods available 
to satisfy all wants. Individuals see usefulness or 
utility in these goods available. This relation of 
utility is something subjective considered by individuals 
as capable of providing satisfaction. While the individu­
al may anticipate certain utility or satisfaction from a 
good, the satisfaction may not eventuate. Price determi­
nation requires an understanding of both the subjective 
and objective factors. 
B. Economic Order
When different things are arranged so as to achieve 
some purpose, they can be said to be organized, or order 
has been put into them. The arrangements any community 
makes so that men are united while resources are divided 
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for the purpose of lessening that gap between wants and 
resources is the economic order or system of that 
community [F,366; 67). 
Order inevitably enters economic life. Production, 
distribution, exchange must be unified in order to 
achieve their purpose of provision for reasonable wants. 
As st. Thomas states, "several cannot be the cause of 
unity or concord except insofar as they are united, 1138 
. • •  and "it belongs to providence to order things to an 
end. 1139 Some economic order therefore is essential and 
always present. In this regard, B.W. Dempsey states: 
Men enter economic activity to provide for 
their wants, exercising personal human provi­
dence. To achieve this end, men associate in 
their economic activity, chiefly through 
division of labor and division of resources. 
These activities then are subjected to gov­
ernment of some sort in order that provision 
for wants may be achieved. Government is the 
execution of providence, and providence is the 
design of order to an end. "In a provider two 
things may be regarded, the premeditation of 
the order and the institution of the premedi­
tated order in the things which fail within 
the providence. 11 This is what persons mean 
when they refer to the economic system of a 
nation [F,56-57). 
An economic system has an entity of its own; just as 
the family or political order is something more than a 
sum of individuals, so too is economic order. Its 
perfection consists of conditions and advantages set up 
in such an optimum manner that the members can satisfy 
their needs for economic goods (proper goods) resulting 
in the utmost utility for each. Thus, the attainment of 
a maximum social income is but an indication that the 
economic system is achieving its due perfection or 
adequately obtaining its end or purpose. The utility 
generated by such a system is to be enjoyed by the 
individual who composes the system. Just as in Scholastic 
38St. Thomas, contra. gent., 1:103:3. 
39 Ibid. I 1: 2 2 : 4 ; 3 : 14 •
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political theory, according to the principle of subsidi­
arity, benefits and advantages accrue ultimately to the 
persons composing the political society. Optimum (effi­
cient) allocation of resources is necessary for maximum 
social income. This optimum allocation with its resulting 
maximum social income and maximum utility to individuals 
comes only through a structure of exchanges, all of which 
are just -- equivalence in the contractual agreements. 
c. Bxohange Ari•••
When some goods are present in such quantity that
some wants can be satisfied to a very low degree of 
intensity, while other goods are so scarce that they 
diminish the intensity of wants very slightly, the 
individual will endeavor to exchange the abundance of the 
one good in order to diminish the scarcity of the other. 
Thus, social cooperation can take the form of actors 
performing different functions but with the proximate 
purpose 11of exchanging the surpluses arising from the 
specialization" of functions [F, 21). Exchange arises when 
persons in close proximity possess surpluses of different 
commodities. 
The first exchange began in those goods which 
nature furnishes for the needs of human life 
because som� person may have more of these and 
another less, as one may have more wine, 
another much bread. Therefore, it was proper 
that they should exchange, and exchange takes 
place up to the point where each has what suf­
fices for him" [F,396). 
This surplus arises either because some wants have been 
satisfied to a very low degree or intensity, or because 
in order to create a "surplus," utility was added to 
already scarce goods through specialization. This prod­
uctive activity created or enhanced the utility of goods, 
and so exchange, that subsequent production and special­
ization, arises [I,136]. 
As St. Thomas says so well, men specialize and 
exchange in order to fulfill their needs: 
Exchange can take place between any commodi­
ties. But the first exchange arises in those 
goods that serve the necessities of human 
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life. one man had more of this and less of 
that and another more of that and less of 
this, as some may have wine and less bread and 
vice versa. Whence it is proper that they 
should exchange. 
When a larger community, village or city has 
developed, some men may be in contact with 
everyone in the community and yet have no one 
with whom to exchange. Others, separated from 
the community, may be in need of many com­
modi ties. Thus among those resources that have 
been divided, exchange must develop so that 
one receives from another whatever that other 
had and in return furnished that which he had. 
This practice prevails even among certain 
barbarous nations who are without the use of 
money and who exchange no more than what 
serves life itself thus giving and receiving 
wine, grain and the like. 
For the welfare of human society, 
many things are necessary: diverse 
offices are done better and more 
expeditiously by diverse persons 
than by men singly. 40 
D. The Act of Exchange
When two individuals meet for exchange, they must
have goods to be exchanged, that is, have surplus goods 
to exchange for others [F,52]. The individuals for a 
commutation must see a different utility in some 
good -- their relation to any specific good must dif­
fer. 0 In other words,· each must possess a good which 
the other desires or sees as useful (possessing utility). 
The ratio of their utilities for the two goods is 
different for each. Both by the Scholastics and a modern 
economist, such as B.W. Dempsey, the term often used 
instead of ratio of exchange is value or exchange value. 
40s t. Thomas, Commentary on the Poli tics, Bk. I, 
Lesson 7. 
41st. Thomas, S.T., II-II, 77, l, resp. and ad. 3 m. 
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The act of exchange, because it provides a bridge for two 
individuals' subjective evaluations, brings about a 
certain qualification (or objectivity) of utilities. The 
subjective valuations which had been treated at least by 
Classical economists was referred to as value-in-use to 
distinguish it from exchange-value. For example, the 
value of a good (wine) is the amount of any other good 
(cheese) for which a unit of it is exchanged. The 
reduction of the physical world to man's utility, this 
"obtaining, increasing and maintaining the perfection of 
things governed," is achieved by a two-fold division. 42 
The first is the well-known division of labor, "so 
rightly extolled by all economists," says B.W. Dempsey, 
"for its promotion of efficiency. 1143 Relying upon st. 
Thomas as his common source, he quotes: 
Though there is in man a natural 
inclination to gather together the 
necessities of life • • •  it is not 
becoming that anybody whatever 
should be occupied in this task. 
Among the bees everybody is busy at 
some function, certain ones collect 
honey, certain ones build the homes 
of wax, but the king-bees are not 
busied in these tasks. So must it be 
among men; because many things are 
necessary for human life which one 
man alone cannot supply for himself, 
it is necessary that different 
things be done by different people, 
that some be farmers, some raise 
cattle, some build buildings and so 
of other things. 44 
Parallel to this division of labor is the division 
of resources serving the same end of "obtaining, in­
creasing and maintaining the perfection" of things for 
man's use. By this two-fold natural division "man effi-
42Prudence, Providence and Economic Decision, p. 22. 
43Ibid., p. 22. 
44St. Thomas, contra. gent. 3: 134. 
131 
ciently reduces the face of the earth to its proper 
providential place." From these divisions, indicates 
B.W. Dempsey, arises a "pervasive interdependence." The 
surpluses which are made possible by the efficiencies 
occasioned by this two-fold specialization require that 
men provide institutional arrangements for stable and 
equitable exchange. "From these stable and equitable 
exchanges arise communities, organic of economic interde­
pendence" (F,319]. Broadening his scope, B.W. Dempsey 
parallels and more profoundly expresses the above 
thoughts, saying that "man draws from the earth its 
providential powers, and dumb things fulfill the designs 
of providence by serving rational men who efficiently use 
the non-rational as scarce means45 to fulfill the ends 
of providence, Divine and human." 
Although the term exchange value seems to be falling 
into disuse -- simply value today -- we shall retain it 
for our peculiar purposes of distinguishing it from 
subjective valuations (value-in-use), and from price. 
Then, too, it is more indicative of our central problem 
of explaining equivalence in Scholastic exchange. 
In numerous places, B.W. Dempsey indicated that he 
followed modern price theory. An exchange consists for A 
and B of both a demand and supply; A demands Y and is 
willing to supply X; B demands X and is willing to supply 
Y. Without at this time embarking on the monetary aspect,
the transaction can be described as a simple purchase and
sale. A's demand for Y is his willingness to purchase a
certain quantity of Y at a certain ratio (value) in
exchange for supply x. B's supply of Y is his willingness
to sell a certain quantity of Y at a certain ratio
(value) in exchange demanding a certain quantity of x.
As soon as three goods are exchanged, the achieve­
ment of an equivalence becomes more difficult. But 
exchange is made possible by being made indirect. 
45Because men are rational, subordinated to the same 
end by the same providence, men are coordinate to each 
other. Thus 
B. W. Dempsey would never consider using another man 
simply and solely as a means to an end (Cf. I-II, q. 100, 
a. 8, ad. 2 m). "It is always wrong for one man to use
another merely as a means to an end" [F,367).
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Example: 
(A = wine 
(B = cheese 
(C = bread 
A does not want cheese for its own sake, but he may 
nevertheless exchange his wine for cheese, since he knows 
that he can exchange the cheese for bread which he really 
wants. In the example, cheese plays the role of a medium 
of exchange, that is, facilitates the exchange of wine 
and bread between A and c. It is acquired by A not for 
its own sake, but for the sake of what can be bought with 
it. No difference in theory arises when we enlarge the 
circle of exchange by including more people and more 
goods, by including goods of various disparate utilities 
(e.g. shoes and houses) [F,394). 
The name of money is given to a good which habitu­
ally acts as the medium of exchange. As the circle of 
exchange grows (market widens), as more and more people 
with different scales of preference (different utilities 
for goods) more dependence is placed on money as a medium 
of exchange [F,395). 
In spite of the immeasurability of utility, there is 
a certain "quantification" of subjective evaluations. 
Quantitative expression obtains when the need arises to 
decide upon the worthwhileness of exchange. For instance, 
A sees utility in his wine and in his neighbor's cheese 
too. He judges the relative merits -- the utility of the 
wine and cheese in his own mind -- "quantifies" his 
subjective evaluations, with the result that he is ready 
to enter into exchange transactions. 
The difficulties of giving such quantitative ex­
pression to his scale of subjective valuations (prefer­
ence/utilities) are vastly increased when they are 
problems any individual must, in reality, face. Such an 
individual has a complex structure of a large number of 
wants; he desires to achieve maximum satisfaction; and to 
obtain this total utility (maximum satisfaction) he will 
have to rearrange (substitute) his varied goods by means 
of exchange with a large number of different people. But 
if there is a generally accepted exchange medium -- money 
-- he will be able to express his willingness to exchange 
in terms of money. The same will hold true for all other 
'individuals. They, too, will refer their exchangeable 
goods to the common monetary denominator, and the 
monetary evaluations of each can be compared with those 
of the other. 
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This is nothing new. B.W. Dempsey depended upon it 
in his analysis; he did not see the need to explain in 
detail. In any exchange act there is a transformation of 
subjective valuations into objective quantitative 
expression. This is made more easy, not different, when 
exchange is indirect, especially when it is habitually 
monetary exchange. When exchange does take place -- the 
ratios having been reconciled -- it will be an exchange 
of equi-valence, of exchange justice [F,395]. 
When actual exchange of goods takes place by the 
parties, the equivalence, in the opinion of B.W. Dempsey, 
benefits exchange justice, not distributive or a "datur 
tertium, 11 sometimes called "economic justice. 1146 Nei­
ther Aristotle nor St. Thomas had any difficulty in 
assigning the transaction to exchange justice whenever 
the two (or more) goods were comparable [F,400 fn.; 401). 
Reciprocity47 (contrapassum) refers to the propor­
tion (secundum proportionabilitatem) between the dif­
ferent values of the· goods exchanged. Contrapassum or 
reciprocity, therefore, is a requirement of proportion­
ality necessary for all justice. Just reciprocity is a 
proportional exchange of goods according to an equality 
of value. 
All justice requires equality. Buying-selling 
requires a strict (arithmetic/proportional) equality. The 
difficulty stated in question form is: how can this 
equality in exchange be achieved with goods of unequal 
value? The classic presentation of this difficulty of 
trying to equate goods of unequal value is found in 
Aristotle's Nicomachaen Ethics and st. Thomas' Commentary 
on this passage. 
To quote Aristotle: 
Now proportionate return is secured by cross­
conj unction. Let A be a builder, B a shoe­
maker, C a  house, D shoes. 
46Cf. John w. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the 
Just Price (Philadelphia, The American Philosophical 
Society, July 1959), p. 73-74. 
47 "the idea of contrapassum (translated: 
"retaliation, 11 but in most economic contexts probably 










The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker 
the latter's work, and must himself give him 
in return his own. If, first of all, there is 
proportionate equality of goods, and then 
reciprocal action takes place, the result we 
mention will be effected. 
st. Thomas, in his commentary on the above-quoted pas­
sage, explains what is effected: 
When the builder receives from the shoemaker 
the latter's product, shoes namely, he must in 
return give his own product. If, first of all, 
equality is arrived at according to proportion 
-- so that so many shoes on the one hand are 
set against one house than the shoemaker does 
in one pair of shoes -- then contrapassum is 
established so that there is reciprocity, as 
it is called, the builder receiving many shoes 
equal to o,ne house and the shoemaker, one 
house • •. •  
Aristotle continues: 
If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not 
hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work
of one being better than that of the other: 
they must therefore be equated. 48 
once they have been equated -- so many shoes have the 
value of one house -- simple exchange can take place.49 
48St. Thomas, commentary on Ethics, Bk.V, Lesson a. 
49Modern economists, such as B. w. Dempsey, would 
indicate that in exchange the tendency is to establish 
that ratio at which the relative marginal utilities are 
equal for the potential exchanges. In monetary exchange, 
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Money equates goods whose value can be made com­
parable. "Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods 
commensurate and equates them; for neither would there 
have been association if there were not exchange, nor 
exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if 
there were not commensurability.50 Money is a commodity, 
can be employed in a simple exchange. What is just is 
what is simply equal in this kind of commutation.51 
• • • what was introduced for the common
utility ought not to bear harder on one party
than on the other, and therefore the contract
between them should rest upon an equality of
thing to thing. The quantity of a good which
comes into human use is measured by the price
given, for which purpose money was invented.52 
and Aristotle: 
For it is not two doctors that associate for 
exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in 
general people who are different and unequal; 
but these must be equated. This is why all 
things that are exchanged must be somehow 
comparable. It is for this end that money had 
been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an 
intermediate. 53 
Non-comparable goods cannot be exchanged in strict 
equivalence. If two or more "goods" are not in a true 
sense comparable, exchange justice which requires strict 
such a tendency will persist and be generalized. In 
indirect exchange, a uniform exchange ratio will be 
arrived at, under given conditions, expressed in money; 
it would in turn express the relative marginal utilities 
for all the buyers and sellers. 
50Arist. Bk. V, Lesson 8. 
51S.T., II-II, q. 61, 4. c; q. 78, 4. c. et ad. 2 m.
52Ibid., q. 11. 1. c. 
53Arist., Bk. V, Lesson 8. 
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equivalence is impossible. some other proportional 
equality brings about that which is due, "equates" the 
goods. Let Aristotle and St. Thomas express this thought: 
• • •  for in many cases reciprocity and rec­
tificatory (exchange) justice are not in
accord, e.g. (1) if an official has inflicted
a wound, he should not be wounded in return,
and if some one has wounded an official, he
ought not to be wounded only, but punished in
addition. 54 
St. Thomas further elucidates: 
• • • in exchange justice the equality of
goods in principally considered. But in
friendships based on utility the principal
consideration is of utility, and so recompense
ought to be according to the utility derived;
however, in buying, according to the equality
of the goods. 55 
B.W. Dempsey was well aware of the above problem. The 
texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas quoted above he, too, 
reproduced but did not explain. There seems to be a 
certain puzzlement in his writing on these topics. For 
instance, the distinction between comparable and non­
comparable goods as a help to the understanding of 
certain quotations, such as: 
. • • for neither would there have been as­
sociation if there were not exchange, nor 
exchange if there were not equality, nor 
equality if there were not commensurability.56 
On this note we rest the matter. 
54Ibid, B. V, Lesson 8. 
55S.T., II-II, q.77, 1, 3 m.
56Arist. , Bk. V. , Lesson 8. 
B. Just Price
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"Goods endowed with utility for human needs and
possessed in surplus by persons wishing to exchange are 
appraised in money at a price" [F,399). So far in this 
dissertation, there has been a deliberate avoidance of 
the term price. This suited our purpose and would have 
suited B.W. Dempsey's for, as he would have character­
istically remarked, "the treatment was not ready for it." 
The price of a good is the number of units of money which 
is given in exchange for one unit of the good [F,396). 
Thus, the just exchange value of a good in terms of money 
is the just price. But this, in turn, involves the 
solution of a more fundamental problem, namely, how the 
value of a commodity is determined [I,138-139). With a 
multiplicity of buyers and sellers who are in communica­
tion with one another, a uniform price will be estab­
lished at which all exchanges, at any certain time, will 
take place. With the aid of money, disparate subjective 
valuations -- for example, between a house and a shoe -­
can be reconciled [F,34-35). Assuming that buyers-sellers 
are free to act as they choose, can contract (agree) with 
one another freely, that is, they are in contact (commu­
nication) with one another, there must be the physical 
possibility of exchange. There must be knowledge on the 
part of the buyers-sellers of the actions of others. 
Modern economists, such as B.W. Dempsey, would refer to 
the above as buyers and sellers in "perfectly competitive 
market conditions." Thus, it is in the market that 
industrial subjective evaluations are transformed into 
the objective prices. 57 
1. Common Evaluations: How are individual sub-
jective evaluations transformed into the objective market 
price? How is the just price arrived at? This value in 
an exchange, which in commutative justice must be an 
57Modern economists would point out that the market 
for any individual good performs the function of estab­
lishing equilibrium between all the subjective evalua­
tions of that good. This equilibrium will be reached 
when the marginal utility of the good in relation to that 
of other goods is the same for all who possess it, and 
when it is higher for those who have the good than for 
those who have not. 
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equality, is the result not of a special valuation of the 
individual, but of the valuation of the whole community 
(secundum communem aestimationem). Thus, the just price 
is based neither on a value supposedly inherent in the 
object, "nor upon an individual I s estimation, but is 
rather 'the expression of the estimate of the community 
on the value of a good offered in a market that is 
genuinely fair, open, and without fraud'" [F,100]. 
The just price found in the market is to an in­
dividual buyer or seller an objective price independent 
of his own needs, wants, or utility he sees in the good. 
While there is a powerful subjective element in estimat­
ing the just price, the just price is independent of any 
subjective judgments. This seeming contradiction or 
paradox by which a price, depended upon and determined 
subjectively by all, becomes subjective and independent 
of each, needs further explanation. Many difficulties 
have arisen and surrounded Scholastic just price doctrine 
because of the confusion that this simple paradox 
engendered. B.W. Dempsey clears up this common confusion 
{I,149-151]. 
common evaluation establishes the just price. The 
fact is incontrovertible that the just price discovered 
in the market place depends not upon individual evalua­
tion, but upon common evaluation. For example, an in­
dividual may be in possession of an article of which he 
has no need, sees no utility, does not want (i.e. medi­
cine), and yet be pleasantly surprised to discover that 
the article can justly command a price at the market. It 
may be his (personal) subjective valuation that the 
article is without utility, but not so the common es­
timate or evaluation. "The just price, however, is not 
determined to a precise point but consists in a certain 
estimate. "58 The common estimate or evaluation is the 
resultant of a large number of subjective judgments of 
the utility "seen" in the good. This estimation, while 
considered to be subjective in origin, has an objective 
basis insofar as the subject evaluation in the last 
analysis must take into consideration the active physical 
qualities of the good to be bought or sold. Notwithstand­
ing its subjectivity or origin, in practice the price or 
exchange value of the good is wholly objective for an 
individual. B.W. Dempsey was always perfectly clear on 
58St. Thomas, S.T., II-II, q.77, 1.c. 
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this point. In numerous places he quoted st. Thomas, 
Lessius, Molina, and de Lugo, to show how Scholastic 
writers themselves effected reconciliation. He was in 
constant amazement that modern writers failed to recon­
cile these subjective and objective elements. "The 
inability to reconcile these apparently contradictory 
points of view, namely that there is a powerful subjec­
tive element in our evaluations, and yet that it is a 
just price which is independent of any subjective judg­
ments," says B.W. Dempsey wonderingly, "seems to be the 
reason why modern writers of ability and authority are 
led to make statements concerning the Scholastics' price 
and value theory which are at variance with the truth to 
the point of being bizarre" [F,418). In a clear analogy 
B.W. Dempsey shows the reconciliation: 
• the resultant of a large number of
personal judgments, the community estimate, 
though partly subjective in origin and partly 
objective, insofar as it is based on a con­
sideration of the actual physical qualities of 
the object for sale, is for me in practice 
wholly objective. The matter is analogous to a 
political election: my vote may have gone to 
Mr. Douglas; the community estimate went for 
Mr. Lincoln; though my subjective choice could 
have been one of the factors determining the 
election, the ultimate outcome, Mr. Lincoln's 
presidency, is for me a wholly objective 
consideration. Similarly, my estimate of the 
worth of an object to me will be one of the 
factors determining the community's estimate 
which will determine the just price. Yet, that 
just price, resultant of many objective and 
subjective forces, once determined, is for me 
a wholly objective fact. 
B.W. Dempsey, in conclusion, has this further comment to 
make: 
Whatever may be the value of a com­
munity to an individual for his 
personal use, the values which are 
to be equated in exchange are those 
set up by common evaluation. This 
and not the special evaluation of 
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the individual, is the ruling one in 
exchange [I,138). 
Clearly, the just price is to be determined by the common 
estimate of the buyers and sellers present in a market. 
In this way, the price will neither exceed nor fall short 
of the value of the goods and service. This is the just 
price. Nowhere, beyond in the above, does St. Thomas 
state precisely how the value of a good is to be ascer­
tained. Certain factors are enumerated and referred to in 
his treatment -- utility, scarcity and abundance, cost of 
production -- that enter into the common estimate. What 
the precise relationship of those constituent elements in 
price formation are he does not deem to treat. such 
treatment was left to modern Scholastics such as B.W. 
Dempsey. 
2. Karlr:et con4itions: 59 The Scholastics assumed
that the market would be composed of a large number of 
buyers and sellers who could not exert any individual but 
only collective influence over price formation. The price 
is independent of individual buyer's or seller's action 
in the sense that each individual will regard the price 
as given and adjust his actions accordingly. This 
follows, notwithstanding the fact that the actions (sub­
jective evaluations) of all buyers and sellers bring 
about a certain price (objective exchange value), from 
the assumptions·that all the buyers and sellers are in 
communication with one another and that none of them 
controls a large proportion of the demand and supply 
[F,426). 
This commonly derived price of the market does not 
cause hardship to the buyer. He need not buy, if the 
price is higher than the utility (his subjective ap­
praisal); he may buy, even if the price (common objective 
appraisal) is lower than his personal appraisal. Nor does 
a price arrived at by common appraisal of all cause 
hardship to the seller, since he need not sell, if he 
judges the price too low; he may sell, if he judges the 
price higher than he considers the good is worth. The 
private knowledge of some individuals does not change the 
common opinion and valuation. This remains even if the 
59This section endeavors to collate and summarize 
material in F,396-406; F,420-430; I,130-140; F,148-160. 
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buyer or seller thinks the price imprudently low or high, 
or he has advance knowledge of a change in supply or 
price. This is common Scholastic knowledge. B.W. Dempsey 
collates and orders, but does not further this doctrine 
[I,149-151]. 
Since exchange is intended for the common utility of 
both the buyer and seller, 60 as was seen in the last 
section, the just price should correspond (be equivalent) 
to the exchange value of the good, and not to the utility 
of the good for the buyer. The buyer will not buy unless 
his subjective valuation of the good (utility he consid­
ers to be in the good) is equal or greater, in turn, 
unless he values the useful commodity of money he 
receives in exchange for his good as high or higher than 
the market price [F,399]. The seller can take the price 
which he discovers in the market, 61 even though he 
values the good at less. Since he is selling at a present 
and not a future price, he can assume that the market 
price is the just price, even though he knows that the 
advent of subsequent sellers will depress the price 
[I,229; F,393]. 
When there is no known price, the buyer and seller 
must arrive at a price by a sort of estimate. Some 
latitude is allowed for error in either direction. Still, 
the seller cannot ask more than he thinks the good is 
worth -- utility of the good -- allowing for a reasonable 
profit. At no time is the seller allowed to take advan­
tage of the buyer. Caveat Emptor is a fallacious princi­
ple. Nor, for that matter, is the buyer permitted to take 
advantage of the seller. "The need of the buyer is not 
something that the seller has for sale and, therefore, he 
may not charge for it" [F,398] • 62 
We have already seen that a good could be sold at a 
higher price if its utility was enhanced. This could come 
about through greater labor effort to produce the 
good, 63 through improvement of the article, or through 
considerable risks to transport it from place to place. 
�S.T., II-II, q.77, a.1. 
61Ibid., q. 77, a. 3. 
62Ibid., q. 77, a. 1. c. 
63St. Th., II-II, q. 77, a. 4, ad. 2; a. 3 and 4. 
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Also, a good might sell for more if it became more scarce 
-- there are fewer rather than more sellers. In the 
present {short-run), the Scholastics assuming a certain 
good already supplied with a certain utility, the 
exchange-value (price) would be determined by utility and 
scarcity (demand and supply). In the hie et nunc {short 
run), the Scholastics, therefore, would maintain that 
price was determined by demand and supply in the market. 
An excess of demand over supply raises the price; an 
excess of supply over demand lowers it. The price which 
is determined by demand and supply is the just price. 
This price closely corresponds to the market price 
of the Classical school. In Classical analysis, the price 
which is determined by demand and supply is the market 
price; while the cost-determined equilibrium price, to 
which there exists a long-run tendency, is the natural 
price. The market price is sometimes higher and sometimes 
lower than the natural price. Scholastic thinking, too, 
seems to approximate this market price of the short-run 
based on utility and scarcity, and the natural price of 
the long-run based on cost of production. But this is 
implicitly, not explicitly expressed by Scholastics. 
The modern competitive price and the Classical 
natural price, in the opinion of B.W. Dempsey, are more­
or-less the same as the just price of Scholastic analy­
sis; the level to which the price of a good tends "in the 
long-run" in modern analysis is what the Classical 
economists simply call competition. But there are 
differences. 
In the perfect competition of modern theory, usually 
perfect foresight, and hence no risk, is assumed. The 
Scholastics, being much closer to the practical order of 
the.daily market, did not assume perfect foresight and 
hence risk was important as a determinant of exchange 
value (price). Also, because of the lack of perfect 
foresight and hence the presence of risk, the Scholastics 
more readily thought of the common estimate (just price) 
as more variable. Even if monopolistic elements could be 
excluded from the market, the Scholastics, because of 
this risk, would at times fall back on legal price fixing 
and the judgment of a good man to achieve a just price. 
Thus, while the Scholastic just price does approximate 
the modern competitive price, it should not be identified 
with such. 
Nor should Scholastic just price and Classical 
market price (in the short-run) and natural price (in the 
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long-run} be looked upon as more than close approx­
imations. There was a world of difference in their 
economic philosophy. The Scholastics did not expect an 
invisible hand or laissez faire policy to automatically 
achieve a competitively free market. Their economic 
philosophy called for cooperation of individuals to work 
for this common good of a free market according to the 
principle of subsidiarity. At times, to keep a market 
free from the unwanted influence of either the buyers or 
sellers, even legal price-fixing might be necessary. B.W. 
Dempsey clearly states this philosophical difference: 
The chief difference between Schol­
astic just price and Classical nat­
ural price is that the liberals 
believed their deistic Providence 
c o n s t i t u t e d  f a i r  m a r k e t s  
automatically through the magic of 
competition, no matter how hard man 
tried to make them unfair. The 
guildsmen believed that men were the 
sons of Adam as well as of God and 
that the accomplishment of the de­
signs of Providence required the 
sedulous application of human reason 
as well as cooperation with divine 
grace [F,100]. 
3. coat of Production:
The value of things exchanged and the price 
expressing this value are subject to all the 
circumstances of time, place and supply that 
modern economists recognize. The basis of 
value and its ultimate common denominator is 
utility, that is•, human need; but, once there 
has been established the demand based on human 
need, the principal determinant of value will 
be outlay and expense, especially labor cost 
[F,405]. 
Justification for placing emphasis on cost of production 
is more understandable for the Scholastics than the 
Classical economists. Considering the fairly stable 
economy of the Scholastic period under conditions of 
legal and guild regulation in a relatively static econ-
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omy, there is more justification for Scholastics em­
phasizing cost of production as a price determinant than 
for the Classicists. Still, at no time did the Scholas­
tics teach that costs of production (e.g. labor costs) 
were the sole determinants of price [F,427-428). Some­
times the Scholastics seemed to emphasize the necessity 
of knowing cost, neglecting somewhat for the moment 
demand considerations in the description of price 
determination. This only occurs when a long-run not a 
short-run situation is under consideration. This neglect 
of demand considerations in the description of the level 
to which price tends in the long run would be justified 
only in the event of constant costs for the industry. In 
an economy (e.g. Medieval economy) that is fairly static 
and the supply being fairly static, the costs would tend 
to be fairly constant. 
By constant costs for the industry, modern econom­
ists refer to horizontal industry -- cost curves showing 
identical unit costs and identical supply price for all 
conceivable rates of output. Under constant cost condi­
tions, a change in demand would change industry output, 
not price. But with sloping industry cost curves and thus 
sloping industry supply curves (e.g. modern economies) 
unit costs would depend on output. The cost at the margin 
would then depend on how much is produced, and this in 
turn on demand. The price is determined by the intersec­
tion of demand and supply, because in a competitive 
market the price-is the device by which demand and supply 
become equated with each other. But only if the supply 
curve is horizontal (constant costs) does cost alone 
determine the price. If the supply curve is not horizon­
tal, the relevant marginal industry cost and the price 
depend on where demand intersects with supply. They 
depend on demand as well as on supply. 
While the Scholastics recognized costs as contri­
buting to price formation, at no time did they exclude 
demand considerations. Emphasis on one or the other is 
not exclusion of either. Here we indicate emphasis, not 
an attempt to force the Scholastics into a mold or false 
dichotomy of contrasting price determination by demand 
and supply (in the short-run) with price determination by 
cost (in the long-run). Surely this is a false division. 
Behind supply there are cost considerations in the short­
run as well as in the long-run, although cost functions 
differently in the short-run (some costs are fixed) than 
in the long-run (all costs are variable) [Cf.I,151-54). 
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Moreover, demand necessarily enters into the de­
termination of exchange value (price) in both the short 
and the long run, unless consistent costs prevail in­
dustry-wide. Modern economic analysis holds that in both 
the short and long-run, demand and supply determines 
exchange value (price) , and that the relationship between 
cost and supply and the role of demand will be different 
in the short run from what obtains in the long-run. The 
Scholastics made no clear explicit distinction between 
the short and long run; B.W. Dempsey did. However, they 
did recognize that costs were present under both "condi­
tions." By their emphasis, they did realize that costs 
had a different relationship to demand and supply in the 
"long-run. 11 There was no further explanation of this 
difference. Such a formal theory was not needed for their 
purposes of explaining the just price. Of course, there 
was awareness that something must be known about demand 
(or some equivalent of it) as well as about cost to iden­
tify price. But this part of the problem was not treated 
to our modern satisfaction, or to B.W. Dempsey's, in any 
phase of the Scholastic period: 
We must be content to say of the late medieval 
moralist that his theory of economic value 
allows weight to all the principal objective 
and subjective factors of cost and utility and 
that price formation on the subjective-objec­
tive market analysis was well understood but 
had not yet been fully fused into a system 
[I,154). 
It is beyond doubt that B. W. Dempsey recognized 
costs as an important factor in price formation. It is 
hard to see in his reference to certain Scholastics "how 
one can . . • appeal to the cost principle as an element 
in the estimation of the common price and still deny it 
some place in the theory of value" [I, 153). In his 
perusal of the Scholastics, B.W. Dempsey gives Lessius 
the most credit for "coming closest to an integrated 
statement" on cost: 
One may charge a higher price by reason of 
labor and expense which one has undergone in 
getting, transporting, and storing goods; that 
is, if goods have not a price set for them. If 
they have, then the merchant can take account 
of extraordinary expenses in the setting of 
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the price at the time when it is first fixed, 
as we see in the case of goods brought through 
dangerous places where there is need of mili­
tary escort against freebooters. But his is 
not to be understood of expenses incurred by 
reason of misfortune or imprudence. The case 
is different if goods already have their own 
price at which they are generally sold; then 
the merchant is bound to sell at that price or 
to keep the goods • • . But in arriving at a 
price of this kind account has already been 
taken of the expenses which are ordinarily and 
unusually incurred. But if the merchant's 
expenses have been greater, that is his hard 
luck, and the common price may not be in­
creased for that reason, just as it need not 
be decreased even if he had no expense at all. 
This is the merchant's situation; just as he 
can make a profit if he has small expenses, so 
he can lose if his expenses are very large or 
extraordinary. 
B.W. Dempsey considered that cost was not sufficiently 
integrated in the analysis of Scholastics (not that he 
himself joined them in this inadequacy). He deplored that 
an integrated price theory had not emerged from Scholas­
tic economic thought. "If Molina had been a little less 
severe with scotus," asserts B.W. Dempsey, "the latter's 
cost theory, plus the ideas on income of Alburtus Magnus 
with which Scotus was_perfectly familiar, could have been 
made into a rounded system. Had these ideas been refined 
by employing the superior knowledge of the later writers 
on •the actual price-forming factors in the market, a 
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I. THB PROBLBK 01' Ill'l'EREST
A. Antecedents of Interest Analysis
Undoubtedly, B.W. Dempsey achieved his finest piece 
of scholarly work in his research and disserta-tion 
writing on interest and usury. With the leisure that he 
never again had purely for research and origi-
nal scholarship, here he made his finest contribution to 
economic thought. Highest praise came from scholars in 
this most difficult economic field, concerning both his 
competence in modern interest theory and in medieval 
usury analysis. His scholarly competence lies not only 
1) in his recognized analysis of modern -- Wick­
sell1 -- Fisher2 -- Schumpeter3 -- theories of
interest;
2) in his painstaking research to accurately
rediscover Scholastic doctrine:
3) in the comparison he then makes between the
moderns and medievals, especially Lugo-Molina­
Lessius; 4 
4) but, finally, above all, in his own peculiar
synthesis of interest analysis.
As is usual in his thought, his own interest doctrine is 
evident throughout his writings. In no one place does he 
formally present his own complete thought on this 
subject. 
B. W. Dempsey• s 
Interest and Usury, 
doctoral dissertation, titled 
was almost at once chosen for 
1Wicksell I, 7-40; also Mises, I, 48 ff.; Hayek, I, 
50 ff. 
2Fisher, I, 74 ff. 
3Schumpeter, I, 63-74; also Keynes, I, 96 ff. 
4Lugo-Molina-Lessius, I, pp. 130-185 incl. 
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publication by the American Council of Public Affairs. 
Later it was translated into several languages. Recently, 
this same treatise which had become a standard work in 
the field has again been reprinted. Joseph Schumpeter, 
the distinguished writer of the introduction to Interest 
and Usury was unstinting in his praise: 
He [B.W. Dempsey] worked out what really 
amounts to a treatise on modern interest 
theory before presenting his interpretation of 
that of the Schoolmen. This treatise, covering 
almost half of the pages of his book, has in 
fact a value of its own quite independent of 
the comparison that follows it [I,VIII]. 
Joseph Schumpeter remained steadfast in his opinion 
written before the Second World War, with the result of 
recently again recommending Interest and usury as a book 
that "combines to a degree that is quite exceptional, 
thorough familiarity with Scholastic thought and with 
economic theory, so that the interested reader may be 
referred to it with confidence. "5 Nor was he chary in 
his plaudits for B.W. Dempsey's "rich doctrinal develop­
ment" and "satisfactory" treatment of Scholastic doc­
trine. 6 Another well-known economist, Dr. Joseph Solter­
er, writing in the American Economic Review7 , recognized 
"Father Dempsey as a scholar pompetent in the field of 
economics as well as Scholastic philosophy." Furthermore, 
he comments on his scholarly courage of entering "the 
twilight zone between ethics and economics.by way of com­
paring interest theories of selected Scholastics with 
those of the eminent moderns in this field." Working from 
his.lifetime premise that sound economic policy must be 
right and just, B.W. Dempsey toiled to reconcile these 
two approaches, one modern, one medieval. Pointing out 
that the purpose of the "medieval writer" was to scan the 
facts, "to see what, given such and such conditions, was 
right and just" in comparison with that of the "modern 
5Joseph Shumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 
95-96.
6Ibid. 1 p. 104.
7Vol. 34, 1944; p. 143. 
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writer" who looks at the facts "to see what will be sound 
policy," B.W. Dempsey was fully confident that there was 
no incompatibility between them. Not that he did not 
think this involved 11 a difference in emphasis that is 
quite important" [I, 1]. Keenly aware but not deterred 
that the "Schoolman" late and early stressed his pre­
occupation with justice and equity" in contrast to the 
"current academic decorum [which] frowns upon an urgent 
concern with what ought to be rather than what is." His 
own motivation for his thorough study of the "best" of 
the medieval and modern interest and usury theorists can 
be succinctly expressed in his own words, "that zeal for 
social reform must be based upon a good working knowledge 
of the system to be reformed if the zeal is to be 
effective" [F,49]. 
Ably he defends his "representative samples" of late 
medieval usury analysis Lugo-Molina-Lessius 
carefully chosen by him for his own exposition of medi­
eval usury doctrine. 8 While never denying the appro­
priateness of the above three as "representative" of 
medieval usury analysis, he himself was content in later 
writings to depend almost completely on st. Thomas Aquinas. 9 
8Interest and Usury, pp. 114-129. 
8Cf. His analysis of St. Th. II-II, q.78 in The 
Functional Economy, pp. 408-411; the writing of articles 
entitled: "Property Rights" and "Money Price and Credit" 
[Vol. iii, Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas (New 
York: Benzinger, 3 vols, 1948] afforded B. w. Dempsey an 
opportunity to make a more profound study of st. Thomas 
Aquinas. His "rediscovery" made him of the opinion that 
st. Thomas Aquinas furnished a "complete but compressed 
treatment of social principles" and that later scholastic 
authors added by way of application but little principle. 
A clue to his early preoccupation (before 1948) with 
later Scholastics rather than st. Thomas Aquinas, is 
indicated by his warning to users of the Summa Theologi­
ae: "the treatment is, therefore, complete but com­
pressed; radical principles, laid down with the greatest 
economy of expression, must be read with care lest the 
brevity lead us to believe that the subjects treated are 
not important." Furthermore, "it would be impossible, 
therefore, as well as idle, to attempt to follow st. 
Thomas' thought in the Summa without using those other 
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In modern interest theory, after ample analysis of 
the chief moderns, 10 he fell back upon Wicksell-Fisher­
Schumpeter, regarding "the writings of these three. • . as 
the foundation of a distinctively modern theory of 
interest and prices" [I,187). As B.W. Dempsey himself 
expresses it, the "author of this study has sought in the 
case of each writer to indicate those principles which 
are at once most basic and most characteristic. 11 Thought­
fully, he adds, "this prevents the presentation of a 
detailed theory." 
Even a cursory reading and study of B.W. Dempsey's 
writings on interest and usury, makes it abundantly clear 
that he possesses in his own mind a comprehensive 
integrated interest doctrine. Following his own dictum as 
a directive that "order is unity in variety, not unifor­
mity" 11, in no place does B. W. Dempsey spel 1 out his 
complete and systematized thought on interest and usury. 
In this section, it is our task to orderly reproduce his 
thought in substance, though not in detail. In this way 
can be demonstrated not only the contribution of his 
peculiar synthesis of interest and usury doctrine, but 
that contribution of his in the form of a unique analysis 
and comparison that he made of medieval and modern 
analysis before development of his own recognized 
original contributions. 
B. Foundations of Interest Analysis
B.W. Dempsey began his study of interest, as he
seemingly did every major problem in econoi:nics, from "the 
central role of choice in the economic process." For him 
the prime economic problem of the individual and society 
is �hat of "utilizing comparatively scarce resources in 
such a way as to yield maximum satisfaction" [ F, 26) . 
Sketching the commonplace in his background for interest 
writings of his, chiefly the Commentaries on the Ethics 
and the Poli tics, to which he so freely refers [Cf. , 
F,166). 
1°For example, 
chapter [I,88 ff.] 
theories. 
B. W. Dempsey devotes one entire 
to John Maynard Keynes' interest 
11Social Order, Vol. 5, April, 1955, p. 159. 
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treatment, he indicates that in facing this problem of 
choice, "man, more or less consciously, ranges his 
multiple wants into an order of importance. In so doing, 
he is guided on the side of cost by two correlative 
principles, the absolute or real cost involved, and the 
relative or opportunity cost" [F,27). Thus, men who have 
practically unlimited needs are confronted with a limited 
quantity of resources, both human and material, with 
which to satisfy their needs. Man is, therefore, under 
the "necessity of arranging both his needs and resources 
on a scale of desirability in making the best combination 
that he can" [F,29]. 
Combining the theory of choice with the notion of 
capital, B.W. Dempsey is in a position to illustrate 
saving as a cost as an important foundation for the 
understanding of his interest analysis. "Capital," 
according to B.W. Dempsey, involves two things: "First, 
saving, at least in the sense of some curtailment of 
consumption or leisure, and secondly, the fabrication of 
tools or instruments into its more efficient form." He 
adds that, at least in the beginning of this process, 
"some expenditure of time" is involved (F,24-25]. 
Following Schumpeter in his classic Theory of 
Economic Development, B.W. Dempsey traces this out within 
the circular flow of incomes. Within this circular flow, 
choice is not, therefore, only between two courses of 
current consumption, that is, to spend more on clothes 
and less on food, but also between present and future 
consumption, that is, to spend less now in order to spend 
more then. The choice becomes whether to spend (consume) 
or not-spend (save). The very problem of saving (not­
spending) is the making of the decision "as to how much 
of my income I will enjoy now, and how much of the 
enjoyment I will postpone" [F,29]. Evidently, a person or 
a community that consumed all of its resources, that is, 
saved nothing, would be a very poor community. Thus, the 
advantages of capital, that is, "saved-up and worked-on 
resources" [F,196], are so compellingly obvious that all, 
even the most primitive people, do some saving. 
When income in the form of money is considered " the 
process, though obscured, is fundamentally the same." For 
a community to spend all its income on current consump­
tion will not raise the standard of living, as "the 
resources of the community will be wholly devoted to the 
production of consumer goods which, because of the lack 
of capital equipment and the resulting low level of 
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efficiency and the big demand, will be high in price" 
[F,30]. 
The economic status of the individual in organized 
society today is largely determined by his command over 
purchasing power, that is, over this income flow. Such 
command is acquired by rendering services -- 11 labor 
service or the ability to organize and direct business 
activity" -- for which wages and salaries are the reward. 
Those who own land may work it or lease it and thus 
derive an income, a flow of purchasing power, from the 
rental. Those who have accumulated wealth by saving or by 
inheritance may either themselves employ it at a profit, 
or may lend it out to others at interest for productive 
purposes. Obviously, interest is a value phenomenon and 
an element in price. Not only the services rendered by 
labor, enterprise and land, but by capital, are primary 
sources of purchasing power for their owners in the form 
of wages, profits, rent and interest. 
c. Xntereat Within the Circular Plow
Before considering the phenomenon of interest in 
detail, it would be well to see how B.W. Dempsey, again 
following Schumpeter, included interest's place in the 
circular flow. Private property is now to be coupled with 
the theory of choice, capital and saving as cost. 
If entr�preneurs were in a position to com­
mandeer the producers' goods which they need 
to carry their ,new plans into effect, there 
would still be entrepreneur's profit but no 
part of it would have to be paid out by them 
as interest. Nor would there be any motive for 
them to consider part of it as interest on the 
capital they expend.12
Interest must be paid because the entrepreneur 
must call in the capitalist to help him remove 
the obstacle which private property in means 
of production, or the right to dispose freely 
12Joseph Schumpeter, op.cit., p. 177. 
of one I s services, puts in their way" 
[I, 69] • 13 
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If an entrepreneur has control over the "balances" 
through saving with which to acquire commodities and 
services, he may buy these commodities and services and 
if they prove productive gain a profit. But if an entr­
epreneur has no right over specific purchasing power due 
to it being in possession (the private property) of 
another or others, he removes this obstacle by becoming 
a borrower at a price. The price paid by the entrepreneur 
(borrower) for "a social permit to acquire commodities 
and services without having previously fulfilled the 
condition which in the institutional pattern of capital­
ism is normally set on the issue of such a social permit" 
is called interest [I, 71] . Interest, therefore, is a 
payment for balances with which to acquire commodities 
and services, not for the commodities and services that 
may be bought with the balances. "Goods are bought and 
sold; money is lent and borrowed" [I,74]. These commodi­
ties and services themselves do not give interest, but 
give rent and wages. Understandably, now, is the follow­
ing quotation from B. W. Dempsey in reference to the 
"missing capitalist." 
In a communistic society interest does not 
exist, for the reason that the agent for which 
interest is paid simply would not exist in a 
communistic community. Though wages and rents 
as such would not be paid in a communistic 
economy, the services of land and labor would 
still be present; but not so with interest" 
[I,69]. 
B.W. Dempsey makes this Schumpeterian approach his own 
when he states positively that a cost-reducing innovation 
is "a source of true profits, and the profits are a 
source from which interest can be paid" [F,160]. Follow­
ing Schumpeter, under the more severe conditions of the 
circular flow, "profits" go to the entrepreneur, with 
interest acting as a tax on those profits. In a socialist 
economy, the entrepreneurial state may achieve in a sense 
a "profit" if the commodities and services over which it 
13Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 181. 
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has control are productive. Since the state is already 
the "capitalist, 11 there is no "tax on profits;" the 
capitalist agent is not separate but already the state, 
and so no separate agent exists who needs to be paid for 
the "right" or "title" or "social permit" to his property 
in the form on interest. Thus, there can be no interest 
in the socialist state. B.W. Dempsey does not follow 
Wicksell, who in his theoretical apparatus admits the 
possibility of the entrepreneurs holding interest gains 
in the form of goods. B.W. Dempsey follows Schumpeter, so 
that with the assistance of capital equipment, innova­
tional acts of the entrepreneur result in "profits," with 
interest acting as a tax on those profits [cf., I,87 
n.62], providing the entrepreneur (borrower) and capital­
ist agent (lender) are functionally separate. Economists
realize that some price must be put on the use of capital
goods in order to ration them, whether the. initial price
paid be referred to as "profits" or "interest." Entrepre­
neurs use capital goods and from them hope to gain a
profit. If part of this profit must be paid to another
who owns the capital equipment, B.W. Dempsey, following
Schumpeter, designates this "tax on profits" as interest.
D. The Analysis of Interest
B.W. Dempsey examined the economic process (and in
doing so made what is tantamount to an exposition of the 
economic process) in both its components and in the 
sequence of its operations. His treatment of the economic 
process in its operations -- production, distribution, 
exchange, consumption -- although traditional, in a short 
space contains a surprising number of keen insights that 
could be associated with a keen professional economist 
(one who has the habit of his science in an eminent 
degree) ; yet, as it is not germane to our Eresent
purposes, it is being mentioned only in passing. 4 
14Cf. F, 51 ff. for fuller treatment of the opera­
tions of the economic process. 
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1. In a static economy: In its components, the
economic process is conceived by B.W. Dempsey15 as 
unfolding in an isolated, contained or unchanging com­
munity "where private property prevails and a system of 
economic organization has been developed with a division 
of labor and free competition" [F,354). In this economy 
everyone lives in each economic period (cycle) on goods 
produced in the preceding period. 
s.w. Dempsey points out that "the market possibilities16 
of the community are known by experience to all producers
and annual production moves in a well-defined customary
round" [I, 63] . If this whole income-output-income of the
community is assumed to occur annually and that with each
"resuming round the fruit of the employment of permanent
sources of productive powers seeks to reach the same
consumer, 11 a complete circular flow results. Having drawn
this above treatment directly from Joseph Schumpeter,
s.w. Dempsey succinctly completes the round through the
following salient quotation: "the sellers of all commodi­
ties appear again as buyers in sufficient measure to
acquire those goods which will maintain their consumption
and their product! ve equipment in the next economic
period at the level so far allowed and vice versa"
[F,354-355; I,63).v
In such an unchanging circular flow of economic 
activity, the economy of itself would evoke nothing new 
because, as experience shows, there would be "no impulse 
to spontaneous change on purely economic grounds" [I, 64] • 
Reflecting upon such a static economy, B.W. Dempsey 
15After critical appraisal [cf. r, 63 ff.] B. w.
Dempsey's treatment as discovered in various of his 
writings follows very closely his former mentor, Joseph 
Schumpeter. To see the full extent of this dependence, 
consult Joseph A. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Devel­
opment. B. w. Dempsey perused the first German edition, 
1911. 
16In F,354 it reads market "responsibilities," but 
from his treatment elsewhere this surely should read 
"possibilities" not "responsibilities." 
17Joseph A. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Devel­
opment (Harvard University Press, 1936), p. a (First 
German Edition, 1911). 
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further contended that "net profit (strictly so-called) 
cannot exist, for the reason that alternative opportuni­
ties of investment being non-existent, all relevant 
knowledge of the customary methods of production is 
available and common to all producers, and therefore, in 
general, no surplus above the value of producers' goods 
can be attained because all sources of surplus are 
exhausted in competitive pricing (F,355]. 
Nor can, of course, that "tax on profit" -- interest 
-- exist. Costs can be considered not only as opportuni­
ties foregone, but as the sum total of expenses. If costs 
are treated as the sum-total of expenses, then "total 
price for all genuine actual expenses (the personal 
services of the business man and the rents on property he 
owns included) must always equal the receipts obtained 
for the products" [F,355]. 
In an economy whose normal course flourishes 
year in and year out through familiar, well­
worn channels, what grounds can there be for 
systematic undervaluation of means of produc­
tion as compared with products?. Competition 
on the one hand and imputation on the other 
must annihilate any surplus of receipts over 
outlays, any excess of the value of the prod­
uct over the value of the services of the land 
and labor involved in it.18 
Thus, the economy in this theoretically perfect form 
operates with no profit, not, that is, without results, 
but without any income or surplus not imputable and 
imputed to the primary factors of production. 
· At this juncture, we follow B.W. Dempsey in his
paraphrasing of an important paragraph from Joseph 
Schumpeter•s work.19 No given sum can possibly obtain a 
larger sum in an economy that "perfectly follows the 
circular flow long enough for the market to be adjusted 
to perfect equilibrium" (F,355,356]. No matter how any 
hundred monetary units worth of resources (including 
management) are employed within the commonly known and 
18Joseph Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, 
p. 160, (quoted in I,64].
19Ibid., p. 190. 
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customary possibilities, "you can obtain from them no 
receipts greater than exactly one hundred units." 
You may apply any hundred monetary units to 
whichever of the existing possibilities of 
production you wish, but you will always 
receive for the resulting product no more -­
possibly less, however than a hundred 
monetary units. 
continuing, B.W. Dempsey concludes that this is "pre­
cisely" the essential characteristic of the equilibrium 
position; it represents the "best" combination -- under 
the given conditions the widest sense -- of the produc­
tive forces. 
In this static economy -- an economy without deve­
lopment of new products, organization, or sources of 
supply20 -- the services of the factors of production, 
such as land and labor, available with the hundred mone­
tary units would yield a product not more than a hundred 
monetary uni ts. This would hold true even when these 
services were applied to the most lucrative production in 
the economy. Now, B. W. Dempsey is ready to draw some 
important conclusions concerning interest in a static 
economy, "an economy without development." 
B. w. Dempsey defines money capital as: "a sum of 
means of payment which is available at any moment for 
transfer to entrepreneurs to enable them to gain control 
over concrete goods" [I,66]. But from his definition he 
persuasively argues that in an economy without develop­
ment there is no "capital" in the sense he uses here21 
and then his all important conclusion: since there is no 
capital in a static economy, "there is no interest in the 
sense of a permanent income, constantly present in the 
economy, obtainable for the use of loan funds" [I,66]. 
Since there can be no loan in such an economy which 
will "positively and permanently enrich both borrower and 
lender, 11 there can be no true interest in such an 
20cf. F,356. 
21cf. F,24-25, 193; W,113-115, 119, 245; on the 
nature of capital: also Chapter IV, "The Functional 
Wage," for a more extensive treatment. 
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economy. The attempt to demand such a return is altogeth­
er impossible. 
2. In a Dynaaic Bconomy: Wishing to be perfectly
clear, B.W. Dempsey categorically states that, while "the 
static economy knows no productive interest, this is not 
the same thing as denying the existence of interest in a 
modern economy" ( F, 3 59 J • "Interest, 11 he says, 11 is the 
child of development, and only with developments can it 
appear and endure." In an almost literary manner, B.W. 
Dempsey sweeps us along his path of argument. "Into the 
economic tranquility of the established circular flow 
enters the entrepreneur with his development" [I,66). 
This entrepreneur, analytically regarded by B.W. Dempsey 
closely following Joseph Schumpeter, is a person of 
highly specialized function." He is the innovator, the 
spearhead of progress-- only this and nothing more. He is 
not, as entrepreneur, possessed of resources or money 
capital, but he possesses the big idea -- the new 
economic combination which will enable his enterprise, 
once launched, to break into the closed circular flow by 
offering more for less and still be able to show a margin 
of profit because of the cost-reducing superiority of the 
innovation" (I,66). For this statement of the explanation 
of interest, B.W. Dempsey does not take credit for 
himself, but quotes with fullest approbation from 
"Schumpeter' s brilliant essay, a truly entrepreneurial 
feat in economic analysis" [F,360). 
For the prices o_f the means of production were 
not determined with regard to this employment, 
but only with regard to the previous uses. 
Here, then, the possession of a sum of money 
is the means of obtaining a bigger sum. On 
this account and to this extent, a present sum 
will be normally valued more highly than a 
future sum. Therefore, present sums of money -
- so to speak as potentially bigger sums -­
will have a value premium which will also lead 
to a price premium. And in this lies the 
explanation o:t interest. 22 
22Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 190 (italics in 
the original); F,358; I,66-67]. 
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In close paraphrase, we follow B.W. Dempsey's 
analysis of under what circumstances "a surplus is ipso 
facto realized," and thus interest. The entrepreneur as 
entrepreneur has no means of initiating his new depar­
ture. Resources must be drawn from industry in general 
and, thus, to divert them, the entrepreneur in a modern 
economy must have resources to credit. If the following 
three conditions are fulfilled, states B.W. Dempsey, the 
new enterprise will show a place for itself in a new 
equilibrium position. The three conditions are {F,67): 
a) the price of the product must not fall in
the face of the new supply, or at least not
fall so far as to offset the net product
gained per worked;
b) the costs of the new combination must be
less than the cost of the resources dispensed
with, or less than the total revenue after
deduction for the possible drop in price;
c) the advance in price induced by the added
demand for raw materials must not, with the
passage of time, come to effect the margin
left by the first and second conditions.
Interest, therefore, may become "a permanent net income 
flowing to a definite class or category of persons within 
the economy. 11 Under dynamic conditions (conditions of 
development), the economist must find for true interest 
a source from which it flows -- some value exists from 
which it is a drawn; a basis on which it may be imputed 
to some type of contribution to production; and an 
assurance of its continued existence as a distinct source 
of income -- the cause of the endurance of the flow {Cf. 
I,68-69). 
II. TD PROBLEM OJI' USURY
A. Money Barren in Itself
With exchange comes the introduction of money, 
with money, the question of price, and of just 
price specifically. With the question of just 
price comes the question of the just price of 
money, that is, of usury {F,392). 
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An exposition of B.W. Dempsey's views on value and 
money insofar as they are pertinent to a discussion of 
money must, of course, treat the question of the ster­
ility or productivity of money. There is no question that 
B.W. Dempsey considered money in itself barren or 
sterile, nor does he base the sterility or unfruitfulness 
of money "on a dictum of Aristotle. 11 "Though Aristotle is 
a respected authority," he says, "I find no reference to 
that dictum of his that money was a sterile thing" 
[I,107]. B.W. Dempsey's own studies of the writings of 
Wicksell-Fisher-Schumpeter, whom he "regarded as the 
foundation of a distinctly modern theory of interest and 
prices" [I,187], authoritatively told him that money in
itself was a barren thing. Summing up his findings, B.W. 
Dempsey states unequivocally that "since 1890, when 
writers of as great authority as Knut Wicksell have, 
without blushing, again proclaimed the importance of the 
fact that money of itself is unequivocally barren, there 
is no need to explain or apologize for the alleged short­
comings of Aristotle and Aquinas" [F,407). Yet his own 
ultimate argument for the barrenness of money was from 
reason and not "respected" authority. His own reasoning, 
falling under contracts, was succinct, brief and through 
illustration: 
If I lend you a durable good, a tool, or a 
draft horse, the ownership can be distin­
guished from the user, and I can charge you 
for the use while retaining the ownership. In 
the case of goods that cease to exist with 
their first use, bread, for example, or wine, 
I cannot charge you for the use while retain­
ing the ownership. I can sell you the wine, 
but if I lend it to you, I can ask for nothing 
more in return than the value of it. Money 
evidently belonged in this second category, 
being good for nothing but to be spent. There­
fore, to charge a price for its use as dis­
tinct from its ownership was an obvious viola­
tion of justice [F,100]. 
There can be no question that money in itself was 
considered unfruitful, but the phrase "in itself" which 
B.W. Dempsey consistently italicized must be interpreted 
very strictly. A loan of money may confer obvious 
advantages, but "that advantage does not arise from the 
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money itself, except insofar as it is subject to the 
borrower's industry and the borrower's risks." For 
example, a person who has stolen an article which is non­
productive in itself, for instance, money, "may still be 
entitled to any gain made by the possession, though bound 
to return the article, or its equivalent value. 11 The 
reason, B.W. Dempsey indicates, is that "things of this 
sort are not productive in themselves but only insofar as 
they are subject to the industry of the business man." 
continuing, "money thus subject to the business man I s 
activity and diligence undergoes a change in value 
relative to money not so placed." Money, therefore, in 
itself, is not a productive good; but, "as far as this 
principle is concerned, the circumstances in which money 
can be considered by and in itself may be very rare or 
very frequent" [I,158]. 
B. Kutuwa as Transfer of ownership
In B.W. Dempsey's later works, he more and more
showed a dependence upon st. Thomas. In st. Thomas• own 
summary he found an adequate summary of his own views or 
doctrine on usury. Particularly, he was "pleased" to 
quote, analyze, sharply defend, and use as a summary of 
his own views, the "central doctrine" found in one 
article in the Summa Theologiae of st. Thomas. 23 It 
having become an integral part of B.W. Dempsey's thinking 
on usury, we too shall quote the entire "corpus" of the 
article for subsequent reference and useful purposes: 
To take usury for money lent is unjust in 
itself, because this is to.sell what does not 
exist; and this evidently leads to inequality, 
which is contrary to justice. In order to make 
this evident, we must observe that there are 
certain things whose use consists in their 
consumption. Thus we consume wine when we use 
it for drink, and we consume wheat when we use 
it for food. Wherefore, in such like things 
the use of the thing must not be reckoned 
apart from the thing itself, and whoever is 
granted the use of the thing is granted the 
23st. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.78, art.1, 
ad corpus: F,407. 
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thing itself; and for this reason to lend 
things of this kind is to transfer the owner­
ship. Accordingly, if a man wanted to sell 
wine separately from the use of wine, he would 
be selling the same thing twice, or he would 
be selling what does not exist; he commits an 
injustice who lends wine or wheat and asks for 
double payment, viz., one, the return of the 
thing in equal measure, the other the price of 
the use which is called usury • • • Now money, 
according to the Philosopher, was invented 
chiefly for the purpose of exchange, and 
consequently, the proper and principal use of 
money is its consumption or alienation whereby 
it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its 
very nature unlawful to take payment for the 
use of money lent, which payment is known as 
usury. 
A setting forth of usury analysis requires some 
knowledge of the theory of value and just price. In usury 
analysis our concern is with the contract of mutuum, the 
justice of which depends upon the equality between the 
thing given and the thing received. This is a value 
problem, and the value problem has been already discussed 
in treating the just price of goods. But as soon as we 
depart from a simple direct sale for cash, the difficul­
ties are identical with those of the usury problem, for 
the anticipated or postponed payment is an implicit or 
virtual loan. 
Usury is gain from a loan of mutuum. 24 Hutuum is a 
contract concerning the loan of an object under such 
conditions that the title to the thing loaned passes to 
the borrower. Frequently, B.W. Dempsey emphasizes that in 
a loan of mutuum, the trans.fer of ownership is the 
"decisive," the "significant," the "crucial point," the 
"critical factor." The important characteristics of 
mutuum are two: 1) that the ownership of the thing loaned 
passes with the loan, and 2) that payment is made not by 
24Hutuum -- The delivery of an article (the quali­
ties of which are fixed in number, weight, or measure) 
with the intent that it immediately became the property 
of the one recovering it with the obligation to restore 
an article of like kind and quality [I,141). 
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returning the identical article but one of the same kind 
[I,143]. Such a loan was called a mutuum, because what 
was mine (meum) became thine (tuum) ; that is, the 
ownership was transferred [F,435). If the ownershiR was
not transferred, the loan was called a commodatum 5 and 
the owner expected the return of the original article. 
Thus, it differs in that the identical article is to be 
returned. B.W. Dempsey expresses this clearly by illus­
tration: 
Now, some loans must be of the first types 
(mutuum), as with wine and grain, and some 
loans must be of the second type (commodatum), 
as with this house on this lot, which has no 
perfect substitute. But many goods can be the 
object of either contract, depending on the 
intent of the parties. Even money can be lent 
on commodatum, and a charge be made for the 
service. A man possessed of a fine coin col­
lection could lend it out for an exhibition 
and charge for its use and require the whole 
thing to be returned, but money that is lent 
to be spent must change owners, because, if it 
is used at all, only the most unusual accident 
would enable the borrower to return the origi­
nal coins. Therefore, a loan of money is 
normally made in such wise as to involve a 
transfer of ownership, and if the money is the 
property of the borrower, then the lender can 
make no charge to the borrower for the use of 
what has become the borrower's property 
[F,408-409]. 
Many goods can be the subject of either a contract 
of mutuum or accommodatum. Except for such novelties as 
coin collections, money is an object of a loan of mutuum. 
Under modern industrial conditions with men grading and 
standardizing, many goods are identical, "constant in 
number, weight and measure." With such standardized 
goods, it is a matter of indifference whether the 
25Commodatum -- (loan of accommodation) -- the free 
grant of something regarding its use alone for a definite 
time [I,141). 
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identical object lent or another standard unit be returned. 
Money seems to be the most highly standardized of 
all goods and, hence, the perfect example of the object 
of a loan of mutuum; for, to all practical purposes, 
money has value only in terms of being spent in the more 
or less immediate future. "Money is the one commodity the 
title to which most certainly is transferred on the 
occasion of a loan and, therefore, a loan of money has 
always been a contract of mutuum [F,436]. Again, "money 
is the object par excellence of a loan of mutuu:m, for 
with unimportant exceptions money cannot be loaned except 
on mutuum and it enjoys the highest fungibility (stan­
dardization)" [I,164]. 
B.W. Dempsey was always careful to note that the 
fundamental consideration in a loan of mutuum is not the 
fact that consumption goods are lent (for money cannot in 
any sense be called a consumption good), but the fact of 
the transfer of ownership. If an object is lent in such 
a way that the borrower becomes the owner of the object 
borrowed, then he cannot be charged for the use of 
something which is his. This transfer of ownership is 
obvious in the case of food and drink, and also in the 
case of money, "for the use of money is the spending of 
it. "26 This is less obvious, but equally true, in the 
case of any standardized (fungible) good that can be lent 
in such a way that the owner is indifferent as to whether 
or not he received back the identical article lent, but 
is satisfied if• he receives a perfect substitute. B.W. 
Dempsey expresses this concretely through example: 
When the important qualities of things are 
fixed in number, weight, or measure, there is 
no purpose in insisting upon the identical 
object being returned, since such standardized 
objects readily work, one in place of another. 
This is obviously true of consumption goods, 
but not exclusively. Two schools, for example, 
might supplement each others' supply of fold­
ing chairs by making gratuitous loans as 
occasional need for each arose. If the folding 
chairs in both schools were of the same stan­
dard mold, there would be no purpose in exer­
cising care to return the same chairs. The 
211st. Th., II-II, q.117, art. 4, ad corpus. 
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loan would be of a standard fungible good but 
not of a consumptive good, and the loan would 
be a mutuum. And, during the loan, the lending 
school would own no chairs but would have 
claim on the borrowing school for the number 
of chairs of the same condition as were bor­
rowed [I,143). 
Unquestionably, therefore, the loan would be one of 
mutuum though the object of the loan would not be called 
a consumption good. 
c. Role of Time in Kutuwa
While usury is contrary to the natural law demanding 
equality in exchange, "it is usury only if it is received 
for the mere loan" [I,165). A loan of money, considered 
in itself or as a "mere loan, 11 is always a loan of mutuum
and, therefore, gain from a loan of money is usury. Thus, 
the central axiom from which usury analysis sets forth is 
that in a loan of mutuum the object borrowed must be 
returned "to an equality" 
-- to an equality of values. Does the passage of time 
considered absolutely by itself alter the value of money 
(some modern experts imply such) and so allow for 
interest?. Does the passage of time remove money from 
being a "mere loan, 11 considered in itself?. Certainly any 
circumstance which does alter the value of money to the
lender or because of which he incurs a cost in the 
occasion of the loan may found a title to compensation; 
otherwise, the object borrowed would not be returned to 
an equality of value. 
The element of time is essential in a loan of 
mutuum, B.W. Dempsey stresses, "otherwise a simple 
exchange would result" [I, 143]. A mutuum must be for some 
period of time; otherwise it would be a meaningless 
exchange of money for money under conditions in which the 
exchange could serve no purpose. The passage of time, of 
itself, is not the basis for interest. There is, in 
general, no real continuous growth of value with the 
passing of time as a primary and independent phenomenon, 
quotes B.W. Dempsey from Joseph Schumpeter's Theory of 
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Economic Development [I,186].27 Furthermore, opines B.W. 
Dempsey, this is a proposition of which the Scholastics 
(Molina-Lessius-Lugo) would "heartily approve." Certain­
ly, B.W. Dempsey does: 
That interest is a phenomenon arising among 
economic objects and subjects precisely in­
sofar as they are durable, that time is our 
external expression and arbitrary measure of 
this durability, does not necessarily involve 
an alteration in such relations of those 
enduring objects and subjects such as to yield 
a net surplus over the values imputed directly 
to the factors. Time may or may not be the 
occasion of such a surplus; it is always a 
condition, but per se never a cause. The 
factors which operate in durable objects and 
alter their relative values must be examined 
in detail; they cannot be bunched under the 
noncommittal head of "time" [I,187]. 
Time, therefore, has no autonomous role independent of 
such forces as may require time in which to operate. B.W. 
Dempsey is at his best as he clearly delineates the role 
of time. "Forces which can produce a net value surplus," 
he sees, "must reside in durable agents or agents with 
enduring effects." But, given that fact, the presence or 
absence of a.value surplus or interest depends upon the 
evaluation of those durable objects; "the mere fact of 
duration is not an explanation of interest in any sense. 11 
Turning to modern writers, B.W. Dempsey admits that they 
consider that "interest is a phenomenon concerning the 
duration of economic processes." He also points out that 
these modern writers have reservations concerning the 
inevitability of pure interest with the mere passage of 
time. 11 B. W. Dempsey thinks this is a position which 
coincides with that of the Scholastics, "who held that 
there is no value surplus automatically generated in 
durable objects by their continued duration" (I,197]. The 
emergence of such a surplus is what requires explaining. 
B.W. Dempsey made these points clear: 1) that usury 
is gain from a loan of mutuum; 2) that usury is unjust 
27Joseph Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, 
p. 171.
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because it is the extortion of a payment without any 
equivalent value rendered; 3) that a loan of money in 
itself is always a loan of mutuum and, therefore, gain 
from a loan of money is usury; 4) that if there is a 
value surplus, time may or may not be the occasion of 
such a surplus; it is always a condition -- "condicio 
sine qua non," but per se never a cause. 
D. Presence of Bztrinsic Titles
Even from earliest times the fact has been recog­
nized that a loan of money may involve circumstances that 
justify a payment over and above the amount lent, even 
though the loan when considered strictly in itself is a 
loan of mutuum. How can this be explained? 
Whenever the risk was so great and so obvious, it 
was acknowledged that there existed a title to a return, 
a title extrinsic to the bare loan. Obviously extreme 
risk imposes a cost on the lender, for which he deserves 
compensation if the loan is to be made at all. Certainly 
it is just or reasonable that any circumstance which 
alters the value of money to the lender, or because of 
which he incurs a cost on the occasion of the loan, may 
found a title to compensation. "These titles were called 
'extrinsic, 1 11 declares B. w. Dempsey, 11 as being something 
apart from the money itself but yet involved in the loan 
transaction when viewed concretely as a whole." Not that 
they were extrinsic to the particular loan, "but since a 
loan may be made in which these titles are absent, they 
are extrinsic to the essential idea of a loan" [I,171). 
Gain immediately arising as an obligation from a 
bare loan of mutuum may not be taken; if taken, it is 
usury. But other circumstances may exist, not essential 
to the loan, yet concretely identified with it, which may 
furnish a sound basis for a title to compensation. With 
approbation, B.W. Dempsey quotes from a clear, succinct 
passage of Lugo: 
There are three chief titles which can cleanse 
a mutuum from the stain of usury: emergent 
loss, risk, and cessant gain; and these three 
can be comprehended under one, emergent loss. 
Risk and stoppage of gain are losses of a 
sort, which, however, are usually distin­
guished for the sake of clearness • • •  Emer­
gent loss, taken in a strict sense, is distin-
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guished from cessant gain by the fact that 
emergent loss causes detriment to goods pos­
sessed; but cessant gain causes a loss of 
goods which you expect to possess but do not 
[I,171). 28 
Emergent loss (damnum emergens) is a loan arising to the 
lender because of the loan; cessant gain (lucrum cessans) 
is a gain which the lender has been making which stops or 
does not materialize because of the loan. These two have 
this in common, as implied in the above quotation from 
Lugo, that they simply represent different forms of a 
cost imposed upon a lender. Relating this in the Wick­
sell-Fisher-Schumpeter manner to the circular flow, cost 
would be the comparative loss from the income stream 
caused by the substituting of one use of capital for 
another. In turn, the return in the form of interest 
would be comparative gain which accrues usually later, 
caused by this same substitution of one use of capital 
for another. The lender yields the values the money would 
have furnished him if he had not loaned it, namely: some 
direct cost to himself (business), and some opportunity 
for gain relinquished for lack of funds [Cf. I,172-174]. 
Of course, either of these is a cost. 
Usury is a gain from a loan of mutuum. But there may 
exist an extrinsic title to compensation, that is, a 
title extrinsic to the loan transaction considered in 
itself. The .tit.le to the gain cannot be the loan of 
mutuum, but a different fact also true at the same time 
and occasion of the-loan; then money does have an ex­
trinsic value. Extrinsic value gives extrinsic title to 
compensation. "Coextensive with this fact of the exis­
tertce of the circumstances that create extrinsic titles, 
the yielding up of money on a loan imposes a cost on the 
lender because he yields those other values along with 
the value of the money considered in itself" [F,438). 
As should be recalled from the treatment of just 
price, a good must be sold at its common price unless 
special circumstances give it a greater value to the 
seller than it has in the common market. Though there is 
a common price of money, a particular lender may have use 
and need for the money, which will justify a charge for 
the loss which the loan imposes upon him. Cost to the 
28Lugo, 25 70.
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lender in any form is the basic title of interest (Cf, 
I,176-178]: it is the special circumstance which gives it 
a greater value to the lender (seller). The extrinsic 
value of money depends upon the general existence of 
alternative investment opportunities, not on the avail­
ability of those opportunities to one individual. When 
these alternative investment opportunities involving a 
cost to the lender become common as to be almost univer­
sal, money itself, under these circumstances, now has an 
extrinsic value. If money, due to its alternative 
investment opportunities, does have extrinsic value, 
lending of it will impose a cost on the lender. If money 
loans in general do not impose costs on lenders, then 
money takes on no extrinsic value and, therefore, there 
being no extrinsic titles to interest on a money loan of 
mutuum, there is no interest. To demand a return on the 
loan itself without the presence of extrinsic titles is 
usurious. 
Returning to the circular flow, in a static economy 
-- an economy without development -- money is, as a 
general thing, relatively sterile. In medieval days, with 
the prevalence of a handicraft (relatively static) 
economy, the possession of a fund of money usually could 
not be considered as "working capital. 11 The loan of 
money, therefore, was a loan of mutuum without intrinsic 
conditions, and so was actually the loan of a sterile 
thing. In modern days, since it is a fact "that money may 
always be readily exchanged for productive goods" that 
causes it to be regarded as virtually productive. Hence, 
extrinsic titles are now present and, therefore, "inter­
est may always be taken on a loan of money, for it is no 
longer, in canonical terminology, a mutuum, but a 
locatio, 29 the hire of a useful thing" ( F, 101 J • Certain­
ly money in general in a modern (dynamic) economy will 
have intrinsic value, hence extrinsic titles. It remains 
for B.W. Dempsey to answer two questions: 1) How much 
money has this extrinsic value: 2) and who has the title 
to that value in a dynamic economy?. He adequately 
answers both questions as one in a single short para­
graph: 
29Locatio (hire or rent) -- a contract by which a 
person or object is granted at a price for its use or 
produce [I,141]. 
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Al though the existence of investment oppor­
tunity depends upon the relation of available 
resources to prevailing technological condi­
tions, there will be no rate of interest, as a 
distinct economic share, unless there is 
saving; and it is clear that, if money has 
intrinsic value because of dynamic conditions 
in the economy, the funds that are available 
for lending are funds that have been saved. 
Therefore, the persons who have title to the 
return from this extrinsic value are those 
persons who have saved previously earned 
resources [F,429). 
III. THE PROBLEM OP INSTITUTIONAL USURY
A modern problem in which B.W. Dempsey is credited 
with making an original contribution is that of the moral 
aspects of credit. His study of the Scholastics on 
interest and usury had given him a keen insight into the 
moral aspects of "institutional usury," as he deigned to 
call it. His unusual knowledge of the chief modern 
writers on interest who viewed such as a problem from 
economic policy placed him in an enviable position in 
treating the economic aspects. No one denies that B.W.
Dempsey here has highlighted a problem and made a 
contribution. ; some do, however, disagree with the nature 
of his contribution of "solution." To fully understand 
his "solution" entails a study of the reasons behind his 
conclusions. Much of.the criticism of his·position arises 
from too little appreciation of how he arrived at his 
strong statement. Full censure, however, is not due these 
critics -- much of B.W. Dempsey's basic reasoning was 
left implicit or scattered profusely throughout his 
copious writings. Our task, therefore, is to explain the 
"morality of interest under conditions where money, 
involving no cost of production and therefore no emergent 
loss to the lender of first instance, can be called into 
being in quantities indefinitely great by the state and 
the banking system" [F,411). 
Since bank credit was little developed in the 
Scholastic period, though by no means unknown, and paper 
money was scarcely used, little of the morality of this 
problem can be directly gleaned from them. This does not 
mean that their principles, which B.W. Dempsey made his 
own and were briefly expressed above, do not fully apply 
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to this relatively "modern" problem. Contemporarily, much 
entrepreneurial activity has of course been financed by 
created credit. Prescinding from the moral aspect for a 
moment, created credit, as B.W. Dempsey admits, makes 
life easier for the entrepreneur" and helps him "comman­
deer control over resources at a lower price in the first 
instance than would have been paid had savers received 
the actual rate of interest prevailing before the 
creation of the new credit" (F,360]. Obviously, he does 
not consider such "convenience" as a moral justification. 
As we have adequately considered, money in itself is 
sterile, and a loan of money in itself, excluding any 
extrinsic title, is usurious. "Money is the one commodity 
the title to which most certainly is transferred on the 
occasion of a loan and, therefore, a loan of money has 
always been a contract of mutuum" [F,436]. "If money in 
general does have extrinsic value, lending of it will in 
general impose a cost on the lender; and, if loans in 
general do not impose costs on lenders, then money will 
have no intrinsic titles to interest on a loan of mutuum" 
[F,439). Such a loan would be one of mutuum, a contract 
binding in commutative justice and thereby demanding 
restitution. Following Joseph Schumpeter,30 B.W. Dempsey 
defines credit as "essentially the creation of purchasing 
power for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepre­
neur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing 
power" [I, 65; I, 66) • "The essential function of credit," 
states B.W. Dempsey in another place, "is to implement a 
new demand without simultaneously creating a new supply 
of goods" (F,356-57]. 
A. credit in the circular Flow31 
The economic process is really one indivisible 
whole. "Out of its great stream the classifying hand of 
the investigator artificially extracts economic facts." 
Yet there is no real understanding unless we see how 
these facts (e.g. credit) fit into the whole. For B.W. 
Dempsey, credit took on real meaning from its place and 
function in the circular flow of economic life. Needless 
to say, he was but following in the now familiar Wick-
30Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., pp. 106 et seq. 
31Ibid., pp. 95-128. 
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sell-Fisher-Schumpeter (particularly the last) tradition. 
At this juncture, our study is not of the static economy 
-- being by definition without interest, it poses no 
problem. "The static economy knows no productive interest 
[F,359]. In an economy without development there is no 
"capital" in the sense here used, that is, "a sum of 
means of payment which is available at any moment for 
transfer to entrepreneurs to enable them to gain control 
over concrete goods [ F, 357] • And since there is no 
capital, there is no interest in the sense of a permanent 
income, constantly present in the economy, obtainable for 
the use of loan funds. 
But if into this "serene and placid round of cus­
tomary activities, development and credit enter," we have 
a problem. "The person or persons in a position to 
initiate this development into the established circular 
flow are under the necessity of diverting resources from 
their previous employments. In the theoretical construc­
tion, this is done exclusively (and in real life to no 
small degree) by means of credit." The essential function 
of credit, as we have seen, is to implement a new demand 
without simultaneously creating a new supply of goods. In 
B.W. Dempsey's theoretical case, an alternative applica­
tion of the system's productive resources can be achieved 
only by a disturbance in the relative purchasing power of 
individuals. "For in the circular flow, there would be no 
idle stocks for the needs of the entrepreneur" 
[F,357] • 32 
The function of credit in the hands of entrepreneurs 
"to disrupt the prevailing optimum disposition for their 
new employment," but-who themselves possess no claim in 
the goods moving in the circular flow. "Insofar as credit 
is.created ad hoc for the entrepreneur and is not drawn 
for the results from past productive services, 11 concludes 
B. W. Dempsey, 11 it represents neither money nor goods from 
the previous cycle of the circular flow" [F,357]: 
Credit is essentially the creation of pur­
chasing power for the purpose of transferring 
it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the 
transfer of existing purchasing power. Even 
the fact that a credit creation may be "cov­
ered" by some property owned by the entrepre-
32Ibid., quoted from p. 96. 
neur does not "alter the nature of the pro­
cess, which consists in creating a new demand 
for, without simultaneously creating a new 
supply of goods [F,357]. 
s. credit from saving
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Credit transactions fall into groups: 1) money which
is lent that has previously been saved, 2) money lent 
that has not previously been saved. In the first group, 
namely, money which is lent that has previously been 
saved, a positive rate of interest may legitimately 
emerge, as a cost is incurred in the withdrawal of incbme 
from its destined use in order to substitute it in some 
other use where it may yield a surplus. "Such a positive 
rate of interest appears when and to the extent that 
there is emergent loss to the lender" [I, 197] • Such loans 
of funds involve an antecedent sacrifice to the lender, 
that is, loans made from funds which have been income in 
the form of saving. Somebody has been given the means 
(credit) of purchasing goods at the same time diminishing 
the purchasing power of somebody else. such a "sacrifice" 
or cost is the basis for extrinsic title and therefore 
interest. B.W. Dempsey clearly held that "if money has 
intrinsic value because of dynamic contributions in the 
economy, the funds that are available for lending are 
funds that have been saved" [F,439]. Therefore, persons 
who have saved previously earned resources, under dynamic 
conditions, have the title to the return from this 
extrinsic value. 
Certainly, B.W. Dempsey would consider that a source 
of legitimate interest would exist in a dynamic economy, 
under such conditions that the demand and supply of 
savings are equal, all savings are invested, and there is 
no investment which does not correspond to subtraction 
from previous income, that is, to funds which previously 
have been cost and which therefore have found their place 
in the pricing system. In such cases, B.W. Dempsey would 
say that Fisher would refer to the rate of return over 
cost [I,187]: Wicksell to the rate of natural interest 
(I, 2 2 O] : and the Scholastics to the average emergent loss 
in the community [I,189]. Certainly, B.W. Dempsey admits 
that these authors use terms that "express ideas with a 
great deal in common" [I,186, 206]. 
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c. credit Hot fro• savings
Credit transactions not based on saving involve,
therefore, no antecedent sacrifice, since no income is 
withdrawn from its destined use in the circular flow in 
order to substitute it in some other use where it may 
yield a surplus. Since no cost emerges, no return or 
interest is due. This form of credit gives somebody the 
means of purchasing goods without at the same time 
diminishing the purchasing power of somebody else. Money 
not earned in production -- not saved -- has become 
available for expenditure on products. With approbation, 
B.W. Dempsey quotes the following from the eminent 
economic authority, Joseph Schumpeter: 33 
The distinction between normal and abnormal 
credit is, however, important for us. Normal 
credit creates claims to the social dividend, 
which represent and may be thought of as 
certifying services rendered and previous 
delivery of existing goods. That kind of 
credit which is designated by traditional 
opinion as abnormal, also creates claims to 
the social product, which, however, in the 
absence of past productive services, could 
only be described as certificates of future 
services or of goods yet to be produced. Thus 
there is a. fundamental difference between the 
two categories, in their nature as well as in 
their effects. Both serve the same purpose as 
means of payment and are externally indistin­
guishable. But the one embraces means of 
payment to which there is a corresponding 
contribution to the social product, the other 
means of payment to which so far nothing 
corresponds --- at least, no contribution to 
the social product even though this deficiency 
is often made up by other things [I,198]. 
B.W. Dempsey's outlook on such a process is simple 
and clear. In such a case of loans not based on savings, 
not only is there no antecedent emergent loss to the 
33Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 101-102; cf. 
footnote on same page. 
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lender, but there can be none. B.W. Dempsey's position on 
this point was almost uncompromising, "unless," he 
states, "we are dealing with a case of public authority 
where impending calamity justified the invoking of the 
ultimate limits of social authority for the common good" 
[I, 200-201). Money loans on the "part of persons and 
institutions who have not saved, and, therefore, do not 
have the extrinsic moral titles to compensation, are 
loans of mutuum. "Whenever money is lent that has not 
been previously saved, there is a gain from a loan of 
mutuum for which no moral title exists [F,439). B.W. 
Dempsey concludes his treatment with the following 
proposition: 
Loans of funds which involve an antecedent 
sacrifice to the lender, other things being 
equal, produce a different price complex and 
disposition of resources from those which do 
not so impose a sacrifice; that is, loans made 
from funds which have been income affect the 
price complex differently from those which, 
not having been income, can involve no ante­
cedent sacrifice [I,197-198). 
B.W. Dempsey strongly defends the "utility" and the 
"clarity" with which his above proposition holds "a 
pivotal position in the theories of all." Summing up 
previous analysis in Interest and Usury, he recalls that 
"Wicksell, Mises and Hayek take strong positions for the 
elimination of the possibility of loans involving no 
antecedent sacrifice." "Schumpeter," he declared, "does 
not commit himself specifically but seems to feel that up 
to a point the good outweighs the evil" [I,199). He 
continues in this vein with other noted authorities. But 
for our purpose of showing that in no way did B.W. 
Dempsey stand alone on the above proposition, the above 
citations should be ample. 
D. usury Element in Inflation
Today, money is lent and production goods are bought 
and sold. If the money lent involved no cost, was 
"created," not withdrawn from saving, a loan of mutuum 
results. Such a usurious loan is necessarily inflation­
ary, too, since purchasing power increases without a 
corresponding supply of goods. This bank credit, or new 
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purchasing power, is "created" (not based on saving) and 
placed at the entrepreneur's disposal. Thus the entrepre­
neur takes his place in the circular flow beside the 
previous producers and his purchasing power its place 
beside the total previously existing. 
Obviously, there has been no increase in the supply 
of goods existing in the economic system. Yet, with his 
new and the economic's increased purchasing power he can 
compete in the purchase of the existing supply of goods. 
Obviously, no goods and certainly no new goods correspond 
to the newly created purchasing power. What it really 
amounts to is a compressing of existing purchasing power. 
In the first place, the purchasing power of previous 
producers in the market will be compressed (they will be 
forced to save); secondly, the purchasing power in the 
market for consumption goods of those people who receive 
no adequate share in the increased money incomes result­
ing from the entrepreneur's demand (his purchase of 
goods/services) is compressed. B.W. Dempsey poignantly 
expresses the effects of this increased purchasing power 
entering the system without a corresponding increase in 
the supply of goods as follows: 
This volume of deposit currency represents not 
so much a loan as a levy upon the holders of 
currency and deposits. They are the ones from 
whom the validity of the new fund is drawn 
through los.ses expressed in higher prices to 
be paid for goods when the new funds go to 
market, as they promptly do. But that is not 
all. Besides drawing too much of what the 
government needs from the poor as compared 
with the rich, finance by bank credits also 
causes a large transfer of real income from 
one set of people (mainly the receivers of 
fixed incomes) to another set of people 
[I,221-222]. 
The injection of pseudo-income, reasons B. W. Dempsey, 
involving no cost and thus no emergent loss, being 
unmatched by goods, generates higher prices and a dis­
placement of incomes which were based on earlier costs. 
Bank credit forces the necessary real capital out of 
the public. "The real saving which is necessary for the 
period of investment is in fact enforced -- at exactly 
the right moment -- on consumers as a whole, for a 
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smaller quantity than usual of consumption goods is 
available for the consumption of the second year" 
[I, 200]. 34 This is the notion and effect of forced 
saving, " a  phenomenon which results from, and is meas­
ured by, changes in the quantity of money or bank credit" 
{I,201]. Bank credit without saving is a usurious loan of 
mutuum and has a necessarily and evil inflationary 
effect. Certain consumers pay the cost through higher 
prices, making the real saving necessary for entrepre­
neurial activity, without reaping the benefit. Illustrat­
ing by means of a government war loan bond, B.W. Dempsey 
relates in one long sentence how when a war loan bond is 
"sold and is paid for out of funds created ad hoc, we 
have a two-fold phenomenon: first, the acquisition of an 
asset (the claim embodied in the bond) without any 
corresponding deduction from income or capital -- in 
other words, without emergent loss or cessant gain by the 
new owner of the new bond; second, in the case of all 
persons who participate in wartime profits, we have a 
lucrum ex mutuo, arising from the fact that the lending 
operations cause a rise in the price of products of 
wartime industry" [I,222]. Thus, according to B.W. 
Dempsey, even a person who might otherwise claim an 
emergent loss cannot at the same time also benefit by the 
rise of prices -- in this case, caused by the expansion 
of government credit -- and on balance have any emergent 
loss. Remembering that the pricing process is a social 
matter, the emergent loss is to be judged "from the 
business as a whole." Falling back on the above example, 
through its effects, B.W. Dempsey's own "definition" of 
inflation becomes clear and apropos. "Inflation is the 
disturbance of the income distribution and consequent 
claims on current output by the transfer of wealth to the 
state to the amount of all treasury expenditure above tax 
receipts and above sales of treasury securities to savers 
who reduce their own expenditures by the same amount. 1135 
If the power of decision is that of either the state or 
34Quoted from Wicksell, Interest and Prices, p. 156. 
35Inflation as a Permanent Problem; a speech given 
several weeks prior to his death to the Twelfth Annual 
Conference for Correspondent Bankers (published in 
brochure form by the Marine National Exchange Bank of 
Milwaukee), p. 45. 
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a banking System, B.W. Dempsey did not absolve from usur­
ious practice [F,440-441). Only a small concession did he 
reluctantly allow to the state in this regard. "If a 
government merely printed paper money and passed it out, 
it would be clear that whatever value the government 
received as a result of the first transaction would be 
something to which it had no right, unless, in a violent 
emergency, this be regarded as commandeering in a very 
inequitable form of taxation" [F,440). Cost does not 
disappear under inflation, but shifts, and unfortunately 
to the "poor" and the "receivers of fixed incomes." 
Inequitable shifting of purchasing power is wrong even 
though done by the state itself or a banking system -­
"institutional injustice." 
B. Injustice of usury
In a static economy, as there would be no alterna­
tive opportunities open to the lender for investing 
savings, there is no possibility of interest. To take 
"interest" would be to violate exchange justice. Money in 
a developed (dynamic) economy has a common value and a 
common price -- a true rate of interest -- and a lender 
can be presumed to incur cost (and so gain a title) and 
so can justly (and so lawfully) charge interest. When 
cost is imposed upon a lender who has alternative 
opportunities, there is reason for interest to be paid. 
Modern economists are not primarily interested in whether 
interest should be paid but whether it can be paid; more 
interested in how economically it can be paid, than why 
interest must be paid. Thus, as B.W. Dempsey has so ably 
presented, in circumstances in which Fisher's Rate of 
Return over cost would be positive, Schumpeter's entre­
preneur would have superior alternative uses for capital 
awaiting exploitation. Circumstances in which "the 
Schoolmen would say a gain from a loan would be usury, 
the Wicksell-Schumpeter train of thought sees as the 
source of a disequilibrium" [I,212]. But the problem of 
justice, not merely disequilibrium, arises if either the 
element of cost or alternative opportunities are not 
properly present. 
Money loaned in the form of credit not based on 
saving and so involving no cost would, according to B.W. 
Dempsey, be a loan of mutuum; as such, it is usurious and 
a violation of commutative (exchange) justice. 
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His emphasis is on commutative justice, since a loan 
of mutuum is basically a usurious contract that falls 
under this justice. This does not infer that because "the 
Scholastic would frown at its very first step, namely, 
the gain from a loan of funds, that, not being income, 
could not involve emergent loss to the lender" [I,208), 
that either the Scholastic or B.W. Dempsey would limit it 
to or neglect the other justices. One justice violated; 
all simultaneously violated. As previously treated, B.W.
Dempsey considered that a violation of exchange justice 
means a violation of social and distributive justice too: 
The circumstances should be noted here that 
though we have limited the discussion to 
commutative justice and to considerations 
drawn from reason alone (since that was the 
most convenient way of dealing with usury), 
additional reasons and motives upon which the 
Scholastic might draw in order to persuade 
participation in the social process of pricing 
are not so limited. In addition to commutative 
justice (there are] the virtues of 
social justice, personal charity and social 
charity, both natural and supernatural, liber­
ality and munificence • • •  [I,215, fn. 64). 
Moving from "the principle which the Schoolman 
applied primarily to persons" and applying them "to a 
process," the usury can then be "regarded as 'institu­
tional' 11 (I, 212 J • Modern economies with banking, monetary 
and fiscal institutions facilitate this institutional 
usury by which the "benefits of saving are swept to those 
who have not saved" [F,163). 
Institutional usury, then, in B.W. Dempsey's eyes, 
is II a process by which governments and the banking 
system introduce a usurious element into a loan contract 
payable in the expanding funds" [F,441). From the 
viewpoint of justice, the peculiarity of the usury 
element in inflation is the fact that mutuum is a con­
tract binding in commutative justice and so demanding 
restitution. The diffusion of the injustice under (e.g. 
wartime) inflation makes it very difficult to know who 
owes restitution to whom. But this difficulty does not 
deter B.W. Dempsey from condemning this process of 
institutional usury. "Savers who suffer under this 
procedure have suffered a loss from a mutuum loan process 
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for which loss they have a right to be compensated" 
[F,441]. Commenting at length, he explains the "proce­
dure": 
• and when investment is financed with
funds that have never been income and which, 
therefore, could not possibly involve antece­
dent emergent loss or cessant gain, then there 
may well be lucrum ex mutuo, since someone is 
enabled to cut into the market and buy at 
current prices before the effect of the injec­
tion of this pseudo-income has had opportunity 
to operate. If the purchase of the investment 
goods proves to have been ill-advised, the 
actual borrower may not be the recipient of 
the gain he has occasioned. But somewhere in 
the economy, "windfall gains" will appear on 
someone's books; the economic process then has 
operated to produce a "gain from a loan" even 
though no person could be shown to have been 
guilty of usury. Again we have the effect of 
usury without the personal fault. The usury is 
institutional, systematic [I,207]. 
In the modern situation to which economists have applied 
the concepts of emergence of natural and money interest, 
divergences of saving and investment, divergences of 
income disposition from tenable patterns by involuntary 
displacements -- B.W. Dempsey regards all of them as 
having bolstered his discussion and giving "a sufficient 
common ground with late medieval analysis to warrant the 
expression 'institutional usury'[I,228]. Then, too, he 
calls it to our attention that "institutional usury" 
seems to be what was in the mind of Leo XIII when he 
wrote, "this evil (the condition of workers) has been 
increased by rapacious usury which al though more than 
once condemned by the Church is nevertheless under a 
different form but with the same guilt still practiced by 
avaricious and grasping men" [F,441] • 36 
The very effect of inflation would be a "disturbance 
of income distribution." Simply, B.W. Dempsey in numerous 
places implicitly and obliquely it is true, but in the 
36Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII; emphasis added by B. w. 
Dempsey. 
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light of his treatment of justice, nevertheless clearly, 
expresses that the usury element in inflation violates 
distributive justice. B. W. Dempsey considers a government 
under wartime conditions when it "makes easy use of 
inflationary methods." He then points out that the "scale 
of the operations makes the usury element in inflation 
very great and very obscure." Brushing aside the excuse 
of obscurity, he points out that its presence is clear, 
nevertheless, "from the changes in income distribution 
always associated with the inflationary process even when 
price changes are delayed" [Cf. F, 440-441). As economist, 
B.W. Dempsey was keenly interested in finding evidence of 
this income displacement. He was ever alert for evidence 
to prove Ludwig von Mises' statement that "changes in the 
rate of saving • • • must result from the new income 
distribution, the new income, in turn, being the result 
of changes in the volume of money. 1137 
When B.W. Dempsey refers to "usury as institution­
al," or "systematic," or the need to "change the system" 
or II institutions, 11 it is his way of referring to the work 
of social justice.38 Granted that he spoke of the "pri­
macy of commutative justice and its remorseless tenacity" 
[I,2120213), he at the same time and in regard to 
institutional usury considered social justice as an ever 
present obligation "to create conditions which 
responsible persons can readily recognize and fulfil 
their obligations in commutative justice" [1,213]. 
He did have one concrete proposal to rectify the 
"system" or money "institutions," for making them soci­
ally right or just [cf. F,161). His proposal was for a 
100 per cent reserve plan, "a fixed money supply, or a 
supply altered only in accord with objective and cal­
culable criteria;" he looked upon such a proposal as a 
"necessary condition to a meaningful just price of money" 
[I,210. He was confident, too, that "a Scholastic of the 
seventeenth century viewing the modern monetary problems 
37B. w. Dempsey, s. J., Cyclical Variations in 
Income Distribution (Econometrica, vol. XI, no.2; April 
1943), pp. 168-169. 
38Cf. The Functional Economy, 79; 38; 324 ff. 
184 
would readily favor a 100 per cent reserve plan" 
[I,210).39 His own reasons for his advocacy of the 
"socially just" 100 per cent reserve plan are strongly 
expressed: 
A system of 100 per cent reserve money, or 
even a system of commercial banks for short­
term credit with 100 per cent reserve with a 
system of equity banks for longer investment 
(provided the equity banks were mutual and the 
benefits of created credit would accrue pro­
rata to all savers), would eliminate the 
obvious inequities and most of the cyclical 
fluctuations from the present "capitalistic" 
system. Either, maintained for long enough, 
would correct the most undesirable features of 
present income distrlbution. The fruits of 
saving accruing to the actual savers would 
diffuse the ownership of investment goods and 
completely obscure the "class" distinctions by 
making interest an important item of income 
for large numbers of people [F,161]. 
CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, B.W. Dempsey achieved his finest piece 
of scholarly work in his research and dissertation 
writing on interest and usury. In order to judge better 
this contribution to interest doctrine, it was found 
necessary to gather his interest writing into one 
cohesive body of thought; as usual, something B.W. 
Dempsey did not do. Through a study of his writings, it 
is evident that his was an analysis of modern interest 
theory; a painstaking research to accurately rediscover 
Scholastic doctrine; a much-needed comparison between the 
moderns and medievals; and lastly -- al though never 
formally and completely in one place -- he achieved a 
synthesis of interest built upon the best of the 
Schoolmen and moderns. 
39B. W. Dempsey drew his "proposal II for making the 
"financial institution" socially just from Irving Fisher 
and as so often from Joseph A. Schwnpeter; of. Jos. A. 
Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, pp. 95 ff. 
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For the most part, B.W. Dempsey respectfully fol­
lowed Scholastic tradition on usury; on a very few 
occasions, as noted, he departed from this path. Up to 
now, treatment of his usury analysis was for the most 
part reserved for an exposition and attempt to integrate 
his views. But this concluding section provides an 
opportunity to make further comments on key points, such 
as the nature of interest and the barrenness of money, on 
which either B.W. Dempsey "seems" to have departed from 
scholastic tradition or others have explicitly named him 
as doing so; then, too, certain other theories at 
variance seem important enough to deserve more than mere 
mention. 
F. The Nature of Interest
The problem with which Scholastic thinkers before 
B.W. Dempsey were concerned throughout the centuries was 
the question of the "permissibility" of interest, a 
question not primarily economic but ethical. It is clear, 
and our above-exposition was based on this premise, that 
the moral permissibility of interest can be determined 
only with reference to its economic nature. Even though 
attention was primarily directed to ethical permissibili­
ty, the problem demands the investigation of the economic 
nature of interest. 
B.W. Dempsey's analysis of interest does not differ 
substantially from the majority of economic experts 
except on the nature of interest. Because of what he 
considers the very nature of interest, B.W. Dempsey 
denies that interest is possible in a socialistic econ­
omy. Since this is a divergence from the usual position, 
further discussion seems apropos. 
B.W. Dempsey holds that if entrepreneurs were in a 
position to commandeer the producer's goods which they 
need to carry their new plans into effect, there would 
still be entrepreneurs' profits, but no part of their 
profit would have to be paid out by them as interest. Nor 
would there be any motive for them to consider part of it 
as interest on the "capital" they expend. On the con­
trary, the whole of what they make over and above costs 
would be "profits" to them and nothing else. It is only 
because other people have command of the necessary 
producers' goods "that entrepreneurs must call upon the 
capitalist to help him remove the obstacle which private 
property by means of production or the right to dispose 
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freely of one's personal services puts in their way." No 
such help is needed in producing within the circular 
flow, for a "going firm" can, and in principle is, 
currently financed by previous receipts which stream to 
them without the intervention of any district capitalis­
tic agency. In a socialistic economy, the state as 
entrepreneur already has possession of the means of 
production (capital goods) needed for innovation. The 
capitalistic agent for which interest is paid simply 
would not exist in a socialistic economy. Hence, it could 
not be the subject of a valuation. And consequently, 
there could not be a net return corresponding to the 
interest form of income. The state in a socialistic 
economy has the disposal of production goods directly. 
The non-socialistic exchange economy must first of all 
procure them by hire or purchase -- and so interest. 
B.W. Dempsey is not alone in his analysis of in­
terest. He is in the excellent, select, and highly 
qualified company of Joseph Schumpeter and Heinrich 
Pesch. B.W. Dempsey identified himself with and made 
Joseph Schumpeter•s interest analysis his own. 
In a communistic or non-exchange society in 
general there would be no interest as an 
independent value phenomenon. Obviously no 
interest would be paid. Obviously there would 
still exist the value phenomena from which 
interes� flows in an exchange economy. But as 
a special value phenomenon, even as a concept, 
interest would not exist there; it -is depen­
dent upon the · organization of an exchange 
economy. 40 
Joseph Schumpeter holds that interest must flow from 
entrepreneurial profit. If the entrepreneur already 
possesses the necessary productive goods, there exists no 
separate function nor (capitalistic) agent to whom the 
entrepreneur must pay for their use. If a separate 
capitalistic agent exists due to the phenomenon of 
private property, part of profit is swept to the capi­
talist, and then "interest acts as a tax upon profit." 
Oswald von Nell-Bruening in an article on Heinrich 
40Joseph Schumpeter, Theory o:f Economic Development, 
p. 176.
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Pesch' s interest theory, which is referred to as the 
theory of economic service (performance), has these few 
significant words to say: "Pesch observed that our modern 
economy granting credit is synonymous with placing 
economic power at somebody's disposal." Quoting directly 
from Pesch: 
This real possibility of making a profit was 
caused by the mere availability of greater 
monetary capital; and this availability is 
caused or brought about immediately by the 
lender's act of granting a loan. Thus the 
lender brings about the possibility of a 
greater money supply, according to the old 
principle: "causa causae est causa causati 11 
(Lehrbuch, 5, 727). 
"This act," concludes Oswald von Nell-Breuning, "of 
making available as an economic potency is an economic 
service and, as such, it is worth its price, just like 
any other service. 1141 If the lender and borrower are one 
(under socialistic conditions) no price need be paid. 
G. Barrenness of Honey
Another point that needs discussion is the "bar­
renness" of money in the modern economy which has so many 
widespread opportunities for probably profitable invest­
ment. Various positions other than 
B. w. Dempsey's have been taken on the "barrenness" of
money. As we have seen, B.W. Dempsey remains with the
older school of Scholastics who in following closely St.
Thomas Aquinas, retaining formally intact the original
Scholastic analysis of usury, justify interest in modern
economic life only by the general application of extrin­
sic titles, particularly that of the 1ucrum cessans
(emergent loss) or loss of profit from investment.
Whenever cost to the saver is present,
B.W. Dempsey would admit an extrinsic title, and hence
interest. Succinctly, "emergent loss to the lender -­
cost in any form -- is the basic title to interest. All
other titles -- cessant gain, risk of capital (periculum
41Oswald von Nell-Breuning. "The Peschian Interest 
Theory," Social Order, April, 1951, p. 180. 
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sortis), delay (mora) and so on -- are but special cases 
of cost to the lender" [F,410). 
A modification of "older" Scholastic analysis with 
respect to the nature of money and capital seeks to 
establish a direct and intrinsic justification for modern 
interest by shifting the loan of money from the class of 
mutuum to that of commodatum or locatio. 42 Today, every 
loan of money is a locatio because money has a general 
applicability to productive enterprise and, consequently, 
money capital has a quasi-productivity. This modern 
theory of justifying interest was favored by John A. Ryan 
in his Distributive Justice. But since "he did not 
definitely commit himself on the matter, "43 it will 
perhaps be best to quote his own words. He states: 
Today the majority of catholic authorities on 
the subject prefer the title of virtual prod­
uctivity as a justification. Money, they 
contend, has become virtually productive. It 
can readily be exchanged for income bearing -­
bearing or productive property, such as land, 
houses, railroads, machinery, and distributive 
establishments. Hence it has become the eco­
nomic equivalent of productive capital, and 
the interest which is received on it through a 
loan is quite as reasonable as the annual 
return to the owner of productive capital. 
Between .this theory and the theory connected 
with lucrum cessans the only difference is 
that the former. shifts the justification of 
interest from the circumstances and rights of 
the lender to the present nature of money 
itself. Not merely the fact that the individu­
al will suffer if, instead of investing his 
money he loans it without interest, but the 
fact that money is generally and virtually 
42Locatio (lease) -- a contract by which a person or 
object is granted at a price for its use or product; 
mutuum and commodatum have been previously defined (cf., 
also I,141). 
43Patrick w. Gearty, The Economic Thought of Monsi­
gnor John A. Ryan (Washington, D. c.: The catholic 
University of American Press, 1953), p. 208. 
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productive, is the important element in the 
newer theory. In practice, however, the two 
explanations or justifications come to sub­
stantially the same thing. 44 
An analysis of the term "virtual productivity" of money 
merely seems to mean that under modern conditions a 
widespread possibility exists to apply the money to 
productive purposes. The fact that money may be con­
sidered productive in view of its power of representing 
real capital does not make it a productive good (and 
therefore the basis of a locatio). We must recall the 
common doctrine that if the use of a thing involves its 
consumption (e.g. mutuum), the thing itself is insepar­
able from its use; and its ownership is necessarily 
handed over to the borrower when its use is given to him. 
The borrower is bound to restore no more than its 
equivalent, for the thing and its use may not be separ­
ated and charged for separately. If the use of a thing 
does not involve its consumption, the thing and its use 
may be separated and charged for separately. If this 
occurs, the contract of commodatum, which is itself 
gratuitous, becomes one of lease (locatio) and rent 
(conductio), with the borrower becoming the lessee and 
the lender the lessor. Thus, in locatio and conductio the 
things that in question are not immediately consumed in 
their proper use and can be returned identically. Because 
they are not consumed in use, they are not, in this case, 
actually "fungibles, "45 and may justly be leased, for 
44John A. Ryan, Distributive Justice (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1942), p. 122-23. 
45Potentially :fungible goods are those highly 
substitutable or standardized objects which may be 
consumed in use, one unit of which may function for 
another; for example, money considered in general or 
money which in a particular transaction, is not going to 
be spent for a good. 
Actually :fungible goods are such goods that are 
actually consumed in use, that do not have other units 
serve for them; for example, money which, in a particular 
transaction, is going to be spent or has been spent for 
a good. 
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after a period of use they are still there to be restored 
identically to their owner. 
In direct opposition, we have the clear statement of 
B.W. Dempsey who denies that money is productive and 
becomes in any sense a contract of commodatum or locatio. 
He states: 
Money seems to be the most highly standardized 
of all goods and, hence, the perfect example 
of a loan of mutuum; . for to all practical 
purposes, money has value only in terms of 
being spent in the more or less immediate 
future. Money is the one commodity the title 
to which most certainly is transferred on the 
occasion of a loan and, therefore, a loan of 
money has always been a contract of mutuum 
[F,476). 
To B.W. Dempsey, money loaned was consumed in its use, 
since the identical dollar need not be returned and a 
transfer of ownership took place in the transaction. 
Thus, the loan of money was a contract of mutuum, not 
locatio. 
In the above long quotation, John A. Ryan remarks 
that "the majority of Catholic authorities on the subject 
(of interest) prefer the title of virtual productivity as 
a justification." If this is true, it would place B.W.
Dempsey in a minority, and some further "defence" of his 
position might seem necessary. But is virtual productivi­
ty the "majority opinion" on interest justification?. 
Certainly, the knowledgeable Lewis Watt does not concur. 
He states: 
Among theologians, the distinction between 
loans for consumption and those for production 
has found no general acceptance, nor has the 
theory that money as such can be hired out for 
profit. Some would say that as an instrument 
of commerce money is, in a developed economy, 
"quasi-fruitful," so that a charge can be made 
merely for lending it; but there is at least a 
strong tendency against this theory, and 
instead, to justify the institution of inter­
est on the ground that nowadays a loan of 
money (mutuum) raises a presumption of loss of 
probably profitable investment to the lender, 
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for which compensation in the shape of inter-
est may rightly be demanded. 46 
To sum up, interest, according to Pesch, is the 
equivalent for a special service able to be valued in 
monetary terms. This service is not due to a property of 
money, which in itself is "barren," but is bound up with 
the loan on the grounds of intrinsic circumstance. 47 
Again, Pesch contends "that the whole approach is 
incorrect" to say that a "loan for production is entitled 
to interest, but not a loan for consumption." "It is not 
the purpose of the loan that is the crucial question, 11  he 
maintains, "but whether the law of equivalence is 
satisfied. This looks to what has been loaned, not to 
what is to be done with what has been loaned. 1148 
In reference to the long passage from John A. Ryan 
quoted above on the virtual productivity of money, 
Patrick Gearty seemingly enlists the approval of B. W. 
Dempsey, for he points out that B.W. Dempsey made the 
following observation with reference to extrinsic titles: 
11If we admit the idea of a market in which the privation 
of money has a common price, these titles might be 
considered as intrinsic to loans in such a market" 
[I, 171, n. 77 J • 49 Closer scrutiny of this footnote seems 
to veto the notion that B.W. Dempsey was "approving" of 
the virtual productivity of money. The above short quote 
was a footnote comment of B.W. Dempsey on his own passage 
contained in the text that follows: 
• • •  there is no title by which the lender
may receive anything beyond the principal
lent. However, any circumstance which does
alter the value of money to the lender or
46Lewis Watt, S. J. , Usury in Catholic Theology 
(Oxford: catholic Social Guild, 1945), p. 44-45. 
47Richard E. Mulcahy, S. J. , The Economics of 
Heinrich Pesch (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953), 
p. 133.
46Ibid. I p. 155. 
49Patrick Gearty, The Economic Thought of John A. 
Ryan, p. 208. 
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because of which he incurs a cost on the 
occasion of the loan may be found a title to 
compensation. These titles were called "ex­
trinsic" as being something apart from the 
money itself but yet involved in the loan 
transaction when viewed concretely as a whole. 
They were not extrinsic to the particular 
loan: but since a loan may be made in which 
these titles are absent, they are extrinsic to 
the essential idea of a loan [I,171; emphasis 
added]. 
These titles might be considered as intrinsic to loans in 
a certain market, or a particular market; but they are 
"extrinsic as being something apart from the money 
itself." They remain extrinsic to the essential idea of 
a loan. 
B. consumed in use
st. Thomas•s position is, briefly, this: money is 
a measure of price and therefore a medium of exchange; 
as a medium of exchange its normal use is to be spent; in 
being spent it is lost to the buyer or used up, is 
consumed in use; the use of money, then, cannot be 
separated from the money itself. From this point st. 
Thomas develops two arguments against usury, one that it 
is unjust to make a separate charge for the use of money 
over and above the money itself; the other that, as 
ownership must be transferred in a loan, it is unjust to 
charge the borrower for the use of what he owns. It is to 
be noted that both of these conclusions are reached from 
the premise that money is consumed in use. The use of 
money is inseparable from the money itself; hence, first, 
the lender may not charge separately for its use, and, 
secondly, ownership of money loaned is transferred to the 
borrower -- because, and only because, money is consumed 
in use. 50 
50st. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., II-II, q. 78; cf. 
quotation of art. 1, ad corpus, in previous dissertation 
text, where it is stated that this passage was an 
"integral part" of B. W. Dempsey's thinking on usury. 
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B. w. Dempsey endorses the primacy of st. Thomas 
Aquinas on the problem of usury. In his story of Molina, 
Lessius and Lugo he refers to them thus: 
The writers [Molina, Lessius, Lugo) whom we 
shall discuss considered themselves at one 
with the medieval way of thinking. All three 
wrote, if not strictly in form, at least very 
definitely in practical content, a commentary 
on Thomas Aquinas . • • they did not consider 
that they brought to this work anything stri­
kingly new. Their work was of a piece with 
that of Aquinas and Antonius of Florence . . .
absolutely the same principles rule [I, 116-
18]. 
Later in the same work, B.W. Dempsey states that 
Molina does not include the notion of consumption good51 
in his definition of mutuum, in which the crucial point 
is the transfer of ownership, which is practicable 
because we are dealing with a fungible good . • .  in his 
[Luge's) opinion, the norm of "consumption goods" does 
not go to the heart of the matter, which for him rests 
entirely in the transfer of ownership" [I,142-144). Dr. 
Herbert Johnston takes sharp exception to the above 
exposition as is clear from the following: 
For Molina, Lessius, and Lugo, as Dempsey has 
shown, the basic factor in mutuum, and so in 
the question of usury, is the transfer of 
ownership;. they explcitly reject the notion 
of "consumed in use" as the important point. 
As we have already seen at the beginning of 
this paper, St. Thomas bases his treatment of 
mutuum and usury definitely and explicitly on 
51B. W. Dempsey distinguishes between a consumption 
good such as food or wine and a standard fungible good, 
such as standardized chairs or highly substitutable 
dollar bills. For instance, "if the folding chairs in 
both schools were of the same standard model, there would 
be no purpose in exercising care to return the same 
chairs. The loan would be of a standard fungible good 
but not of a consumption good, and the loan would be a 
mutuum" [I,143). 
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the notion of money as consumed in use: the 
argument based on the transfer of ownership 
depends directly on that conception and is 
intelligible only in its light on this ques­
tion, then, and this is the one at issue, the 
work of Molina, Lessius, and Lugo can hardly 
be said to be "of a piece with that of Aqui­
nas." 
• • . In the light of the foregoing develop­
ment, it may fairly be asked whether, by
rejecting the notion of "consumed in use" in
favor of that of "transfer of ownership" as
the fundamental point in the consideration of
mutuum and usury, Molina, Lessius, Lugo and
Father Dempsey do not seem to have cut them­
selves off from the authentic medieval tradi­
tion on this problem and from the possibility
of a true understanding of its solution.52 
In response, it should first be clear that St. Thomas 
Aquinas' term "consumed in use" includes not only B.W. 
Dempsey's term, consumption good, but also standard 
fungible good. In an attempted refinement, B.W. Dempsey 
wishes to distinguish the way wine or food was consumed 
and the manner in which a standardized product such as a 
folding chair was "consumed." Thus, one could hardly say 
that B.W. Dempsey explicitly rejected the notion of 
"consumed in use." Whether he gave it proper emphasis in 
relation to "transfer of ownership" is another point of 
consideration. 
Dr. Herbert Johnston wrote this article attacking 
B.W.,Dempsey's understanding of mutuum, and hence usury,
in 1953. B.W. Dempsey, ever alert to such articles, 53 
seems to take up the charge, at least indirectly, in his
subsequent book, The Functional Economy, published in
52Herbert Johnston, 110n the Meaning of I Consumed in 
Use I in the Problem of Usury, 11 The Modern Schoolman, 
January, 1953, pp. 107-108). 
53Dr. Herbert Johnston I s article with appropriate 
border markings was in the possession of B. w. Dempsey. 
The writer of this dissertation now has this marked 
article in his possession. 
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1958. we shall allow B.W. Dempsey to "answer" the charge 
of misplaced emphasis himself. 
The fact that St. Thomas [S.T., II-II, q. 78, 
art. 1] draws his first example from the realm 
of consumption goods has drawn some writers 
off on the tangent that the injustice of usury 
has something to do with consumption loans and 
would not be involved if there were a question 
of productive loans. There is nothing in this 
text or elsewhere to justify this view. Al­
though it is perfectly true that the most 
tragic victims of usury may be those who 
borrow for consumption purposes, this does not 
of itself establish the justice or injustice 
of the act, though it may be highly signifi­
cant for other virtues. A careful reading of 
the text will indicate that the fundamental 
consideration is not the fact that consumption 
goods are lent (for money cannot in any sense 
be called a consumption good), but the fact of 
the transfer of ownership. If I lend any 
object in such a way that the borrower becomes 
the owner of the object borrowed, then I 
cannot charge him for the use of something 
which is his. This transfer of ownership is 
obvious in the case of food and drink, and 
also in the case of money, "for the use of 
money is the spending of it" [S. T., II-II, q. 
117, 4 ad corpus]. It is less obvious but 
equally true in the case of any standardized 
or fungible good that can be lent in such a 
way that the owner is indifferent as to wheth­
er or not he receives back the identical 
article lent but is satisfied if he receives a 
perfect substitute. 
That it is the transfer of ownership 
which is significant is clear from the intro­
duction of the phrase, "the return of the 
thing in equal measure." When anything is lent 
in such wise that the return of the original 
article is not expected but the return of one 
of the same sort, the debt is resolved with 
payment II in equal measure. 11 A Model-T Ford 
could be lent for some dangerous excursion. 
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The owner of the car might be fully aware of 
the dangers involved, and be fully satisfied 
if he received back, not his own car, but 
another Model-T of the same year and approxi­
mately the same mileage [F,408]. 
In the light of the foregoing development, may it 
not again fairly be asked whether B.W. Dempsey in any 
sense "cut himself off from the authentic medieval 
tradition" on this problem of usury and "from the pos­
sibility of a true understanding of its solution?" 
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Chapter Saven 
'l'HB FUllCTIOIIAL WAGB 
Whether or not within his framework of socio-economic 
thought B. w. Dempsey made an outstanding recognized 
contribution in the form of a FUNCTIONAL WAGE. 
I. TBB PROBLEX OF WAGB ANALYSIS
A. The State of Wage Theory
B. Practice Outruns Wage Theory
c. The Need of an Internal Principle of
Organization 
II. TBB ANALYSIS OF TBB FUllCTIONAL WAGB
A. The Antecedents of the Functional Wage
B. Functional Wage through organization
C. Functional Wage through Motivation
D. Capital Creation by Labor




THB FtmCTIOIIAL WAGB 
I. THE PROBLBK OF WAGB ANALYSIS
The Frontier Wage, B.W. Dempsey's last work, was
published posthumously; actually, only a few hours after 
his death (July 23, 1960). It is a book about wage 
analysis. The specific purpose of the book is to examine 
a particular theory o( wages, namely the wage theory of 
Johann Heinrich von ThUnen. This wage theory is not a new 
theory; it is just over a hundred years old. B.W. Dempsey 
felt that it admirably fitted into his own economic 
thought. Within his lifetime, B.W. Dempsey had carefully 
integrated his own thought on the basis of the best of 
scholastics and what he considered the best of the 
moderns, particularly Joseph A. Schumpeter. He had long 
felt keenly the need of a wage theory that would fit into 
his ow� mature thinking', This he found in Johann Heinrich 
von ThUnen. Needless to say, he endorsed it enthusiasti­
cally. Furthermore, it gave B.W. Dempsey an opportunity 
to "complete" hts own economic thought, Accepting the key 
ideas of van ThUnen, B.W. Dempsey now for the first time 
had a doctrine of the fu�ptional wage to fit into his 
functional economy. Von ThUnen attempted to establish an 
economically sound and correct wage •.. The author of The 
Frontier Wage was certain that van ThUnen had succeeded. 
Thus, he published not only to publicize but to develop 
this fact. B.W. Dempsey was convinced that his functional 
wage theory presented not only an economically sound and 
correct wage, but a just wage as well. 
A. The state of Wage Theory
In The Frontier Wage, B.W. Dempsey reviews and
examines theories of wages that economists have presented 
to the world in the past two hundred years: first, in 
some detail, in their own content, and then in their 
relation to one another and in their relation to the 
times which produced them. Together with von ThUnen, B.W. 
Dempsey draws from his survey the conclusion that, except 
for very broad and obvious factors, if the economic 
analyst today is asked to state with any precision what 
determines this or that particular rate of wages, the 
only possible answer, in B.W. Dempsey's words, is "I 
don't know." 
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Not only to remedy what he considered the deficiency 
of present wage theory, but also to complete his own 
system of economic thought, were the reasons why B.W. 
Dempsey analyzed this wage theory. More proximately, as 
B.W. Dempsey admits, The Frontier Wage "owes its origin 
to a cursory but penetrating remark by Joseph A. Schum­
peter in his H��tory or Economic Analysis that Johann 
Heinrich von ThUnen•s wage formula could not be called 
unsound in itself as some had thought; and further, that 
the formula in spite of the severity of its conditions 
might have useful implication for some forms of profit 
sharing" (W,VII]. 
For many years, himself deeply interested and 
involved in the profit-sharing movement, B.W. Dempsey was 
well aware that academic economists had ignored profit 
sharing. He asked himself the question: why have academic 
economists ignored profit sharing while it was obviously 
succeeding and offering increasing promise? Characteris­
tically, his answer was always "that the operation of 
profit sharing had never been presented to the academic 
world in the analytical formulae currently in vogue among 
and acceptable to economic analysts" (W,VII]. Thus, 
Schumpeter' s observation seemed to B. w. Dempsey, the 
respectful disciple, an invitation to present profit 
sharing in such form. 
B. W. Dempsey was of the opinion that a fresh 
analysis should be made of the problem of wages. Admit­
tedly, he had come to the realization and conclusion that 
the "pivotal · problem of wage determination" has no 
"analytical foundation worth mentioning. 11 . "Wages are the 
things men work for and live by," emphasizes B.W. 
Dempsey, "and if we do not know where we are or how we 
got.there in this critical field, we do not know very 
much about how our economy as a whole is operating." He 
cites a number of analysts of American business and 
economic practice of like mind. "There exists precious 
little dynamic theory of the long-term development of 
wages" (W, 30) • 1 "The unsatisfactory state of this branch 
of economics is an open secret or, in Veblenian terms, a 
matter of common notoriety outside the profession as well 
as inside it. Theoretical support can apparently be 
mustered in imposing strength for almost any opinion or 
1Kurt Rothschild, The Theory or Wages, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell and Matt, 1954, p. 157. 
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even emotion" [W,30) • 2 Other quotations cited by our 
author underline the fact that when the economist turns 
to the general problem of wage determination "his voice 
becomes muted and his speech halting: 113 that wage eco­
nomics is in a "muddled state": that an economist can 
safely deny that there is "any theory to evaluate. 114 
"At present there is no comprehensive theory of wages 
that commands general acceptance. 115 
B.W. Dempsey feels that the "ideological and 
propaganda significance" of being unable at present to 
put forth an adequate wage theory is "overwhelming. 11 
Marxism has no such embarrassment, even though "it is 
totally unembarrassed by facts." 
B. Practice Outruns Wage Theory
As our curve of achievement has gone up, our curve 
of explainability has gone down. If we [Americans) cannot 
tell even ourselves why and how we pay the wages that we 
do, B.W. Dempsey explains, "the curve of explainability 
is very low indeed. 11 "Fortunately for us," he hastens to 
add, "the reason for our inability to explain ourselves 
lies in the simple fact that 'American practice in this 
regard has outstripped theory'." Clearly, B.W. Dempsey 
was of the opinion that, in a number of important ways 
which have been inadequately recognized, practice outruns 
theory. 
2M.Brienfenbrenner, "A Contribution 
Aggregative Theory of Wages, 11 Journal of 
Economy 64 : 459-69, December 1956. 
to the 
Political 
3Paul Samuelson, "Economic Theory and Wages," in D. 
M. Wright, ed., The Impact of the Union, New York:
Kelley and Millman, 1956, p. 312.
4D. w. Taylor and H. c. Pierson, eds., New Concepts
in Wage Determination, New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1956, pp. 3, VII. 
5J. M. Clark, "Wage Theory is an Age of Organized
Labor," in Philip D. Bradley, ed., The Public Stake in 
Union Power, Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1959, p. 303: cf. w, 30-32 for further citations. 
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First of all, many organizations have introduced 
profit sharing programs -- which have no home in present 
"academic" wage theory. Eloquently, B. W. Dempsey, long an 
ardent advocate of profit-sharing, eulogizes this 
practice: 
Profit sharing by widening the function of 
enterprises opens the door for the release of 
human capacities that Marx, the European 
Doctor of Philosophy, locked up with his 
theory of class conflict. 
Long ago America was warned that unless we 
manifested the same inventiveness and re­
sourcefulness in social dynamics as we have 
manifested in physical production and in 
distribution and sales promotion, we would 
lose our momentum and be confronted with 
economic and social decline. our progress in 
the field • • •  and their application by the 
Council of Profit Sharing Industries are among 
the finest signs that we are re-ordering 
ourselves on some solid basic compass points 
and using the recovered principles of func­
tional economy with strong effect [F,265].6 
Secondly, in almost all industries wages are higher 
than any "outmoded" wage theory warrants. Part of this 
margin is represented by a pension, welfare, stock 
ownership or other similar fund, and especially in the 
growth of these pension funds which somehow are tied to 
output. Implicitly and in practice, wage theory is being 
outrun. "Failure to recognize explicitly what is being 
done," B. W. Dempsey states categorically, "greatly limits 
the effectiveness and benefits of what is actually being 
done" [W,31]. 
Thirdly, American production is organized. Referring 
to large scale businesses such as "motor, steel and chain 
stores," B.W. Dempsey points out that the methods 
developed in such huge industries are studied and adapted 
by much smaller uni ts "which also have good ideas of 
their own." certainly, in consequence of the higher 
standard of living, some workers become savers and thus 
6Cf. F, 260-265; F, 364-365; W, 146. 
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make a beginning of becoming capitalists [cf., F,129]. In 
no way does this present phenomenon fit into current wage 
theory. "When we recognize where we are and what we are 
really doing, we don't look quite so foolish when we try 
to explain. If our practice has outrun our theory let us 
keep the good practice and formulate a new theory. 117 
c. The Nead of AD Internal Principle of organization
A most familiar theme running through all of B.W.
Dempsey's writings is the need for an intrins,ic principle 
of orderly cooperation. In countless places [F,21, 57, 
390; W,128-129] he alludes to this intrinsic principle of 
socio-economic life. When two or more difficult things 
converge on one objective, this new combination, this 
unity of diverse things, has been produced by order of 
some kind. To paraphrase B. W. Dempsey's thought in 
reference to the factors of production, as expressed 
frequently throughout his writings, these factors do 
actually co-operate in the production of goods and 
services. Furthermore, the economic processes are somehow 
coordinated into a system, or waste would be too common 
and overwhelmingly great. Obviously, therefore, "the 
relations between labor and management should be con­
sciously cooperative as their substantive interests are 
complementary." The factors are in fact unified and the 
processes do reach an end. 
B. W. Dempsey considers "the Ricardo-Marxian view" of 
the economic system which is widely accepted, explicitly 
or implicitly, as furnishing no intrinsic principle of 
orderly cooperation and coordination of factors of 
production -- land (nature), labor (man), and capital -­
nor coordination of the economic processes -- production, 
distribution, exchange, consumption. An economic system 
that assumes "an ineradicable clash of wills and inter­
ests," an essential opposition of factors in processes, 
provides no rational intrinsic basis for the orderly 
cooperation which is actually essential. B.W. Dempsey 
believes that on the American economic scene this 
internal organization of factors and processes was 
practically achieved in contradiction of their proposed 
beliefs: 
7B. W. Dempsey, "The Wage Frontier, 11 Review of 
Social Economy, September, 1960, p. 108. 
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As long as people's common sense caused them 
to act in violation of their own (Marxian 
class conflict) professed beliefs, we could 
get along. When serious economic troubles, 
like price collapse following wartime infla­
tions, made an opposition of interest seem 
real at the time, and revealed the lack of an 
internal principle of organization, economics 
turned outside itself to politics. Labor and 
business alike appealed to Civil Government to 
impose on economic activity from without some 
kind of order and unity, which it was incapa­
ble on its own terms as then professed of 
providing from within [W,129]. 
B.W. Dempsey's views continue in the same vein. He 
regarded Ricardian economics as having a "radical defi­
ciency" that could furnish no positive principle of unity 
within the economic unit because such an economic system 
believed that economic activities possess "in the free 
struggle of competitors • . a principle of self­
direction which governs it much more perfectll than would
the intervention of any created intellect." This view
overlooked the possibility that the free self-determining 
intellects which bring the goods to competitive markets 
could alter their own economic organization. When they do 
alter, competition and free markets, as B.W. Dempsey 
posits, remain a strong and useful economic stimulus and 
discipline, but a secondary one. To directly quote: 
"Markets presuppose organization and organizations; they 
do not create it or them; but man's own organization for 
production can create and control and adjust" [W, 174]. In 
conclusion, the author of The Frontier Wage sees the lack 
of such an internal principle of organization in Ricar­
dian economics "that sent both management and labor, 
sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both, to 
the doorstep of the state begging for an extrinsic prin­
ciple of unity to supply the one they lacked as being its 
basic deficiency" [W,174-175]. To establish such an 
intrinsic principle as a basis of a functional wage is 
the purpose of The Frontier Wage. The indispensable 
condition of social order is "to abolish conflict between 
8Quadragesimo Anno, n. 88.
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the classes. 119 Only the establishment of an internal 
principle of organization can abolish class conflict. The 
basic problem, therefore, is to find a wage theory that 
will furnish an intrinsic principle of organization for 
a functional economy; such a principle understood would 
remove the prevailing practice and pseudo-principle of 
class conflict. 
The nineteenth century bequeathed us only one 
wage theory, the Ricardo-Marxian with variant 
forms, surprisingly combined with a labor-cost 
theory of exchange value • • • Marx simply 
took Ricardo's subsistence theory and class 
conflict, subtracted the right of private 
property from the system and emerged with the 
exploitation theory; labor produced the whole 
value, labor got less than the whole value. 
Therefore labor was "swindled" • . . But to 
posit class conflict on principle is an eco­
nomic process where cooperation is obviously 
essential if anything at all is to be produced 
is an irrational and inherently contradictory 
analysis. This would be true if factors and 
classes were co-extensive which, in America, 
they are not. But it is the vestiges of this 
one wage theory, the child of nineteenth 
century erroneous analysis, in our business, 
labor and economic thinking which furnish the 
explanation of our utter lack of a workable 
wage analisis in the face of our productive
triumphs. 1 
To regard present day Marxism as a viciously 
aggressive empire willing to extend its domi­
nation by any means whatever is only political 
common sense. To regard Marxism as a political 
economic system with any claim to serious 
attention by Americans is indefensible. 
American twentieth century practice has com­
pletely outrun nineteenth century Ricardo-
9Quadragesimo Anno, No. 81. 
10The Frontier Wage, p. 98-88]. 
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Marxian class conflict theory. Both Ricardo­
Marxian capitalism and Ricardo-Marxian soc­
ialism belong to economic history. The future 
belongs to American Functional organization if 
we will stop trying to impose anachronistic 
categories on the facts.11 
II. TRB ANALYSIS OP TRB PUNCTIONAL WAGB
B.W. Dempsey bases his functional wage, which is an
integral part of his functional e�onomy, on the "adequate 
wage theo:r;:y" of Johann H. von ThUnen. His "rediscovery" 
of von Thonen gave him an opportunity to integrate and 
complete his own analysis of a "functional economy." In 
no way was this "rediscovered" wage theory a stranger, or 
something completely alien to B.W. Dempsey's thought, but 
in reality, as we shall see in the ensuing treatment, a 
continuation of his own thought. It is not our task to 
give ThUnen's thoug�t and contribution, but B.W. Demp­
sey's. Upon von ThUnen, B.W. Dempsey built; his wage 
theory he made his own -- merged, integrated, developed 
it into a consistent whole. 
If the hundred-year-old wage analysis of von ThUnen 
is so useful, why has it not gained wider acceptance? 
Why had it to be in a sense "rediscovered?" Schumpeter 
in his History of Economi�.Analysis puts his finger on 
the precise reason. Von ThUnen called his wage a "natu­
ral" wage, "but of course, this wage is not natural in 
the sense that the free market mechanism tends to produce 
it" [W,371) • 12 He distinguished carefully between what 
was natural in the sense that the market mechanism tended 
to produce it and the wage which emerged in an economy 
with r�tional and human reorganization. By natural wage, 
von ThUnen meant a wage that was commensurate with human 
nature concretely considered. "A wage that is conformable 
to intellectual activity and to a full use of all men's 
abilities is a wage that is conformable to human nature" 
[W, 135 J. "Yet so bemused by the power of the market 
11Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
12Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 
p. 467; Schumpeter devotes several p�ges to von ThUnen,
pp. 4 65-68; in these pages von ThUnen' s famous wage
formula is explained.
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system was the nineteenth century, 11 relates B. W. Dempsey, 
"that any economic magnitude not so produced could be 
ignored and was. 1113 
A. The Antecedents of the l'Unctional Wage
Briefly, the foundation of B. W. Dempsey's functional
wage analysis was von ThUnen's treatment of the Isolated 
State. on the frontier of the Isolated State, the worker 
"with courage and industry" could clear land, make his 
own farms, and create his own capital; or even more 
easily, groups of associated savers and capital-producing 
workers could clear and then work the land. When the 
return came in, what they would pay themselves as wages 
and what they would take as return on their capital 
production depended entirely upon the workers• free 
decision. As long as these conditions lasted, wages 
within the frontier had to be sufficient to compensate 
the worker for this opportunity foregone, or he would not 
forego it. The wage emerging under these conditions was 
a wage commensurate with human nature and in this sense 
a natural wage. B.W. Dempsey expresses ThUnen's purpose 
practically: 
• he set about to do what he could to
install a wage system that would promote his 
workers a family living wage, give them some 
incentive to increase output by improved 
methods, and make a start on building up a 
capital sum and these are the essential ele­
ments of a wage "conformable to human nature" 
[W,48]. 
Under the market mechanism, if the worker has no 
income but wages and if wages are in no way related to 
product, then the worker's sole advantageous course is to 
raise wages to the highest level economic pressure can 
get him. If the worker has no income but wages and if 
wages are in no way related to product, the lower the 
employer can keep wages, the higher his investment income 
will be. Under these conditions, one is forced to 
conclude, total output definitely will be less than it 
13
The Wage Frontier, p. 102-103.
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could be under alternative workable forms of organi­
zation. 
What von ThUnen has done, in short, is to give 
mathematical expression, supported by economic analysis 
and quantitative expression under the limited conditions 
of the frontier of an isolated state,14 to an alterna­
tive form of organization in which wages are related to 
output. 
Firstly, a wage system, and therefore a wage theory, 
must recognize and reconcile two legitimate goals of the 
two most active factors of production. Workers are 
interested in subsistence, "not Ricardian minimal 
subsistence but adequate means of life;" a man "works for 
a living." On the other hand, management is primarily 
concerned with output. A practical wage system must be 
one which by intelligent organization taking human beings 
as they are "genuinely integrates these two most reason­
able concerns." "In the divorce of the worker from his 
product," states von ThUnen, "lies the source of the 
evil" of the opposition of classes, of the meager wage he 
observed actually being paid because total output was so 
low and the worker had neither motive nor opportunity to 
increase it. 
Secondly, production is a cooperative effort. 
Conscious organization is necessary to achieve, not only 
among fellow workers but among all the factors of 
production, the kind of cooperation that maximizes output 
and minimizes cost. Such organization does not replace 
competition,· but conditions it, alters it; competition 
remains "a powerful economic force" but organization 
precedes it. "Certai"nly intelligent organization and not 
a bare formula," opines B.W. Dempsey, is the core of von 
14 
• assumes that the isolated state is in a
static condition; that the laborers are equal in intel­
ligence, skill, etc.; and that perfect competition 
pervades the entire state. He assumes that beyond the 
margin of cultivation there is a limitless territory 
whose fertility is equal to that of lands already under 
cultivation, and he maintains that the rate of wages and 
the rate of interest existing at the margin of cultiva­
tion determine the rate of wages and rate of interest 
throughout the entire state [W,110]. 
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ThUnen 's thought. 15 Organization is simple recognition 
of the fact that, "save for the rare individual working 
quite alone," total output is the result of coordinated 
effort. "This kind of functioning organization," comments 
e.w. Dempsey, "is essential to high output at low cost
and it is not produced by a market mechanism • • •  When
organization succeeds in integrating all elements in the
production unit and giving them sound motives for
cooperation in maximizing output and minimizing cost, the
performance is so transformed that it may well seem to be
a wholly new thing. "16 
ThUnen was not only an excellent theorist, but a 
practical man. He considered that an approach to a 
natural wage tied to output is better than no such link 
at all. "This much is evident," he states, "that even if 
a complete return to the natural wage (commensurate with 
human nature) were not possible, the bad conditions would 
be mitigated to a great extent if the workers could be 
given even some part of their wage in proportion to the 
product of their labor" [Text W., 328; italics added). 
Basing his treatment on von ThUnen, B.W. Dempsey in 
summary fashion outlines the frontier wage on three 
frontiers [W,178-182). This frontier wage "is the wage 
that prevails when workers have real and practical 
alternatives of creating capital of their own" [W,178). 
The frontier wage is encountered and so can be described 
on three frontiers: the "analytical" frontier, the 
"geographical" frontier, and the "organizational" 
frontier. 
First, the analytical frontier, also termed the 
"theoretical" frontier (cf. W,181), had as its essential 
characteristic that what the worker produced over and 
above subsistence for himself and family he had the 
opportunity to turn into capital in the form of improv­
ement of his own property. On this "theoretical" fron­
tier, economic organization is such that the workers and 
the capital providers are assumed to be the same people. 
Thus, when economic organization is composed of capital­
creating labor, either simple opposition of interest or 
"class conflict" are impossible. Even when the workers 
and capital providers are not the same people, the 
15The Wage Frontier, p. 104.
16Ibid., p. 105.
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economic organization is most advantageous, providing 
there is to some (increasing) extent workers• participa­
tion in capital 9.wnership. While this frontier is 
conceived by von ThUnen as a .. theoretical condition, B.W. 
Dempsey points out that 11ThUnen explicitly appealed to 
the American frontier as substantially verifying his 
•unrealistic' conditions and as having in fact achieved
a natural wage" [W,170].
Second, the frontier wage was actually met on the 
American geographical frontier during all but the last 
decade or two of the nineteenth century. Having estab­
lished 1 the size of the maximum wage that can be main­
tained in his �.laboratory on the frontier of the Isolated 
State," von ThUnen turned confidently from his theoreti­
cal (analytical) frontier model to the "North American 
States" to point out that here his analysis was verified. 
The reason for its verification, B.W. Dempsey acutely 
points out, "was that as long as it was at all possible 
for a man to take a rifle and an axe and head for the 
wilderness and return a landed proprietor, the employer 
on the seaboard had to pay a wage sufficient to make some 
resist this temptatJon" [W, 5 J. This wage actually was 
high enough (von ThUnen estimated it to be three times 
the comparable European rates) that some were able to 
save and to head west fairly well-equipped. "The high 
wage designed to keep men from the frontier," B.W. 
Dempsey emphasizes, "made possible a rate of saving, a 
degree of capital accumulation, so high that those who 
did take to the frontier did not have to do so empty­
handed, but many were able to go forth quite well­
equipped with the all important capital goods" [W,179). 
The third and last frontier, the organizati9nal 
frontier, "recognized originally perhaps by ThUnen 
alone, 11 is the presentation of the opportunity and 
challenge to create realistically within the producing 
organization the conditions which duplicate the oppor­
tunity and motivation for creative and constructive 
activity once exercised on the geographical frontier. The 
essential characteristic of the geographical frontier, as 
of the theoretical frontier wage, was "that what the 
worker produced over and above subsistence for himself 
and family could be made in the form of improvement of 
his own property if he was willing to work at it 11 
[W, 182 J • The task of the organizational frontier makes an 
advance, for it is 11to duplicate realistically, honestly, 
and vividly the motivation and opportunity to maximize 
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output and lower costs that existed when real alterna­
tives and opportunities to go west were presented to the 
worker" [W, 182] • The sums the workers earn and save arise 
solely out of the efficiency earnings that are made 
possible by organization of free, self-determining 
persons: 
To minimize this combination of current total 
output and ultimate human potential, it was 
necessaey to go beyond the mere symbols of his 
(von ThUnen's) formula. The formula was estab­
lished under conditions where workers and 
investors were the same people but it remains 
valid when workers and investors are different 
people. But obviously the best results would 
be obtained where workers participated in 
capital creation by saving as well as by its 
physical creation. Therefore the more fully 
workers could participate in investment income 
the better, and therefore the more fully their 
increasing compensation could come to them in 
forms which could be invested and yield fur­
ther investment income, the greater would be 
the total return and the greater the rate of 
progress. This required organization and to 
his own analytical front��r and the American 
geographical frontier, ThUnen added the orga­
nizational frontier and left it for future 
students to conquer with appropriate organiza­
tional innovation. 17 
within this rediscovered Thunian framework, in 
innovational fashion, B.W. Dempsey constructed 
functional wage system. 
B. Functional Wage Through organization
true 
his 
In his last year of life, it "greatly pleased" B.w.
Dempsey to be able to complete his functional economy 
system. Sufficient has been mentioned to indicate his own 
recognition of the need of a .functional wage theory to 
develop, integrate, and complete his works. In that year, 
he was fond of rethinking and mulling over St. Thomas's 
17The Wage Frontier, p. 106.
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social writings, 18 Joseph Schumpe:�er' s economic 
thought,111 and Johann Heinrich von ThUnen's20 writings 
on wage. These were his inspiration, the mentors of his 
mature thought. This dependence becomes abundantly clear 
in our subsequent treatment. 
In the "current style of economic analysis, 11 once an 
analytical sequence is started in the Schumpeterian21 
circular flow, as is often done, from a static or steady 
equilibrium, there is no way to change this situation 
except by entrepreneurial innovation which changes the 
production functions. Yet the common experiences of many 
enterprises, even with those which do not share "prof­
its, 11 is that real changes do occur which are not 
entrepreneurial innovation in character. Yet, obviously, 
at least in some broad sense, "innovation has occurred 
and it is not basically entrepreneurial innovation." To 
account for this innovational phenomenon, B.W. Dempsey 
analyzes certain functions and makes several useful 
distinctions. In outline form: 
1. FU.nction of Management: (The preservation of
equilibrium). Management adjusts an enterprise in equi­
librium to the inevitable minor variations, foreseeable 
at least in a general way, in the quality of materials, 
the sequence of orders to be scheduled, the shifting of 
personnel to cover vacancies, and so forth [W,162-163; 
128-129; 148].
2. Function of Enterprise: (The disturbance of
equilibrium). The entrepreneur introduces the truly new 
18St. Thomas: Summa Theologiae: Commentaries on the 
Ethics and the Politics. 
19Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Theory of Economic 
Development; History of Economic Analysis. 
20Johann Heinrich von ThUnen: The Isolated State in 
Relation to Agriculture and Poli ti cal Economy, Volume 
Two. 
21Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, 
Chapter I, "The Circular Flow of Economic Life as 
Conditioned by Given Circumstances"; also cf. pp. 63-89. 
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idea, process, or product, which brings with it new 
production functions (Text, W,246-248; F,353-364]. 
3. FU.nation 0£ the Labor Force: (The perfecting or
completing of equilibrium or innovation). 
The big new idea of the entrepreneur involves 
hundreds of little new ideas; and the work force, in a 
plant that has been genuinely motivated and integrated by 
being tied to output so that everybody is genuinely 
interested in maximizing output and minimizing cost, can 
and does provide the "innumerable minor internal innova­
tions" that adjust a true entrepreneurial innovation to 
a new equilibrium. 
Although B.W. Dempsey, in a heading in his Func­
tional Economy, refers to The Worker as Entrepreneur 
(cf., F,364], he distinguished carefully this internal 
"innovation" from true enterprise because it is without 
risk, and from true management because it is innovation. 
But, at the same time, he insists that it is a fact; "and 
every time a man in the plant says, 'why don't we try it 
this way?' and a cost saving results, we have an example 
of this internal innovation." 
Schumpeter in his classic analysis of the 
function of enterprise quite legitimately 
stripped the economic process of development 
down to its barest bones in order to isolate 
the function of the entrepreneur. This was 
proper and instructive and illuminated the 
process as never before. However, the utility 
of this device does not require us in real 
life to find enterprise pure and unmixed. The 
experience of the member firms of the council 
of Profit Sharing industries continuously 
reveals among the working personnel of these 
firms the qualities of mind and will that are 
proper to the entrepreneur. "Why don't we try 
it this way?" coming from the men on the floor 
who really know the operation, is a common 
experience in firms whose profit sharing 
program has awakened the human impulse to 
progress. Likewise, the acceptance of respon­
sibility for the care of property and equip­
ment, for the avoidance of waste, breakdowns, 
or schedule snarls rests upon the other half 
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of the entrepreneurial function, the action of 
the will. 
The funds which sound profit sharing makes 
available for distribution to workers are not 
wages; they are efficiency earnings that the 
co-ordination of many little entrepreneurial 
acts makes possible [F,364-365]. 22
Since man cannot determine values directly, he must 
turn to the thing he can determine: his course of action, 
which can affect cost and supply through organizational 
change. According to present socio-economic theory, wages 
tend to the minimum of subsistence through the opposition 
of factor class interests. As B.W. Dempsey points out, 
"the notorious unsatisfactory state of wage theory arises 
from the fact that firms try to buy a commodity -- man­
hour input -- which cannot be quantified and measured and 
packaged like a commodity and may not be delivered on 
time even if it could be" [W, 160] • In a functional 
economy, the functional wage would become attainable 
through organizational change -- and only this way. once 
having admitted internal innovation -- that is, the self­
determination of men to set up organizations which are 
expressive of human nature -- into the circular flow, 
"there is no limit to its horizon." The whole human 
race, organized for unity, can raise itself to uncondi­
tional freedom"· (Text, W, 337]. 
In concrete economic terms related to wage payments, 
the ability to make choices is that which.differentiates 
labor from the other factors of production once their 
owners have put them into specific form. Investors in a 
par.ticular industry make choices, and their choices are 
embodied in plant and equipment. Suppliers of a particu­
lar enterprise using the sunk costs of their previous 
investment in plant and equipment use working capital to 
turn out materials which are sold. The machine and the 
materials once specified in a definite form can be 
22In reference to the above, B. w. Dempsey states in 
a footnote that "As might b� expected, the work of that 
first-rate economist (von ThUnen) on re-examination fares 
very well in explaining a •wage consistent with human 
nature' when the small entrepreneurial roles are recog­
nized" ( F, 365] • 
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accurately priced in a market and can go on the books of 
a company at a definite cost. All of these items become 
permanently committed. But the value of the machines and 
materials (other than secondhand or scrap) depends 
chiefly on the continuing contribution by labor which 
every day has the opportunity of making a fresh choice of 
the direction and degree of its commitment and effort. 
commitment of labor is not permanent as the other factors 
of production are. Thus, it follows that the value of the 
machinery and materials is determined by the effort which 
labor chooses to expend in the productive process. B.W. 
Dempsey, by way of example of this freedom of commitment, 
indicates "make work rules" and the "slow-down strike." 
Since investment in plant and current operation by 
suppliers is free in the first commitments, the necessity 
of adequate motivation for fixed and current investment 
has always been recognized. What has not been recognized 
is that the "commitment of labor remains free day by day 
and that the application of effort and intelligence is a 
voluntary daily commitment" [W, 135]. Therefore, the 
contribution of a voluntary agent cannot be priced in a 
market in the same way as non-voluntary agents such as 
machinery and materials can be priced. Labor cannot 
simply be a cost to be minimized, but is a collaborator 
within the firm which needs full motivation to release 
its full powers, the same as any other voluntary contrib­
utor such as the entrepreneur or the investor does. The 
capacity of labor to commit or inhibit its contribution 
of personal assets does not only occur at the moment of 
first employment or at the time of contract negotiations, 
but remains real every single day of employment when the 
commitment of the free agent may be altered or reversed. 
c. Functional Wage Through Motivation
"Mo.�ivai.ion and organization are the poles around
which __ ThUnen's world revolves" [W,62]. B.W. Dempsey built 
on ThUnen foundations of motivation and organization, and 
again these are the poles, commensurate with human 
nature, upon which a functional wage system is built. 
Organization alone is not enough. Unless a simple, 
intelligible, and acceptable motivation is presented to 
the worker, he will neither use his intelligence nor his 
freedom for the purpose of maximizing output and minimiz­
ing unit cost. Nor will this motivation just happen. 
Thus, the stress on proper organization, for "organiza-
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tion must furnish adequate motivation to the worker to 
use his intelligence and freedom" [W,135). "The ultimate 
root of any human organization is in motives, in the 
will" [W,148). It has long been recognized that workers 
grow and develop when they are given motive and opportu­
nity to develop their capacity for responsible action 
[cf. W,162-163). In the words of B.W. Dempsey: 
Unless a simple, intelligible, and acceptable 
motivation is presented to the worker for 
contributing to cost reduction, variable unit 
direct cost is not simply subject to manage­
ment decision except through the negative and 
costly procedure of dismissal. Without such 
satisfying motivation, cost reduction is 
something "they" do: co-operate is something 
"we'! may or may not do [W, 159). 
In a sound socio-economic organization, a worker has 
"simple, intelligible, rewarding, and rewarded motiva­
tion" to integrate his actions with the objectives of the 
firm because he participates in the net result. The firm 
is an organization, as B.W. Dempsey puts it, when "what 
'they• want and what •we• want coincide." Motivation is 
always necessary for the release of human powers and free 
commitment which is the only way a rational person, 
complete and self-possessed, can become a part of any 
organization.· 
D. capital creation �Y L�r
. The word "capital" is used in a confusing variety of 
senses. The use of the word capital is perhaps most often 
confused with a supply of money with which an enterprise 
does business. This, however, is a transferred meaning of 
capital. "Money is not capital, but is merely the means 
of getting capital" [F,24]. 
In its economic sense, capital is saved-up resources 
and saved-up labor employed in the production of goods 
and services. Though man and nature are the ultimate 
factors of production, capital is not simply man or 
nature, but it is a man-made instrument of production, 
desired not for its own sake, but for the sake of the 
things that it will produce. Capital goods are productive 
tools, in contrast with consumer goods which yield direct 
satisfaction to the one who uses or consumes them. 
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capital is the word used to describe all tools, machines, 
sources of power, or alterations of nature (roads, for 
example) that are produced not for their own sake, but 
for the sake of things that can be produced with them. 
Capital goods have in general these three charac­
teristics: their production involves the passage of time, 
in some cases a very long time; they are intermediate 
goods, not ordinarily consumable nor intended for 
consumption; they can enormously increase human efficien­
cy. To this bare outline of the nature of capital, B.W.
Dempsey fully subscribes [cf. W,245, 143-145, 358-361, 
113-114, 119; F,24-25, 195). Thus, its significant 
features are that it enormously increases man's efficien­
cy and control of nature, that it involves saving, at 
least in a sense of non-consumption, and finally, that 
saving and the construction of the goods involve the 
passage of time. 
B.W. Dempsey explains by example how capital in­
volves saving and some expenditure of time in its 
buildup: 
A pioneer fisherman, for example, can catch 
fish by throwing his lines from the shore. If 
he builds a boat, however, he increases the 
range of his activities, and ultimately in­
creases his catch of fish. During the period 
when he is building the boat, he is unable to 
fish, and in this phase the saving or under­
consumption consists of the fish that he does 
not eat, because he did not catch them. Sec­
ondly, if he threw all of his cut logs into 
the fire to keep himself warm some evening, he 
would have no logs with which to build his 
boat and thirdly, the construction of the boat 
takes time [F,25). 
B.W. Dempsey fully recognized the capital-creating 
function of labor, and made much of it. Capital, he 
insists, is the product of labor; but this product in 
turn replaces human labor and itself serves for the 
further production of new capital. Between capital and 
labor, accordingly, an intimate connection and substi­
tutability occur which seem to be indissoluble. Since the 
original capital [cf. text, W,249-255) is born wholly of 
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labor, labor is the onlf proper standard for the cost of
production of capital.2 
In several other ways, B.W. Dempsey saw capital as 
caused by labor. First, by saving -- in the sense of non­
consumption, man places an always indispensable condition 
of capital formationi and the manner of the saving may 
raise it from the status of a condition to that of a 
cause. B.W. Dempsey explains: 
At the very least, if logs are actually used 
for consumption purposes, such as the making 
of a warm and cheery fire, they will never be 
used for capital purposes, no matter how well 
suited they may have been for such purposes 
[W,114]. 
Non-consumption is the first minimum negative condition 
of capital formation. Second, man is the immediate 
physical, efficient cause of capital. Man "moves one 
thing from here to there and removes another from the 
path of the first" -- all activities that are designed to 
increase output. Third, man is a further cause by his 
intelligence -- he makes the land more productive than it 
was in its natural form. 
The moving of this and that grading, 
draining, watering, planting, the removal of 
badly placed shade trees, the keeping of well­
placed fruit trees -- these are all directed 
by intelligence. _To explain capital, which to 
be must involve a method of production in 
some sense superior, we must appeal not only 
· to man's labor of muscle but to his labor of
mind. Without man's physical and intellectual
labor capital is and remains unintelligible
[W,115].
23Cf. Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analy­
sis, p. 590 n., on the necessity of repeated emphasis 
that the use of labor as a standard of value has no 
connection whatever with a labor theory of valuei cf. 
W,164 fn. 
E. Programs of Functional Wage Theory
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True profits are the result of innovation. True
profits are distinct from mere wages of management and 
normal interest on investment. To fully bring out the 
function of the labor force as intrinsic innovators and 
their corresponding relation to "profits," B.W. Dempsey 
turns to a profit sharing program as an example. He 
looked upon the introduction of a "sound profit sharing 
program" as an organizational innovation as real as "the 
conception of the supermarket or the shopping center" 
[W,161). Briefly, we shall sum up the reasons, in summary 
fashion, why he considered profit-sharing as a program 
that would in actual fact furnish the proper organization 
and motivation for a functional wage system. 
First, since a sound program requires the full 
understanding, acceptance, and concurrence of the workers 
as well as of management, the introduction of the program 
could be considered as entrepreneurial innovation on the 
part of both labor and management. 
Second, while the basic major commitment to pro­
cesses, products, and quantities is the domain of man­
agement, the innumerable recurrent minor decisions by 
which the basic decision is actuated and by which costs 
are minimized are the domain of the workers in the midst 
of the process. Of course, the promptness and accuracy 
with which these little decisions whose cumulative 
importance is so great are made depends primarily upon 
the motivation which has been presented to and concurred 
in by all voluntary inputs. 
Third, even in the most highly automated process, as 
well as in the most elementary manual operations, 
B.W. Dempsey would hold that the observation of the man 
who sees the process most clearly and closely may be the 
source of a great number of minor internal innovations. 
Certainly, the cumulative effect of even these minor 
intrinsic innovations can be powerful if they are numerous. 
B.W. Dempsey would conclude from the above that 
"there is literally a world of difference between that 
minimal return which is the exclusive and excluding right 
of the stockholders, born of opposition of interest and 
strongly perpetuating the dual situs of decision, and the 
expanding return born of voluntary concurrence of all 
voluntary inputs including individual workers when they 
are given motive and opportunity to develop their 
capacity for responsible action" [cf. 161-163). 
220 
In his constant effort to put his theoretical 
writings into practical form through example, illustra­
tion and program, B.W. Dempsey did not hesitate to 
suggest the elements of a suitable practical wage con­
tract to fit his functional wage theory.2• 
1. A basic organization contract of stable cooper­
ation an4 cooperation in pro4uction. This he assures us 
would do away with the "necessity of putting on a show of 
class conflict every two or three years." 
2. A guarantae4 annual wage at about 60 par cant of
present levels. This he would consider the minimum family 
wage element in wages. 
3. A pro4uct income basa4 on total net revenue of
the operation with some cognizance of the part which 
labor coats are of total costs. This he would consider 
the product element in wages, healing the "divorce of the 
worker from his product." "Product income," B.W. Dempsey 
advocates, "should be paid in two parts, one part cash, 
one part paid into a fund which yields income for pension 
and welfare purposes, either in the stock of the company, 
in mutual funds, in the stocks of companies with equally 
sound policies, or in any other prudently managed fund." 
COHCLUSIOH 
B.W. Dempsey always felt that a sound economic 
community should conform to certain principles. He never 
felt that sound economic organization could be blueprint­
ed. He viewed his life work as an endeavor to discover 
these underlying principles of economic organization. He 
sought out those principles that unite economic society 
according to what men do and contribute, namely their 
function. The subtitle of "The Frontier Wage, " The 
Economic Organization of Free Agents, shows how natural 
it was for him to assume that to strive for the "natural 
wage," a wage that corresponds to human nature, is good. 
But to show that a wage theory is commensurate with human 
nature means to call attention to the fact that, realis­
tically, production is a cooperative free effort, 
requires intelligent organization and adequate motiva-
2•The Wage Frontier, p. 109.
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tion. Briefly, the proper economic organization of free 
agents implies the embodying of the underlying principles 
of an adequate wage theory. 
Admittedly, it is too early to fully evaluate the 
degree of his wage contribution. That B.W. Dempsey has 
made a contribution by 1':is "re-discovery," by refining 
and development of von ThUnen, at least this, surely, can 
be granted without argument. His own claims for his wage
theory are valid norms for its evaluation and the worth 
of his contribution. A rapid enumeration of some of the 
claims made by B.W ... Dempsey in his presentation and 
development of von ThUnen•s wage theory should assist us 
with evaluation. His "functional" wage analysis: 
1. Denies and elbainat;es class conflict; as a principle.
If a functional wage analysis in economics is a 
fact, class conflict becomes an untenable theory; not 
only the pseudo-principle of class conflict, but the very 
fact of class conflict is counteracted by a tenable 
functional wage theory. 
2. Est;ablishes an int;rinsic principle o� cooperat;ion.
With the disappearance of the guilds, an internal prin­
ciple of organization or order in economic life was lost;
functional wage theory claims to have recovered this
principle -- this should be a great and fundamental
contribution. Such a functional wage theory furnishes an
intrinsic principle of orderly cooperation, thereby
furthering the coordination of factors of production -­
land (nature), labor (man), and capital, and the coordi­
nation of the economic processes -- production, distribu­
tion, exchange and consumption. "Extrinsic unity imposed
by the state can be no substitute for the recognition and
cultivation of the intrinsic unity that actually exists
and produces in daily operation" [W,172].
3. Is a t;heo.ry #;hat; cat;ches up vi t;h wage pract;ice in t;he
United States. There is a need of a theory that hauls
alongside of current wage practice where to some degree
proper organization, adequate motivation, and intelligent
cooperation make every man a potential capitalist. "There
exists then, in the United States, genuine functional
communities, large groups of people who have a common
interest, a common task, and a common purpose. These
persons, regardless of location form a functional
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community quite as real and almost as important as the 
civil municipality" [F, 320-321]. There is, therefore, 
need of a fresh analysis of the functions of the entre­
preneur, of management, and of labor. 
,. Completes his functional system of economic thought 
which is recognized as a contribution, by integrating
into a functional economy a corresponding functional wage 
theory. In such an economy, innovation by free and 
intelligent economic agents can be continually absorbed. 
Organizational innovation can be recognized precisely as 
an innovation by a free agent, and group action is 
provided a place in the analysis. 
5. Is a •rediscovery• and presentation of .. the •key•
contribution of a great economist, von ThUnen. Even
though such a presentation would have merely historical 
value, this is a significant contribution of economic 
ideas. Furthermore, it can surely be considered as a 
presentation of "new" wage theory to the "academic" world 
in the analytical formulae currently in vogue and 
acceptable to economic analysts. 
,. JlaJces a just wage possible. B.W. Dempsey was convinced 
that his functional wage theory presented not only an 
economically sound and correct wage, but a just wage, as 
well. Previously, B.W. Dempsey placed most of his 
emphasis on exchange justice -- particularly as his 
treatment had to do largely with the application of price 
determination to the area of interest rates. But in the 
area of the just wage, contributive (social) justice 
becomes more operative. Admittedly, if every market were 
fair, then every worker should be getting a living wage,
and that, in exchange justice. 
Most often this market is not fair, and in B. W. 
Dempsey's opinion, this is due to a market not organized 
along functional lines. In such a "malfunctioning" 
economy, quite apart from the employer's ability to pay 
a living wage, B.w. Dempsey would deem it impossible to 
show that the employer has a strict obligation to pay a 
wage above the going rate. He held that under these 
conditions the full-time effort of an experienced, able­
bodied worker may or may not command a living wage at the 
going rate. When such a worker cannot command a living 
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wage, then for some reason "the market in that industry 
is badly organized." 
• . . not that the employer has an obligation
to pay a wage which he could not long pay, but
rather that all parties: workers, managers,
owners, bondholders and possible consumers,
have an obligation to consider their position.
They must set about establishing a market that
serves both those contributing to the industry
and the purposes of the community of a
whole.25 
That is, while a living wage cannot be shown to be due 
any worker in commutative justice apart from market 
conditions, it is readily shown that an "equally impor­
tant obligation exists" in contributive (social) justice. 
In his opinion, his functional wage theory would remedy 
such a badly organized market, render the industry 
socially just and so the industry would provide a living 
wage at the going rate. A truly just wage can exist and 
be preserved in a properly organized, that is, a socially 
just economic community. B.W. Dempsey attempts to 
organize such a community. 
once a market has been established "that serves both 
those contributing to the industry and the purposes of 
the community as a whole," an employer has an obligation 
to pay a living wage, and a worker can command a living 
wage in exchange justice. Then a just basic wage should 
be paid to an employee for his labor and assumed by 
management as a cost of doing business. But the employer 
cannot determine what is the just total wage for the 
employee until after the product has been sold and the 
net profits realized. Only after that, under functional 
organization, can the true value of the employee's labor 
be determined. A just total wage, therefore, must be 
geared directly to profits and must include a share of 
those profits. B.W. Dempsey is quick to point out that 
"this presupposes that the employees have expanded their 
extra cooperative efforts so that good profits can be 
realized." Since you cannot pay a total just wage 
without paying the employees "their profit share" (as von 
25Bernard W. Dempsey, "Economic Community," Social 
Order, April, 1955, p. 151. 
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ThUnen stated) , then employees have a right to their 
profit share and can demand this share. Under functional 
wage organization, this share is owed to them in exchange
justice. Such a presentation gives a theoretical under­
pinning to such programs as profit sharing. Thus, the 
remedy of the deficiency of wage theory could be claimed 
as a contribution. 
7. Gives labor groups an adequate philosophy of labor. A
philosophy built upon intelligent cooperation rather than 
conflicting interest is more consonant with the nature 
and dignity of a man. Sharply critical of the current 
labor movement (sometimes others mistakenly believed he 
was anti-union), he based his criticism on the willing­
ness of the movement to accept apparent gains in social 
justice at the expense of subsidiarity. To him this was 
tantamount to the acceptance that the "end justifies the 
means." Unions, in his opinion, have "confronted [us] 
with a gain in objective social justice combined with a 
loss of subsidiarity function and a sharpening of class 
conflict with the state now involved in the conflict" 
[F,448]. By objective social justice, he meant a condi­
tion that, although it may be judged to be contributive 
to the common good, is brought about by forces other than 
the exercise of social justice. An economy organized on 
intelligent cooperation and motivated along functional 
lines would eliminate class conflict, be protective of 
subsidiarity,. be consonant with social justice, and 
therefore be the basis of a satisfying philosophy of 
labor. 
8. Consonant with the social principles put forth in the
soc-ial encyclicals. B. W. Dempsey himself, while admitting
they are not identical, perceive� the "intimate parallel"
in two analyses, that of von ThUnen and that of Pius XI
in Quadragesimo Anno; he quotes the following passage to
exemplify what is parallel:
Man's productive effort cannot yield its 
fruits unless a truly social and organic body 
exists, unless a social and juridical order 
watches over the exercise of work, unless the 
various occupations, being interdependent, 
cooperate with and mutually complete one 
another, and what is still more important, 
unless mind, material things, and work combine 
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and form as it were a single whole. Therefore, 
where the social and individual nature of work 
is neglected, it will be impossible to evalu-
ate work justly and pay it according to jus­
tice.26 
This does not mean to infer that B.W. Dempsey considered 
the wage contract unjust. Far from it, as he quotes the 
following from Pius XI, referring to it as being "clear" 
in itself and "common teaching among qualified Catholic 
scholars: 11 "the wage contract is not in itself an unjust 
contract. 1127 Commenting, he says, "participation, though
eminently desirable on many grounds, cannot be shown to 
be a matter of natural right and, apart from a specific 
contract freely entered into, is not a matter of commuta­
tive justice" (F, 264]. Yet, if the innovating function of 
the worker gives him the "ethical claim" to participate 
in "profits," as B.W. Dempsey seemingly indicates (cf. 
W,139], how can a wage contract which seemingly does not 
admit this function be just? 
How B.W. Dempsey would answer this is not precisely 
known.26 But his earlier well-stated position is clear.
"Certain programs, of which profit sharing is the most 
common and most successful, cannot be demonstrated to be 
obligatory in either commutative or social justice" 
(F, 204]. Yet, at the same time, he admits that these 
programs "may be of greatest practical benefit in 
creating an atmosphere in which these obligations are 
easily fulfilled." The following Papal quotation not 
only indicates B.W. Dempsey's position and reason for it, 
but gives the reason why he was "so pleased" to toil on 
The Frontier Wage. He was eager to find ways that the 
wage contract could be modified somewhat by a contract of 
partnership: 
In the present state of human society, how­
ever, we deem it advisable that the wage 
contract should when possible be modified 
26Quadragesimo Anno, No. 69, 74-75. 
27Quadragesimo Anno, No. 64 � F, 204. 
26Cf. The Functional Economy, Chapter II, "Basis of
Just Wage," pp. 204-277. 
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somewhat by a contract of partnership as is 
already being tried in various ways to no 
small gain both of the wage earners and of the 
employers. In this way, wage earners are made 
sharers in some sort in the ownership, or the 
management of the profits [F,205].29 
Does B.W. Dempsey's "functional wage theory's" use 
of the term "profit" fit into normal economic theory? 
According to the "functional approach" profits are a 
residual income created by the external innovations of 
the entrepreneur. When capital is borrowed, payment is 
made prior to the residual determination of profit in the 
form of interest -- "a tax on profits." When the worker 
makes internal innovations, the return to him can be a 
sharing in profits. But is this last real innovation? 
Where is the risk element? The noted authority A. 
Vermeesch indicates common traditional doctrine when he 
states that under the term "labor" there is included all 
those who supply labor, whether of a manual, intellectu­
al, or directive character. 30 Seemingly, B. W. Dempsey 
would grant that a worker may forego payment for his 
intellectual (innovating) endeavors as part of a wage 
contract. His worker is an innovator who assumes a 
certain "risk" by being willing to depend upon anticipat­
ed profits as part of his reward. B.W. Dempsey attempts 
to establish something other than a legal basis or 
agreement for. the worker's participation in profits. He 
bases it on the worker's economic function of being an 
internal innovator who assumes some risk because he 
forgoes his assured wage contract payment for the 
anticipated reward of "innovating" endeavors. 
, Assuming the worker as innovator, is there a real 
obligation in commutative justice to reward him by profit 
sharing? Certainly, labor's reward under the wage 
contract is determined by the value of the work, not by 
any right to the final product of his labor. Does this 
change? It would seem that labor, under the wage 
29Quadragesimo Anno, No. 65. 
30A. Vermeesch, Quaestiones de Justitia (Brugis:
Beyaert, 1901), p. 499 ff.; Cf. also his commentary on 
the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in "annotationses," 
Periodica, vol. XX (February, 1931). 
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contract, would have no right in commutative justice to 
demand any portion of profits while the old contract was 
in force. B.W. Dempsey looks upon profit sharing as a 
desirable goal in social justice, as an organizational 
means of changing the level of wages. Once the level is 
changed through an employer's action, is he not bound by 
the higher level in commutative justice? By then has it 
not become the "common estimation? 1131 
Does II income from superior worker efficiency"32 
fall under profits or economic rent? If it falls under 
economic rent, the "functional wage theory" fits more 
snugly into normal economic theory. Suppose the return 
that was expected by the employer from an excess of price 
over cost was to be derived not from an innovation by 
him, but from a higher level of efficiency that could be 
attributed solely to his own workers (not to his manage­
ment and not to workers in other plants). Would he be 
obliged in commutative justice to give such to his 
workers? Such a return of course would not come under 
the definition of a "profit." 
Would not the answer be that he would be obliged 
even though those workers were already receiving a living 
wage? Could he not consider this type of income to the 
workers of one particular firm over the level paid to 
workers in all firms and, therefore, over the common 
anticipated productivity of that type of worker, to be an 
economic rent because of a greater comparative efficiency 
in his workers?33 Economic rent, a differential sur­
plus, should be paid to that factor responsible for its 
31Cf. Chapter II, "The Just Price." 
32W, 182 -- "These [capital] sums are amassed at 
nobody's expense: they arise out of the efficiency 
earnings that are made possible by organization of free, 
self-determining persons." 
330. von Nell-Bruening, Reorganization of Social
Economy (transl. from German by B. W. Dempsey) (New York: 
Bruce, 1939), p. 169; "It is clear that efficiency must 
be compensated for. consequently, better performance can 
demand a higher compensation, and it is superfluous to 
state this explicitly." 
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existence. 34 Just as the renting of land of greater 
fertility demands a higher return, so workers with a 
higher efficiency that is relatively scarce may demand a 
singular reward additional to the wage commensurate with 
the common productivity of all workers. Is not the 
employee entitled in commutative justice to a wage that 
represents the economic value of his labor and to a rent 
that is due his particular service? 
Many probing questions could be added. Those above 
were not intended to exhaust the possibilities of B.W. 
Dempsey• s functional wage approach. They were rather 
leads which readily suggested themselves, built around 
the one topic or problem: B.W. Dempsey's concept of 
profit. 
Certainly, some of the above claims of making a 
contribution to wage theory seem valid. While it is too 
early -- The Frontier Wage was published late in 1960 -­
to make an adequate evaluation of his contribution, 
internal evidence gives indications of a real contribu­
tion. True evaluation of these claims must await the 
sifting of experts over a period of time. 
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